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 I explore the relationship between political instability and terrorism in this 
dissertation, using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which contains both domestic 
and transnational terrorism. I use the Political Instability Task Force data to measure 
political instability.  
 Breakdown theory suggests that the occurrence of political instability should 
increase levels of terrorism within a state, because when a rapid social change, such as 
political instability, occurs, there is a severing of social bonds that tie individuals to 
society. The effects of the disruption in controls should be to increase levels of non-
routine collective action, of which terrorism is a form (Durkheim, 1930 [1951]; Useem, 
1998). In addition, different types of instability ought to invite different levels of 
terrorism based on the degree of disruption to the societal controls. There are four types 
of political instability: ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide and adverse r gime 
change. Further, I extrapolate two theoretical extensions from the breakdown m del. The 
first extension is that more instability episodes should produce more terrorism within a 
state. The second extension is that when two or more instability episodes occur within a 
year, this increased temporal density should produce more terrorism than when one 
instability episode occurs within a year.  
 I test the theoretical framework using the negative binomial regression model
with country and time fixed effects. The first model contains control variables that 
measure country demographics, governance and contiguity to an unstable nation with 147 
states from 1970-2005. The second model examines the effects of control variables that 
measure the population age structure and social and economic development in a smaller 
sample of 116 states and years from 1981-2005. The third model adds ethnic minority 
group characteristics from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset and co tains 82 
countries from 1990-2005. This three-sample strategy allows me to speak to the omit ed
variable and sample selection biases that may impact the results. 
Empirical results demonstrate that political instability is an important predictor of 
terrorism incidents. The breakdown model itself is supported, but the extensions are not 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction and Theoretical Conceptualization 
Introduction 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an in-depth examination of the 
relationship between state instability and terrorism. I use the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), the most comprehensive open-source database on terrorism in the world with 
approximately 82,000 incidents, to measure domestic and transnational terrorism. I use 
the Political Instability Task Force data (PITF) to measure the occurrence of four types of 
political instability around the world: ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide and 
adverse regime change. I examine GTD data for the years from 1970-2005 for most 
nations around the world with more than 500,000 population.  
I examine the distribution of terrorism and state instability at the country-level 
using a modified breakdown theoretical framework. This framework is based especially 
upon the work of Emile Durkheim and was later modified by criminologist Bert Useem 
(Durkheim, 1930 [1951]; Useem, 1998). In brief, at the macro-level, when rapid social 
change occurs, like state instability, some societies cannot absorb the disruptive effects to 
the social order. When the rapid social change occurs, the social ties that bond individuals 
to conventional society may disintegrate; individuals may also decline to engage in new 
conventional commitments to society. This freeing of individuals from the constraints of 
conventional society allows them to take on non-routine collective action, such as 
collective violence, rioting and terrorism. On average, according to the modified 




forms of non-routine collective action) than states that are politically stble. I turn now to 
a review of my analytic and methodological strategy.  
The main independent variable of interest is the occurrence of any of four types of 
state instability, as measured by the Political Instability Task Force data. The four types 
are ethnic war, revolutionary war, genocide and adverse regime change. If more than one 
episode of instability co-occurred or occurred within five years, the instability was 
termed “complex” by PITF and treated as analytically inseparable. The dep ndent 
variable is the frequency of terrorism incidents worldwide as measured by the Global 
Terrorism Database. For control variables, I draw mainly from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset.  
I conduct a multi-pronged set of analyses. First, I conduct the Model 1 analysis 
with a small set of control variables that measure country demographics, governance and 
contiguity characteristics on Sample 1 which is composed of 147 of the 164 possible 
states from 1970 - 2005. 1 Second, I run Model 2 which contains the population age 
structure and social and economic development variables on Sample 2, which contains a 
smaller sample of 116 states and years from 1981-2005 for which more complete data 
exist. Third, I conduct the Model 3 analysis with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data
control variables on ethnic minority group characteristics for Sample 3, which contains 
an even smaller collection of 82 states and years from 1990-2005. Fourth, to ensure that 
statistical inferences are appropriately made between the different models, I replicate the 
Model 1 analysis on the smaller samples analyzed in Models 2 and 3. This multi-pronged 
analysis gives me the flexibility to test important control variables whose data coverage 
                                                        





are restricted to very small samples of the data as well as to conduct a basic nalysis that 
includes many of the states most likely to experience state instability. It also informs the 
Model 1 analysis on the role that omitted variable bias plays in those results upon 
comparison to the subset analyses. By comparing the Model 1 results using Samples 1, 2, 
and 3, I can also examine the effects of sample selection bias. 
Because the dependent variable is a count of the number of terrorism incidents per 
state-year, I use the appropriate statistical analyses for such a variable. These include the 
Poisson, the pooled negative binomial, the zero-inflated Poisson, the zero-inflated 
negative binomial models, the random effects negative binomial and the fixed effects 
negative binomial. I do the relevant model-fit testing and diagnostics to choose the bes  
model for the data, including how to best deal with the lack of independence between 
state-year observations. To address the dependency across countries, I use fixed-effects 
negative binomial regression, which only utilizes the within-country variation to estimate 
the models. I also include time fixed effects in these models. Finally, the results are 
presented and conclusions and policy recommendations drawn.  
Theoretical Conceptualization 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will review how terrorism and political instability are defined in 
this study. I will also review the reasons that have been given in the policy literature for 
expecting a relationship between state instability and terrorism as well as the criticisms of 
this relationship that have been discussed in the literature. Further, I will discuss the 
macro-level theoretical framework. This is a modified breakdown theory model. I turn 




Definition of Terrorism 
 In the current research I define terrorism as “the threatened or actualuse of illegal 
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social 
goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). The data set 
that I use here is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the largest open-source database 
of terrorism incidents in the world. It includes both domestic and transnational terrorism 
incidents from around the world from 1970 to 2007. The GTD is an incident-level 
database, meaning that the unit of analysis and collection is the individual terrorism 
incident. Information collected about each terrorism incident includes the basic who, 
what, where, and when, such as the date, city, and country of the incident, type of attack, 
target detail, weapon detail and information about the perpetrators, if any is available. I 
turn now to the definition of state instability.  
Definition of State Instability 
 One of the earliest discussions of instability in the foreign policy sphere is 
Helman and Ratner (1992) in Foreign Policy. They defined a failed nation-state as one 
which is “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international 
community” (Helman and Ratner, 1992: 3). This includes the breakdown of civil order, 
government functioning and economic deprivation which themselves can each lead to 
violence and anarchy. Once the state is seized by widespread violence, the outflow of 
refugees and outbreaks of random warfare and human rights violations can threaten to 
spread the violence to other nations in the region. In practice, this picture of state 
instability, also called coercive incapacity, is often divided into two conceptual 




entirety of its territory, called loss of territorial integrity. The second dimension is the loss 
of the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. This second dimension means that the
government of the state must be the only executors of legal force in the state, with no
sub-state groups laying claim to such a right (Piazza, 2008). Helman and Ratner (1992) 
closed their famous article by arguing that failed and failing states con tituted such a 
threat to international security that the United Nations ought to intervene to save or fix 
these failed and failing states.  
The idea of fixing or even preventing states from failing proved to be interesting 
enough to the foreign policy world that in the mid-1990s, Vice President Al Gore 
commissioned a task force to study the problem and to attempt to predict the 
phenomenon. The State Failure Task Force was convened in 1994 and involved 
academic, policy and methodology experts. Over time, they broadened their focus to 
include not only “extreme state failure” but to include bouts of political instability and the 
term “state failure” was abandoned in favor of state instability or fragility (Marshall, 
2009a: PITF data page). The Task Force changed its name to the Political Insabi ity Task 
Force after it broadened its focus. 
The Political Instability Task Force defines political instability as “civil conflicts, 
political crises, and massive human rights violations that are typically associ ted with 
state breakdown” (Esty et al., 1995: 1). This broad definition of state instability is 
operationalized as the presence or absence of any of four conflict events: (1) e hnic war, 
(2) revolutionary war, (3) adverse regime change or (4) genocide as well as (5) a 
combination of any of those discrete events termed “complex”. The Political Inst bility 




greater than 500,000 population between 1970 and 2007. They were collected both 
retrospectively and prospectively by a consortium of academic experts and Central 
Intelligence Agency intelligence experts. In the next section, I will discuss how state 
instability and terrorism may be related to one another.  
Connecting State Instability and Terrorism 
  The general interest in a connection between state instability and terrorism 
among those in the public policy world is intimately tied to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Hehir, 2007). In fact, state failure had been regarded as a 
marginalized topic of study prior to September 11. After those terrorist attacks, however, 
failed states quickly came to be regarded as “more threatening” than stable states (Hehir, 
2007). This was due to the seemingly free operation of training camps in the Sudan and 
Afghanistan by al Qaida and leader Osama bin Laden (Newman, 2007). More generally, 
failed states have been accused of incubating terror by transnational terrorist 
organizations by offering them safe havens or operational bases. These states have al o 
been accused of allowing transnational crime syndicates to operate within their borders, 
which may fund and provide recruits for the terror groups (Piazza, 2008). Further, 
because these states are often actively at war with sub-state groups, there may be 
increased access to arms trafficking and illicit funding for terror activities. Finally, failed 
states may be sites where weapons of mass destruction can be acquired locally or from 
smuggling abroad (Newman, 2007). This long list of serious dangers in the current policy 
literature applies mostly to the threat of transnational terrorist events, par icularly against 




 However, the connection between domestic terrorist events is also quite important 
and perhaps more theoretically relevant. In other words, when a state experiences 
breakdown in its ability to govern and function, it should stimulate attacks against it that 
occurs within its own borders. Instability could also stimulate transnational attacks 
against other states that are planned and equipped domestically. Further, this could take 
the form of attacks that occur on domestic soil but are conducted against targets that 
represent another nation on domestic soil, such as attacks on McDonalds or foreign 
embassies. This is what I expect given the modified breakdown theoretical perspective 
adopted here (Durkheim, 1930 [1951]; Useem, 1998). Piazza (2007) also expected this 
when he suggested that state instability at home could make conditions that are conducive 
to “creating” a terrorist as well as providing a wealth of opportunity for terrorist 
organizations to flourish. In addition, he argued that in failed and failing states, there is 
little to no provision of basic human needs (administrative incapacity) nor are there 
effective or legitimate government institutions. This power and legitimacy vacuum, 
combined with little human security or economic and occupational opportunity, can 
provide sufficient motivation for potential terrorist action against governments. Further, 
the lack of security can allow terrorist groups to move, recruit and attack with impun ty 
(Piazza, 2007). In the next section, I will review the major alternative hypot eses 
regarding the relationship between state instability and terrorism.  
 Challenges to State Instability and Terrorism 
 The state instability and terrorism nexus has not gone unchallenged in the policy 
and scholarly literature. The first set of critiques primarily comes from those who are 




terrorism against another state, typically the United States. For example, both Menkhaus 
(2003) and von Hippel (2002) remained skeptical of the nexus between state failure and 
transnational terrorism. This is because transnational terrorist groups, as foreigners, may 
be more conspicuous in such a state than in a more stable state. It also could overexpose 
the group to international counter-terrorism efforts, because the state government is too 
weak to repel such international advances. Instead, Menkhaus (2003) suggested that 
transnational terrorism is more likely to flourish in quasi-states – those with neither a 
fully functioning nor non-functioning government (see also Hehir, 2007). These are states 
in which the government itself is weak, but not floundering, and corrupt but able to 
provide some coercive and territorial control. In addition, failed and failing states may be 
best used as transit stations for smuggling men, money and arms into nearby states. 
 Alternately, Schneckener (2004) suggested that modern transnational terrorism is 
planned and coordinated across many states, both failed or failing and stable states. 
Newman (2007) suggested that the governments of failed states may actually welcome 
such groups because they are sympathetic to their ideological causes, rather than being 
unwilling, exploited victims, such as in Afghanistan and Sudan. He further suggested that 
the lack of operating governments and social institutions may be incidental or that it may 
be an enabling factor rather than a necessary cause. Most of the objections discus e  
above specifically refer to transnational terrorism networks. In the next section, I discuss 
the critiques of the state instability connection with terrorism more broadly.  
 The following critiques apply to both domestic and transnational terrorism. 
Menkhaus (2003) and von Hippel (2002) both suggested that terrorism may be less likely 




against third-party states’ intervention or the policing of transnational terrorist 
organizations. In addition, both of those authors asserted that it is likely unpleasant to 
operate in the chaos of everyday life that exists in such a state. In addition, the 
assumption that terrorists naturally want to operate in an environment of chaos and 
anarchy is probably questionable (Menkhaus, 2003). Though such an environment could 
lessen the probability of detection and capture by authorities, it also could increase th  
chances that group members are caught up in the violence and chaos there. Finally, Hehir 
(2007) noted that since state failure has multiple causes and contributing factors, it is 
unlikely that there would be a single path between state failure and terrorism.  
The final challenge to the state instability – terrorism nexus is discussed below.
Simply put, there is little conceptual clarity to the term “failed / unstable / failing state”. It 
could mean coercive capacity – the loss of territorial integrity within a state and the loss 
of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. On the other hand, administrative 
incapacity is also defensible– the inability to make collective decisions, to carry out the 
social contract and to deliver service goods to the public. Still further, the concept could 
include legitimacy so that the citizens of the state know that their government is the only 
one who can act with force and legitimate power against individuals and groups within 
their state. Finally, it is still unclear the degree to which these incapacities may be related 
to one another (Hehir, 2007). Overall, the critiques to the instability – terrorism 
relationship are not without merit. Yet, the reality of terrorism that either occurs in an 
unstable state or is launched from an unstable state, such as the attacks of September 11, 




Conceptualization of State Instability 
As discussed above, the operationalization of state instability used in this 
dissertation is that of the Political Instability Task Force – namely, the presence of 
revolutionary war, ethnic war, genocide, or adverse regime change. In this study, I adopt 
the legitimacy conceptualization of state instability. This conceptualization views state 
instability as one in which the government is not able to compel conformity in its citizens 
actions due to its inability to operate in an effective or legal manner. Ethnic and 
revolutionary wars against the state clearly demonstrate that the state has lost its ability to 
prevent its citizens from illegally taking up arms against it and any other groups within its 
borders. Genocides demonstrate that the government has improperly used force against 
its own citizens by slaughtering them. Adverse regime change operationalizes a lack of 
legitimacy, because it involves situations in which the state has experienced dramatic 
changes in its governmental system that would not likely occur in a functioning and 
effective government. These four operationalizations represent a broad, but relevant 
interpretation of a loss of legitimacy. In the next section, I review and discuss the 
theoretical framework used in this study – the modern breakdown model. I choose this 
particular model as it provides the best explanations for how and why I expect stat 
instability to increase terrorism.  
Breakdown Model 
Classical Breakdown Model 
The classic conception of the breakdown model is that individuals are more likely 
to engage in collective action when their ties to society have diminished (Durkheim, 1930 
[1951]). The disintegration of social ties occurs when rapid social change takes pl c  




absorb the effects of these changes. Instead, these social changes cause ruptures in the 
basic social order. The ruptures themselves cause tension and strain. The strains motivate 
people towards collective action. In the classic conception, collective action includes both 
positive and negative forms – that is, it includes social movements, such as participation 
in non-violent protests for civil rights, and destructive collective action, such as rioting 
and civil disorder. There are structural and individual-level consequences to these 
disruptions; the individual feels strain, which is interpreted as alienation or deprivation, 
and the society loses its binding power over its citizens through its formal and informal 
institutions. This loosening of ties makes individuals more likely to participate in 
movements because of the weakened ties and because of the new lack of community 
commitments (Durkheim, 1930 [1951]; Snow et al., 1998). In the next section, I review 
the more modern conception of the breakdown model. 
Modern Breakdown Model 
The first main difference between the classical and the modern breakdown model 
is that strain and breakdown are now conceptualized as separate but at times, overlapping 
results of rapid social change. Strain is a broad term that encompasses many frustrations 
and occurs as a result of rapid social change. Breakdown is narrower and is specifically, 
the disintegration of social ties between the individual and society (Snow et al., 1998). 
The second main difference was demonstrated in a seminal work by Useem (1998) which 
proffered that the “heart” of breakdown theory is that there is a difference betw en 
“routine” and “non-routine” collective action. Routine collective actions are positive 
forms of collective action, like social movements, non-violent protests, strikes and rallies. 
Non-routine collective actions are those that more seriously contravene social norms, 




– for routine collective action, individuals do not need to free themselves from the 
constraints of society to act. For non-routine collective action, they do. In fact, non-
routine collective action is the result of this breakdown of social norms, but routine 
collective action does not emerge from the severing of social bonds. On the contrary, 
routine collective action comes from the strengthening and reinforcement of solidarity in 
these social bonds. For routine collective action, it is likely that some pre-existing formal 
and informal organization will help to bring about collective action. There is no obvious 
need for pre-existing organization (which may even be inhibiting) in non-routine 
collective action.  
Formally, the Useem (1998) interpretation of the breakdown model is that non-
routine collective action may occur when individuals are no longer controlled by the
formal and informal social controls that bind them to society. The ties to society can be 
and often are severed in times of rapid social change, such as in times of social 
disorganization or mass unemployment like the Great Depression (Useem, 1980). Once 
the controls are disrupted, it is more likely, but not certain that individuals will engag  in 
non-routine collective action such as rent and food riots and disturbances at relief centers 
(and possibly crime as well; Piven and Cloward, 1977). Overall, the modified breakdown 
theory gives us reason to expect that terrorism, a non-routine collective action, should be 
more likely to occur during times of instability, which is when a nation is experiencing 
breakdown in formal and informal controls.  
State Instability and Terrorism 
 State instability is measured by the presence or absence of the following f ur 
conditions, revolutionary war, ethnic war, genocide, and adverse regime change – or 




events certainly meet the criteria to be considered rapid social change of the kind that can 
cause breakdown, the severing of social ties from the individual to the community. Thus, 
the modern variant of the breakdown model would predict that individuals living in an 
unstable state should be more likely to engage in non-routine collective action than those 
living in a stable state. Terrorism is clearly a form of non-routine collective action. As 
shown in figure 1, the causal path from these models constitutes the following: rapid 
social change measured as instability leads to the severing of social ties and the absence 
of formation of new conventional social ties which frees an individual to non-routine 
collective action, which is measured here as terrorism.  
 
Figure 1. Modified breakdown theory relating state instability and terrorism. 
The solid arrow represents causal pathways that I will test in this study by relating state 
instability to terrorism. The dashed arrows represent the mechanisms that the modified 
breakdown theory predicts are responsible for the macro-level relationship between 
political instability and terrorism. Although I cannot test these mechanisms, I find it 





Extensions to the Breakdown Model 
In addition to the existing breakdown framework, I sketch out two logical 
extensions of the breakdown model and test them in this dissertation. Breakdown 
suggests that rapid social change should increase non-routine collective action, because 
the rapid social change loosens the controls on the behavior of individuals. I extrapolate 
from this two more theoretical expectations. First, more terrorism should result from two 
or more instabilities in a relatively short timeframe than that which results from just one 
instability episode during that time. This is because as the state experiences more 
breakdown, the constraints that bind individuals to society should be further degraded. As 
the controls to conventional society are ground down, non-routine collective actions, like 
terrorism should increase.  
Second, the shorter the time frame in which multiple instabilities occur, the more 
terrorism incidents should be expected; that is, the temporal density of the multiple 
instabilities should have an effect on terrorism. In this study, temporal density refers to 
the number of instability episodes that occur within the same year. If a state experiences 
multiple instabilities in a year, it should be sent into a downward spiral of negative 
consequences like non-routine collective action as the controls in society are destroyed. 
In this case, more temporally dense instabilities should result in even more terrism. 
These theoretical extrapolations are derived as logical extensions of breakdown theory 
and will be tested in this dissertation. In the next chapter, I will review the empirical 





Review of Empirical Literature 
Introduction 
In chapter 1, I described the theoretical conceptualization supporting the proposed 
research. Key concepts include terrorism, state instability, and breakdown theory. In the 
next section, I review the empirical research that addresses the relationship, if any, 
between state instability and terrorism. I first examine the relativ y sparse literature on 
state instability and terrorism, which will be followed by a brief review of the predictors 
of state instability, and a review of the tests of breakdown theory. 
Empirical Tests of State Instability and Terrorism 
 There is a small but growing empirical literature on state instability and terrorism. 
However, there is no worldwide, historical and modern test of the relationship that 
includes both domestic and transnational terrorism. Yet, there is a small literture that 
addresses the relationship in the Middle Eastern context, that predicts terrorit gr up 
formation, and that predicts transnational terrorism worldwide. I begin with several 
studies that directly related state instability and terrorism. 
 Piazza (2007) evaluated whether democracy promotion in failed states in the 
Middle East had its post-9/11 anticipated effect of decreasing the levels of terrorism 
experienced in those states. He defined failed states primarily as havingadministrative 
incapacity, the inability to deliver the basic political goods a state is expect d to provide, 
such as personal security. He proffered two pathways between terrorism and state 
instability. First, state instability could help to generate the conditions hat create 




terrorist groups and networks if they were to move there. Once the terrorists are 
established in the state, the state would be unable to oust them.  
Further, Piazza (2007) suggested that as the public witnessed the inability to 
remove the terrorist element from the failed state, the government of that state would lose 
legitimacy, the power to compel conformity in its citizens and may unintentionally spur 
some citizens toward terrorism. Once the state’s authority had been so undermined, they 
would be unable to maintain control over many forms of civil strife or to prevent further 
strife through the power of deterrence or the power of adequate law enforcement. 
Terrorists could also exploit the outer façade of sovereignty of the ostensibly failed state 
to obtain legal documents that would make their operations easier.  
 Piazza (2007) used the Political Instability Task Force Data (also used in this 
study) as his measure of state instability. He formed an additive index to create an 
intensity scale, which was scored from 0-4 for each type of instability (adverse r gime 
change, ethnic war, genocide, and revolutionary war). However, he only used the data 
from Middle Eastern nations. For his terrorism data, he used the RAND-MIPT data. He 
hypothesized that state instabilities from 1972-2003 in the 19 countries analyzed would 
be positively related to the domestic and transnational terrorism incidents. It is important 
to note that from 1972 to 1997, the RAND-MIPT data did not systematically include 
domestic terrorism in their data collection. Thus, the analysis included only transnatio al 
terrorism from 1972 to 1997, and from 1998 to 2003, the analysis included both domestic 





Using a pooled time series negative binomial regression analysis, Piazza (2007) 
found a positive relationship between terrorism and instability, except when he included 
lagged prior levels of terrorism. Further, state instability was the most consistent 
predictor of levels of terrorism in the models. He also examined the effects of instability 
on the existence of terrorist groups that the RAND-MIPT analysts considered as having 
the home base in that country. He found that those Middle Eastern countries that were 
experiencing state instability were more likely to host groups that committed terror 
attacks domestically and transnationally. In addition, the unstable Middle Eastrn states 
were also more likely to be attacked by groups from other states.  
This study suffers from several drawbacks. First, it is not clear why he only 
utilized data from the Middle East, because both the terrorism and state instability 
databases have data for the vast majority of all states in the world. Further, it is important 
to note that though his transnational terrorism incident data covered the period from 
1972-2003, the RAND-MIPT domestic terrorism data only covered the period from 
1998-2003. Due to the limitations of the RAND-MIPT data, Piazza (2007) is unable to 
truly examine the domestic nature of the relationship between state instabilty and 
terrorism. Though this empirical study was limited both geographically and conceptually, 
the relationship between state instability and terrorism passed a crucial fi st test.  
 Piazza (2008) further explored this relationship in a subsequent article. In this 
second article, he conceptualized the relationship between terrorism and state instability 
as one of coercive incapacity rather than administrative incapacity. That is, he 
conceptualized the relationship as one initiated by the fragile state’s inability to maintain 




 In this analysis, Piazza (2008) utilized the Fragile State Index (FSI) for the year 
2006. The FSI provides a four tier ordinal scale of the level of instability based on 12 
social, economic and political / military indicators. The categories in order f seriousness 
include Alert, Warning, Monitoring and Sustainable. For his terrorism incidents database, 
Piazza used the RAND-MIPT transnational terrorism incidents from 2000-2006. First, he 
included transnational terrorist incidents that occurred in the state in question. Sec d, he 
included incidents launched by groups whose home base was evaluated by the RAND-
MIPT as having been in the state in question but whose incidents had taken place in other 
nations.  
Piazza (2008) hypothesized that fragile states would be more likely to be the 
location of transnational terrorist attacks and more likely to be the source of transnational 
terrorist attacks on other nations. This hypothesis was supported. On average, Alert 
countries were more than 3 times as likely to be the site of transnational terroris  attacks 
and more than twice as likely to be the host to a group which committed transnational 
terrorist attacks than states in the Monitoring or Warning category. In addition, the top 5 
most fragile states in the FSI were the most likely to be targeted as the location and to be 
the source of transnational terrorism.  
 In a secondary analysis, Piazza (2008) also re-examined the Political Instability 
Task Force data and created an additive scale to form categories of states based on the 
intensity of their instability. Using the ITERATE transnational terrorism database and a 
host of controls, he found that states with more intense state instabilities were mor  likely 
to have transnational terrorism incidents originate in their borders. They wer also more 




places. Further, quasi or weak states did not experience markedly more terrorism 
incidents. Piazza (2008) concluded that state instability is an important dimension of 
transnational terrorism.  
 However, this study has several drawbacks. First, in the primary analysis, the 
causal ordering of state instability measured only in 2006 and terrorism measured from 
2000-2006 is at best, contemporaneous and at worst, reversed. Second, by creating an 
additive scale of the intensity ratings of four very different types of instability in the PITF 
data, he equated them as if they were similar or equally likely. In fact, each type of 
instability is not equally likely to occur in any given state. He also seemed to examine 
more states (195) than are available in the PITF data from 1991-2003 (162). Finally, this 
analysis necessarily excluded incidents where the perpetrating group and therefore, the 
nationality of the group were not known. This is a very serious under-counting of 
potentially informative incidents. In the end, however, these are drawbacks in what is 
nevertheless an interesting and informative analysis.  
 Marshall (2002) briefly examined the connection between state instability and 
terrorism using the Political Instability Task Force Data in a larger analysis of the 
predictors of global terrorism. For his terrorism data, he compiled his own domestic and 
transnational data set using the Keesing’s World Archives from 1991 to 2000. He defined 
the terrorism concept to exclude incidents in which the victims were not civilian or non-
combatant populations.  
Overall, Marshall (2002) found that the predictors of state instability and 
terrorism were quite similar. Specifically regarding terrorism, he found that armed 




data) was positively and significantly related to the incidence of terrorism in the state. He 
also found that a history of ethnic and revolutionary war or adverse regime change within 
the state itself increased the probability that terrorism would occur there lat . 
Finally, Marshall (2002) attempted to differentiate between Collective Political 
Violence that included violence against civilians by state or non-state actors, like rebel 
groups, and terrorism proper. Very little was able to differentiate between them. States 
that experience terrorism relative to the lower level collective political v olence with 
some violence against civilians were more likely to have advanced or post-industrial 
economies, but these incidents were less likely to draw fatalities. These states were also 
more likely to be democracies with lower quality of life, youth unemployment, 
systematic ethnic discrimination in the political and economic sphere, to have a larg r 
agricultural sector, to be more likely to be involved in international violence and wars, 
and to have a relatively higher proportion of autocracies in their immediate region. 
Though this was not a direct test of the instability – terrorism nexus, it did demonstrate 
the importance of diffusion of armed conflict over borders and of the history of armed 
conflict or regime changes in predicting later terrorism incidents.  
Newman (2007) conducted a simple test of the state instability - terrorism nexus. 
Conceptually, Newman viewed the state instability issue as one of safe-haven. Without 
the justice apparatus to prevent and deter the settlement of transnational terrorists within 
the borders of the state, transnational terrorists could train and even settle there. However, 
he did point out that, even in Afghanistan and the Sudan, the government may have 




most terrorism occurs domestically against the domestic government and businesses, h  
questioned the analytical usefulness of the instability – terrorism nexus.  
 For his simple test, Newman (2007) examined groups in the RAND-MIPT 
Terrorist Organization Profiles and 84 other groups that were listed on the American, 
United Kingdom and European Union’s terrorism watch lists. Using a subsample of 54 
terrorist organizations that had conducted incidents which claimed fatalities, he looked at 
the data and found that the more dangerous groups were more likely to have originated 
from states with weakened state capacity as judged by the Failed Stat s Index’s Conflict 
Assessment Tool. Further, if the European nationalist and ideological groups from the 
developed world were excluded from the subsample, weak states were more likely to host 
the base of operations for one of these groups. However, Newman concluded that 
although terrorist groups do sometimes operate in these types of states, at best, instability 
is only an enabling condition and did not approach necessity or sufficiency. Further, 
terrorist organizations certainly operated in stable and functioning states. He concluded 
that there were clearly important intervening variables in the relationship between state 
instability and terrorism.  
 However, this study does not represent a strong test of the instability – terrorism 
relationship. In fact, it is unclear whether the author undertook an actual data nalysis or 
test; from the description, it seemed as if he simply visually inspected the da a. Further, 
his sample of groups included those that do not perform acts of terrorism but who utilized 
terrorist-type rhetoric. This is due to the inclusion of the United Kingdom’s watch list, 




drawbacks of the study, Newman (2007) contributed to the debate by problematizing the 
importance of these types of states.  
 Tikusis (2009) reevaluated the skepticism with which Newman (2007) 
approached the state instability - terrorism link. Tikusis saw the instability and terrorism 
relationship as one of the conditions that enable existing terrorist groups to function, 
particularly due to population displacement, group grievances, inconsistent economi 
development and lack of public services and security. However, he took issue with the 
Newman (2007) contention that if a state did not host a major terrorist group (the 
foundation of the Newman analysis) that it negated any relationship between instability 
and terrorism incidents themselves.  
 Tikusis (2009) tested the instability – terrorism incident link with 2 years of data. 
He utilized the Fragile States Index rankings for 2006 and 2007 – looking at states ranked 
over 90 on that scale. He then compared the data for these weak and failing states to the 
RAND-MIPT terrorism incident data (both domestic and transnational) for 2005 and 
2006 using a cluster-analysis. Tikusis found that weaker states were significantly more 
likely to have experienced fatal terrorism incidents than relatively stronger states. In fact, 
none of the “most stable” states experienced any fatal terrorism incidents while only one 
of the fifteen “stable” states experienced fatal terrorism for those years. However, weak 
states did not differ significantly from stronger states in the actual number of fatalities 
experienced for those fatal incidents. Weak states were only slightly more likely to have 
experienced terrorism incidents regardless of whether they drew fatalities.  
Finally, Tikusis (2009) examined whether there were any differences between 




Terrorist Organization Profiles) and weak states that did not host a major terroris  g oup 
on the 12 sub-indicators that make up the Fragile States Index ranking tool. He found that 
terrorist group-hosting weak states were slightly less likely to have exp ri nced a sharp 
and / or severe economic decline on the FSI. They were also more likely to have 
experienced political instability and violence. Overall, though, there were few diferences 
between weak states that hosted major terrorist groups and those that did not. Tikusis 
concluded by “unequivocally” asserting a relationship between weakness of states and 
the occurrence of fatal terrorism incidents.  
In a final simple assessment of the strength of the relationship, LaFree, Dugan and 
Fahey (2008) used the Political Instability Task Force data to examine the rlationship 
between state instability and terrorism via the Global Terrorism Database from 1970-
1997. The terrorism data were first categorized into two groups: those states th t ver 
experienced an episode of instability from 1970 to 1997, even if only for a year (ever 
failing) and those that never experienced an episode of instability from 1970 to 1997 
(never failing). The number of incidents (or fatalities) was then averaged over the number 
of states in each category. From 1970 to 1978, never failing states experienced more 
terrorism incidents and more fatalities than ever failing states, though levels of terrorism 
and fatalities were low in both categories. However, from approximately 1978 onwards, 
the levels of both terrorism incidents and fatalities in ever failing states grew to surpass 
those in never failing states.  
In a second analysis, the researchers re-classified states as “in filure” only for the 
years in which they experienced the episode of instability. States were classified as “out 




fatalities) was then averaged over the number of states in each category. Of the top 25 
countries with the most terrorism incidents, 15 of those countries had experienced at least
one year of instability and 12 states had experienced at least one decade of instability. 
The instability – terrorism incidents and fatalities relationships were even clearer when a 
state was “switched out of failure” when the instability episode ended. For incidents and 
fatalities, in-failure states far surpassed out of failure states in incidents and fatalities for 
nearly the entire post-1978 series. No explanation was offered, however, for why the 
relationship between instability and terrorism took root only in the post-1978 period. 
LaFree, Dugan and Fahey’s (2008) simple test suggested that state instability and 
terrorism are linked for at least some states and some times. 
In a related study, Fahey, LaFree and Dugan (2007) examined whether there wer  
differences by type of instability in the time-trend relationship between state instability 
and terrorism. Overwhelmingly, they found that the meat of the relationship between 
instability and terrorism was in the complex category of instability. The stat s that 
experienced the most terrorism were those which had ever experienced a complex 
instability. Recall that the complex instability is made up of states which experienced two 
or more instabilities in the same year or within five years of one another. T y also 
examined whether the timing of the instability mattered; they tested both lagged and 
“early” timing formulations of instability. That is, they examined time trends when the 
currently in fragility status was turned on a year before the instability started and turned 
off a year before it ended as well as models in which the instability start year was lagged 
one year and ended one year late. None of the timing measures seemed to matter, 




the same despite the timing of the instability indicator. This small study further endorsed 
the value of examining the state fragility and terrorism relationship, particul rly research 
which disaggregated the complex category by type and state-year.  
Though the empirical literature on state instability and terrorism is modest, it has 
shed light on the utility of further examination of this connection. There does appear to be 
some support from the current literature for a significant relationship between state 
instability and terrorism, but further and deeper analysis is needed to flesh ut the 
parameters of this relationship. In the next section, I will briefly review the predictors of 
state instability. 
Empirical Predictors of State Instability 
 Predicting state instability is certainly not the main focus here. Yet, in order to 
guard against omitted variable bias, it is important to include variables in my models that 
measure each of the domains that are related to both state instability and terrorism. I now 
turn to a brief review of the predictors of state instability.  
The original purpose of the Political Instability Task Force was to find the 
predictors that signaled the onset of state failure. It was believed at the time that there 
was likely some combination of factors that would warn policy makers that failure was 
imminent (Marshall, 2009a). These policy makers would then presumably send in the 
appropriate resources to forestall the failure. However, this process would not end up 
being as simple as it first seemed. The Task Force spent years working on a d refining 
both technically simple and complicated models for simple post-diction within-sample. 
Within-sample post-diction consists of splitting the sample between earlier data, for 




and economic demographics that are able to predict the onset of instability in the later 
data from 2001 to 2003. However, a full early warning system for detecting an imminent 
instability and sounding the alarm has not been put into place. However, the Task Force 
members have been able to come up with a set of variables that are able to post-dict 
reasonably well within-sample. I present the recent results of those efforts below. 
 Goldstone et al. (2005) examined the onset of instability from 1955-2003 using a 
case control method. They sought to identify the risk factors for instability two ears 
prior to the event occurrence. Over that time period, the PITF data includes 111 adverse
regime changes, 74 ethnic wars, 62 revolutionary wars and 40 genocides. Because these 
events can and do overlap within-country and within-year, there were a total of 141 
instability episodes. Their two-year post-diction models achieved 80% accuracy. 
Instability was fairly evenly distributed over time, save for a peak in the early 1990s. This 
peak was then followed by a declining trajectory. Regionally, sub-Saharan Africa led 
with 35% of the instability episodes.  
 Goldstone et al. (2005) used case control matching with logistic regression to 
analyze their data. They matched country-years with instability to stable country-years 
(no instability for two years prior and four years hence). They determined that further 
breaking down of instability into its four categories (ethnic and revolutionary war, 
adverse regime change and genocide) was extraneous, because the models did not differ 
across type of instability. Out of the many variables they tested in their models, there 
were only four important factors.  
The most important predictor of state instability was the nature of the regime type. 




Yet, full democracies were 3-5 times more likely to experience instability in the next two 
years than full autocracies. However, partial democracies were at evn higher risk of 
instability. Partial democracies were those regimes in which there were elections with 
unobstructed political participation, but they fell short of full democracy otherwise. 
Similarly, partial democracies beset by factionalism had the highest odd  of experiencing 
instability. Partial democracies with factionalism are those nations where ethnic or other 
groups control the political system such that the special interests of the group in power 
are promoted and in-group members are held in higher esteem than out-group members. 
Partial autocracies (those which allow competitive elections or substantial political 
openness but not both) were also at increased risk of instability.  
Infant mortality was also an important predictor. Nations at the seventy-fifth 
percentile of infant mortality (compared to the twenty-fifth) had 4-7 times higher odds of 
experiencing instability two years hence (Goldstone et al., 2005). Though this fac or 
could be proxying for many concepts, they believed that it referenced the level of 
economic development in the nation. Countries with four or more neighboring countries 
experiencing instability were far more likely to experience instabiliy themselves. Finally, 
nations that have discriminated against ethnic minorities living within their borders were 
twice as likely to experience instability in the next two years.  
 Marshall and Cole (2008) examined state instability and conflict around the world 
between 1995 and 2007 and its relationship with income. Though Marshall works 
regularly with the PITF data, he utilized a different measure of state instab lity for this 
paper. The authors made use of the State Instability Matrix which rates st t  both on 




development, and social development. This is a broad but classic view of the concept. 
They found that states with higher GDP per capita were much less likely to experience 
instability. However, there was very wide variation on instability scores for all income 
levels. That is, income is certainly a factor, but it cannot be the only good predicto . 
Some states with high income per capita had less than ideal-instability scores whilst some 
states with low income per capita were more stable than expected. Marshall nd Cole also 
examined the instability scores for oil-producing nations (in which their annual et 
production was at 10 or more barrels per capita) and found that only three had the 
instability scores that their income level would have predicted; the rest were far more 
prone to instability. Those three nations were Denmark, Russia and Kazakhstan. Overall, 
the relationship between income and state instability is complicated, and it is far from a 
perfect predictor.  
 Finally, Marshall (2008) issued a report on the systemic risk of instability using 
the PITF data. He reviewed the extant literature on the subject and concluded that periods 
of instability most often followed a prior period of less severe political instability, rather 
than stability. He suggested that instability tended to break out most often in relatively 
newer autocratic states or states with factionalism problems (when a state’s political 
system is dominated by an ethnic or other specialized group and the government is usd 
to pursue the specialized interests of that group). This is because instability ended to 
happen in states which either moved further towards autocracy to consolidate their 
disorder (adverse regime change) or ethnic or revolutionary war broke out when the 
factionalism in the system proved untenable. The results he reviewed demonstrated how 




voice. These actions can polarize the citizenry and the political society until a spark sets 
the tension aflame into ethnic or revolutionary war. Once the instability begins to set in, it 
tends to persist over time. He concluded that it is important to address the predisposing 
factors so that the process could be cut off before it could cascade into more and new 
problems.  
The Marshall (2008) review of the literature hints at the possibly distinct causal 
factors that may be behind the different types of instability. If there ar distinct causes, it 
is important for me to disaggregate the instability independent variable into its 
component types (adverse regime change, ethnic or revolutionary war, and genocide) to 
assess any differential effects on the prediction of terrorism incidents worldwide. I will 
briefly examine the literature on each different type of instability from the PITF data. 
Empirical Predictors of the Types of State Instability 
Civil Wars: Ethnic and Revolutionary War 
 I will first review the recent report on the predictors of ethnic civil wars as 
defined by PITF. To review, ethnic war is defined as an“[episode] of violent conflict 
between governments and national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities 
(ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status”
(Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 6). Ethnic wars are a subset of the more general “civil 
war”. An example of an ethnic war included in this analysis is the one fought by the
Serbs in eastern Croatia and Krajina against the newly independent Croat government 
from 1991 to 1995. I will also briefly review the literature on the more general “civil 
war” as defined by each of the studies’ authors that I review below. First, I turn to the 




 Gurr et al. (2005) used case-control methods combined with logistic regression to 
post-dict the onset of ethnic war from 1995-2003 for all nations over 500,000 population. 
Over that time, there were 74 ethnic wars. This is about three times as many wars as the 
other type of war PITF includes, which is revolutionary war. Ethnic wars were fairly 
evenly distributed over the time period, except for a steady increase of ethnic war onsets 
in the 1980s, which peaked in 1991. This peak constituted 21% of the 157 included 
nations. Ethnic wars tend to be a precipitating event in setting off more instability events 
(putting the nation into the complex category), particularly another ethnic war and 
genocide. This demonstrates the importance of separating out ethnic war from 
revolutionary war, as the same cannot be said for revolutionary war. 
 Gurr et al. (2005) achieved roughly 80% correct post-dictive classification in their 
ethnic war models. There were 50 onsets of ethnic war during the period. They matched 
three “healthy” country-years for each ethnic war onset country-year. Thei  most 
impactful predictor was the presence of active, systematic state led discrimination against 
minorities within the nation. This factor best signaled the onset of ethnic war. In addition, 
higher levels of ethnic diversity greatly increased the odds of experiencing an ethnic war.  
Regime type also had important and strong effects on the odds of ethnic war. 
Specifically, partial democracies with factionalism were the most likely to later 
experience ethnic war (Gurr et al., 2005). Interestingly, partial democracies without 
factionalism and partial autocracies did not have increased odds of experiencing ethnic 
war. Abutting states with current civil or ethnic war and the state’s own prior ethnic war 
or genocide in the last 15 years significantly increased the odds of ethnic war onset later. 




three to four times. Overall, this model supported the conceptual importance of prior 
grievances (prior conflict, state-led discrimination, partial democracy with factionalism) 
and greater opportunity to go to war (youth bulge, ethnic diversity, conflict in 
neighboring states). 
 Sambanis (2001) published an interesting bridge between the specialized civil war 
literature, like Gurr’s and Marshall’s work on ethnic wars, and the aggregate civil war 
literature (presented below). He tested whether there were differences in the predictors of 
onset of ethnic war versus non-ethnic civil war. Non-ethnic civil wars were define  as 
revolutionary or other wars while ethnic wars were operationalized using the PITF 
definition of ethnic war. He predicted the onset of ethnic and non-ethnic wars using a 
random effects probit analysis for 161 countries over the period between 1960 and 1999. 
This period covers 77 ethnic war onsets and 32 revolutionary war onsets.  
First, ethnic wars were unlikely to break out in democracies; in addition, the more 
democracies in the state’s region, the lower the risk for the onset of ethnic war in a state 
(Sambanis, 2001). Ethnic heterogeneity significantly increased the probability of later 
ethnic war onset. Further, conflict in neighboring states increased the probability of the 
state experiencing an ethnic war. Per capita real income had a moderate neg ive 
influence on the likelihood of subsequent ethnic war onset. Overall, politics had an 
important influence on the onset of ethnic civil war.  
With regards to differences between onsets of different civil war types, Sambanis 
(2001) found that there were important differences between ethnic and revolutionary war 
onsets. For example, per capita real income was a far stronger negative predictor of the 




affect the likelihood of revolutionary war onset nor did ethnic heterogeneity. However, 
changes in regime type, towards democracy, significantly increased the probability of the 
onset of revolutionary war. Years of prior peace and conflicts in neighboring states also 
failed to predict the onset of revolutionary war. Sambanis (2001) concluded that there 
were important differences between the predictors of ethnic wars, which are wars of 
identity, and revolutionary wars. Wars of identity seemed to be fought primarily over 
political grievances rather than economics while revolutionary wars did not seem to be 
fought over political grievances, as defined here. The work of Sambanis (2001) supported 
the separate examination of ethnic and revolutionary war.  
Civil Wars Not Separated by Type 
Despite the evidence presented by Sambanis (2001) on the dissimilar causation of 
ethnic and non-ethnic wars, I will briefly review the literature on the aggregate civil war 
category. This literature mainly draws from the Correlates of War data, as well as the 
Sambanis updated version of that data. An example of a civil war in this data includes a 
war in 1993 between the government of Congo-Kinshasa and the rebel group there 
(Sarkees, 2000). The majority of this literature does not differentiate between th  type of 
civil war fought based on the underlying disagreement. Marshall and Cole (2008) 
reported that at the same time that the onset of international war clearly d clined, civil 
war increased in prevalence since the end of World War II and peaked in the late 1980s, 
with an average of four civil war onsets per year. In fact, 20 of the 21 wars ongoing in 
2008 were civil or communal wars. I briefly review the literature on predicting ivil wars 
below.  
In a series of papers, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler set out an economic theory 




political grievance characterized by Gurr et al. (2005). Over time, Collier and Hoeffler 
refined and elaborated their economic rational choice perspective on the costs and 
benefits of civil war. In sum, their rational choice framework suggests that civil rebellion 
will occur when the incentives for rebellion are larger than the costs of rebellion. 
Rebellion occurs for the purposes of replacing the regime or to force state secession. The 
benefits of rebellion include victory over the government (tempered by the probability of 
obtaining it) and the spoils of either being in charge of the state now (and its tax revenue 
or looting during the chaos) or having seceded and won their independence. The costs of 
the rebellion are disproportionate for the rebels compared to the government which has 
far more resources upon which to draw. These costs include the monetary costs of 
conducting civil war, like the costs of outfitting a rebel army and their labor (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998, 2002). However, once the rebellion is underway, the rebellion will pay 
for itself monetarily such that the “start-up” costs are far more prohibitive than the costs 
of continuation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). If the state is high in lootable natural 
resources, such as oil or diamonds, then these will be regarded as a benefit of rebellion
and they will function to help finance the continuation of the rebellion (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002). Rebellions will occur when the costs are outweighed by the benefits. 
This is independent of the level of political grievance among the rebels which may 
include state discrimination against the rebels if they are ethnic or religious minorities. 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998, 2002, 2004) economic model of civil war causation stands 
in general contrast to the political grievance model of ethnic civil war. I present their 




Collier and Hoeffler (2004) tested the political grievance model against their own 
economic framework of civil war. Over time, they adjusted their model to shift away 
from the economic costs of rebellion and have begun to look more at opportunities for 
rebellion. They tested this for 98 countries for each five-year period from 1960 to 1999. 
Their civil war data set followed the classic Correlates of War definition: a conflict 
between a state and a non-state challenger that claimed 1000 battle-deaths over t e course 
of the conflict, with each side inflicting at least 5% of those casualties (Small and Singer, 
1982). Thus, these civil wars do not focus on the type of war, either ethnic or 
revolutionary; their dataset simply includes all intra-state civil wars that meet the 
inclusion criteria.  
The economic / opportunity factors generally performed as expected. First, they 
found that the proportion of the GDP accounted for by natural resource exports (such as 
diamonds, oil and lumber) was highly significant and non-linear in its effects on the onset 
of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The risk of civil war onset was at its peak when 
approximately 1/3 of the economy was accounted for by natural resource exports, which 
the authors labeled as a highly dependent economy. Further, GDP per capita and growth 
in per capita GDP were both significantly negatively related to the onset of civil war. 
Their proxies for the high costs of starting a civil war included male secondary school 
enrollment (if it is low, it is easier to recruit men to the rebel army), the length of peace 
prior to the conflict (need to lay out more costs initially to equip and outfit a rebel army 
after a long time at peace), heavily mountainous terrain (in which the rebelscan hide 
from government forces), geographic dispersion of the population (if they are highly




fractionalization of the people (which makes it more difficult for the rebels to 
communicate amongst themselves). The proxies for the high costs of starting a civil w r 
were all at least marginally statistically significant at the .10 level in the expected 
direction.  
On the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) political grievance measures did 
not predict civil war well. If political grievances against the state or regime in charge 
were relevant predictors of civil war, then high levels of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization and polarization along these lines should be supported. In addition, it 
would be expected that the unequal distribution of income and land would be positively 
related to the onset of civil war. Ethnic fractionalization was only marginally st tistically 
significant at the .10 level, and religious fractionalization was not able to achieve 
statistical significance. Further, ethnic and religious fractionalization was not statistically 
significant and was even negative rather than positive. Ethnic dominance, wherein t  
largest ethnic group constituted 45-90% of the population, was also statistically 
insignificant as were both measures of income and land inequality. The only political 
variable that performed as expected was regime type: democracy was negatively related 
to the onset of civil war. Overall, the political grievance underperformed.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also tested a combined model of the onset of civil 
wars. They found that all the included economic / opportunity variables performed as 
expected: natural resource exports, especially oil, school enrollment, population 
dispersion and social fractionalization. The only political grievance factor that was even 
significant in the combined model was ethnic dominance; when one ethnic group 




onset. They concluded that the economic / opportunity model was the best supported. 
However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) can likely be reasonably be criticized for their 
loose interpretation of political grievance or control variables as support for the economic 
/ opportunity model (such as social fractionalization or male school enrollment). In 
addition, it is reasonable to assume that their model would suffer from multi-collinearity 
issues given the amount of ethnic and religious dominance / fractionalization / 
polarization included in the models. Yet, the clearest criticism is of their depen nt 
variable. The results offered by Sambanis (2001) and others clearly demonstrate the 
importance of separating civil war into its components of ethnic and revolutionary war, 
which I do here. I turn now to an additional model for an aggregate civil war measure.  
Gurr and Marshall (2000) also examined a combined measure of civil warfare 
from the Minorities at Risk database. Their measure of war was limited to any type of 
war that was conducted by an ethnic minority at risk. However, their war measure was 
actually included in a larger “rebellion” variable, which included terrorism, declarations 
of independence, guerrilla violence and full-scale civil war. They measured this is as a 
scale with political “banditry” and non-systematic terrorism at one end and full-blown 
civil war at the other. Thus, they partially predicted the onset of terrorism, a  well as 
lesser and greater forms of political violence, like war. Their model of the ons t of civil 
war conducted by ethnic minorities at risk covered 1997 and 1998; the predictors were 
measured in the years prior.  
Gurr and Marshall (2000) found that the following factors increased the 
likelihood of rebellion, which ranged from non-systematic terrorism up to and including 




demonstrations and riots) by the ethnic minority, organization by the ethnic minority i to 
political groups, support for the ethnic minority by foreign governments, high 
concentration of the ethnic minority in geographic space, government repression in the 
prior year, and regime instability over the prior three years. These wre consistent and 
strong predictors of rebellion; there were also some less consistent predictors of rebellion. 
Minority-specific factors that increased the likelihood of rebellion included prviously 
losing their political autonomy, ethnonationalist ideology in the minority, whether the 
group is a communal contender, support from related groups elsewhere in the world, and 
ample armed conflicts in nearby states and in the overall region. Other factors that 
decreased the likelihood of rebellion were increased ethnic group support for conformist 
organizations, support from regional and international organizations, and whether the 
group is an indigenous ethnic minority. These models predicted political rebellion, 
including protracted civil war as well as less contentious actions, amongst a population of 
ethnic minorities. This model is related to the others presented above but also pulls in 
characteristics of the group itself to predict the occurrences of violence. Where the data 
are available for the period from 1990 to 2005, I include many of these predictors in my 
Model 3, which contains control variables that measure ethnic minorities at risk 
characteristics. I turn now to the literature on adverse regime change, another type of 
state instability collected by the Political Instability Task Force and used in this study as 
an independent variable.  
Adverse Regime Change 
The Political Instability Task Force’s Ulfelder and Lustik (2005) presented the 
results of their examination of the predictors of adverse regime change. Adverse regime 




including major and abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral systems to closed, 
authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites and the mod of 
governance; contested dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial are  of 
a state by extrajudicial means; and or near-total collapse of central sta e au hority and the 
ability to govern” (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 10). Operationally, this shift involved 
a six or more point swing in the POLITY score as well as the interregnum code for 
complete collapse of the central government from Polity (-77). POLITY score  rate 
regime types and range from -10 for full autocracies to +10 for a full democracy 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2007).  
In this paper, Ulfelder and Lustik (2005) specifically modeled the transition 
towards autocracy, a form of government they defined as a government that 
institutionally lacks accountability to its citizens. These transitions twards autocracies 
were labeled as “backslides” and specifically involved situations when unelected officials 
replaced elected officials. An example of a backslide occurred in 1980 in Burkina Faso. 
The democratic election of the president of that country was greeted by labor and 
economic unrest and was subsequently overthrown by a military coup, after which the 
constitution was suspended. Sixty backslides occurred from 1955-2003 for the 162 
nations examined. They achieved 85% correct classification in their post-dictive models.  
First, the age of the democracy was an important predictor of backslides; the risk 
rose steadily after two years and stayed high until the democracy had endured for 15 
years, after which the risk of backsliding declined (Ulfelder and Lustik, 2005). They 
hypothesized that either this timing indicated that the danger usually coincided w th the 




democracies, one of which was destined to fail early and one of which was destined to 
last long-term. Economic development was also important; they specifically tested infant 
mortality, but overall, the rest of the indicators also demonstrated that the higher t e 
development level of the democracy, the less likely it was to backslide towards 
autocracy. Factionalism, or democracies in which specialized interests to the party in 
power are favored, also significantly increased the odds of backsliding. The growth in the 
per capita GDP over the prior two years was only weakly significant, though negative. 
They suggested that due to the importance of economic development and the weakness of 
two-year changes in GDP, the long-term economic well-being of the democracy mattered 
more than short-term changes for predicting backslides. Interestingly, they were unable to 
find any important effects for trade openness, region effects or prevalence of dem cracy 
in nearby states. Backslides, or transitions towards autocracy, were well predicted by a 
small set of variables, including the regime characteristics, long-term economic health, 
and factionalism. I turn now to the predictors of genocide. 
Genocide 
Harff (2003) presented a model that examined the antecedents of genocide from 
1955 to 1997 using the same case control method and logistic regression method utilized 
by other PITF research. Genocide was measured using the PITF definition: events which 
“involve the promotion, execution and / or implied consent of sustained policies by 
governing elites or their agents – or in the case of civil war, either of the cont nding 
authorities – that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or 
politicized non-communal group” (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 14). An example of 
this is from 1956 to 1972, the Sudanese government slaughtered civilians living in the 




secession. Unlike the other forms of state instability, genocide only occurred once on its 
own in a state-year. The rest of the genocides occurred nested in a complex instability 
that included other ethnic and revolutionary wars and adverse regime changes; there were 
126 such instances that included 35 genocides. Because these occur almost exclusively in 
a nested way, the purpose of Harff’s (2003) model was to ask what can distinguish 
between instabilities that included genocide and those that did not. The predictors were 
measured for the prior year. 
Harff’s (2003) post-dictive model of state instabilities with genocide events 
achieved 74% accurate classification. Recall that this model predicts the likelihood of 
experiencing a state instability that includes a genocide versus a state in bility episode 
that does not also include genocide. This model does not predict genocide relative to no 
instability.  
Prior state instability over the preceding 15 years was a positive and statistically 
significant predictor (Harff 2003). States that had experienced a prior genocid  were 
about three and a half times more likely to experience another. States in which the ruling 
party espoused an ideology that singled out certain groups of people for discriminatory, 
persecutory or genocidal treatment were marginally significantly more likely (at the .10 
level) to experience an instability with an episode of genocide than those without such an 
ideology. States in which the ruling party was part of an ethnic minority (relativ  to the 
people they are ruling) were two and a half times more likely to experience an instability 
with a genocide than those in which the ruling party is part of the majority. States 
governed by autocracy rather than full or partial democracies were about three and half 




that were less economically connected to the world (lower trade openness) were mor  
likely to have an instability that included a genocide.  
Autocratic states with previous instability, a previous episode of genocide, a 
political elite that is both an ethnic minority (relative to the population of the stat ) and 
espouses an exclusionary ideology, and a state with few international trading partners had 
a predicted probability of .90 for instability with genocide. However, a state in instability 
that had no risk factors had only a .028 predicted probability of genocide occurring in that 
instability. Harff (2003) tested many different models, including models without repeat 
genocides in the dependent variable, and the model stayed substantively the same. 
However, in none of the alternate models were ethnic diversity or ethnic discrimination 
able to achieve statistical significance, which is an interesting null fi ding; perhaps 
discrimination is less important once instability has already set in. Overall, a elatively 
simple model was able to distinguish between instabilities that experienced genocide and 
those that did not.  
After examining the predictors of the types of state instability that will be 
included as an independent variable in this analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that they 
are at least a partially unitary phenomenon. That is, they are predicted by many of the 
same variables and are similarly “caused”. However, though they may be similarly 
caused, it does not follow that they exert similar effects on the probability of a state also 
experiencing terrorism incidents, the dependent variable in this analysis. The question of 
whether each type is equally likely to result in terrorism incidents is an open, empirical 
question, one which I intend to test here. The different types will be disaggregated and 




the similar predictors of the different forms of state instability, the main theoretical, 
independent variable in this analysis, it should be noted that although it is not possible to 
include every single variable from prior studies due to lack of annual data from 1970 to 
2005, I am able to include variables that tap all of the domains shown as important in 
prior work. If these domains are also related to terrorism, then the model is less l kely to 
suffer from serious omitted variable bias. I turn now to the empirical results of tests of 
breakdown theory, the main theoretical framework in this analysis.  
Empirical Tests of Breakdown Theory 
Over the years, different forms of the breakdown model have been developed 
across disciplines and dependent variables. I will review the empirical evidence on the 
form closest to what I adopt here as the most applicable breakdown model for the state 
instability – terrorism question. That is, social ties bind and restrain the actions of 
individuals and provide formal and informal social controls on their actions. Rapid social 
change can sever these ties. These loosened and severed ties can then leave thos  
individuals free to engage in non-routine collective action, such as rioting, rebellion and 
civil violence, including terrorism. I turn now to the relevant research. 
Attitudinal Studies of African Americans after the Race Riots 
 Caplan and Paige (1968) utilized samples of Newark, NJ and Detroit, MI 
residents to study riot participation in those cities, sites of two of the more serious race 
riots of the period. Specifically, they surveyed representative samples of households 
living in census tracts that had seen violence and property damage during those riots. 
They achieved approximately 2/3 response rates in both cities and assessed riot 
participation by asking whether the respondents were “active” or had committed physical 




age 25 netted 11% of the sample self-identifying as rioters. For Newark, which as a 
sample of only-black males between 15 and 35, 45% of the sample self-reported riot 
participation. There were differences across samples in the demographics of participants 
but overall, the rioters were neither the poorest of the poor nor the least educated. They 
did differ, however, in their beliefs regarding the positions of blacks in society. For 
example, the rioters were more likely to perceive themselves as falling behind ot er 
blacks, to report racial discrimination and to disagree that the US was “worth fighting 
for”. Overall, the data supported the importance of the exclusion of blacks from 
economic and social betterment and the resulting discontent caused by this exclusion. 
This resulting discontent is largely supportive of the breakdown perspective.  
 In another examination of the race riots of the period, Miller et al. (1976) 
reanalyzed survey data from 2800 African Americans in 15 cities. Unfortunately, riot 
participation in the sample was too rare to enable conclusions about actual rioters, but 
they were able to extract two other groups from the data by analyzing responses to 
questions about protesting, the riots themselves and attitudinal measures. They termed the 
first extracted group nonviolent protesters and the second riot-prone protestors. These 
two groups were clearly different on social integration. The nonviolent protestors were 
more likely than the violence-prone protestors to have higher levels of education, income, 
to be in a more skilled job, to be from an unbroken home, to be married and to be older. 
This study clearly supported the breakdown hypothesis that individuals who engage in 
non-routine collective action (protesting with the potential to turn to violence) are likely 
to be low on social integration compared to individuals who engage in routine collective 




negative relationship between social integration and potential to riot. I turn now to two
studies of an aggregated unit of analysis: cities. 
City-level Analyses 
 Lieske (1978) analyzed cities themselves for their proneness to be the site of riots. 
He found that more socially disorganized cities were more likely to have experienced a 
race riot than cities with lower levels of social disorganization. He measurd ocial 
disorganization with a composite of measures, such as divorce, separation and birth 
illegitimacy rates, non-white population changes and moving, and levels of crime. This 
study supported the breakdown model’s contention that high social disorganization 
makes non-routine collective action more likely. Further, Gurr (1976) similarly found 
that times of high civil strife and high crime covaried in his study of London, Stockholm, 
New South Wales and Calcutta. Analyses at the city-level also demonstrated a correlation 
between social disintegration and non-routine collective action. I turn now to specific 
case studies of the breakdown model. 
Case Studies 
 Piven and Cloward (1977) evaluated the breakdown model in their qualitative 
case study of poor people’s movements. First, they determined that the idea of political 
protest is not a commodity that is available to all classes of society; in fact, it only 
becomes available to the poor during certain times, namely during times of masive 
social dislocation. This is because people are usually acquiescent regarding their lot in 
life, and they will continue living their daily routine unless forced to action by massive 
social changes. This shift to protest first requires a change in consciousness: a change in 
beliefs about whether the system is unjust and wrong, about whether their demands for 




requires a change in behavior, which involves widespread law violation, performed en 
masse. Piven and Cloward found that the Great Depression involved so many 
spontaneous protests in the streets, rent and food riots and disturbances at relief centers, 
because it involved both massive unemployment and (forced) migration.  
Piven and Cloward (1977) also found that the release from the daily rhythms and 
controls of the work day and the loss of home and community destroyed the structure and 
routine of everyday life for those individuals affected. The loss of structure and the de-
routinization of everyday life allowed the collective actions to occur. Economic change, 
such as massive loss of employment, in particular, affects the structure and institutional 
control of everyday life. This is because work is such an integral part of the routine f 
everyday life on the one hand and on the other, work provides sustenance. After the loss 
of work, the “comforting banalities” of everyday life disappear; if sustained, crime will 
rise, families will be destroyed, and non-routine collective action will result a  
individuals attempt to struggle through life. Unfortunately, during the Great Dpression, 
forced migration in search of work further broke down communities, social relationships 
and thus, formal institutional control over the actions of men.  
Piven and Cloward (1977) also discussed how individuals chose one collective 
action relative to another. They concluded that the poor are less likely to use violence, 
because the risks of such action may involve brutal repression by the government and 
exact too high a price. Generally, though, individuals use collective action that ivolves 
institutions to which they have access; workers strike and the unemployed riot. Overall, 





Useem (1980) examined survey data from the anti-busing movement that resulted 
from school desegregation in Boston in 1974. The movement itself involved both routine 
(school boycotts, formation of neighborhood information centers, mass demonstration, 
and a formal opposition organization) and non-routine (violent mass demonstrations) 
collective action to prevent busing for the purposes of school desegregation. Useem 
examined in-person interview data of 468 white Bostonians. These individuals resided in 
mostly white neighborhoods that were disproportionately affected by the desegregation 
order and were the site of activities in the anti-busing movement. He strove to answer 
whether social disorganization increased discontent, whether discontent made collective 
action in the anti-busing movement more likely, and whether social solidarity helped or 
hindered the movement. Social solidarity is an important conceptual counterpart to 
breakdown (which will be discussed further later). Basically, it is the opposite f social 
disorganization: integration of the individual into society via informal social bonds, such 
as work, school, church and other voluntary activities. Useem measured participation in 
the movement as: participation in school boycotts, the establishment of private schools
for students who refused the busing, protest marches and the organization of anti-busing 
organizations. Social solidarity was measured as: involvement in group activities, 
community attachment, attachment to primary groups and attachment to secondary group 
organizations.  
First, Useem (1980) found that community and secondary group attachment made 
anti-busing movement participation more likely. Primary group attachment had a
negative or null relationship with participation depending on whether social class was 




seemed that solidarity, as manifested by community attachment and secondary group 
participation, not disorganization made this discontent stronger and stimulated 
participation in the movement. Thus, less connected individuals were less likely to join 
the movement. In the end, both solidarity (not disorganization) and discontent stimulated 
both types of collective action. These findings both supported (the discontent finding) 
and contradicted (the disorganization finding) the breakdown model.  
 Useem (1985) examined the New Mexico prison riot of 1980 using a breakdown 
framework. In normal times, he emphasized, the larger societal structure keeps men’s 
appetites in check. However, when disorganization strikes at this societal structure, it 
frees individuals from the normally inherent regulatory structure that keeps p ople 
engaged in conformity. This disorganization increases the discontent within society. 
Individuals who live in that society are freed to act in antisocial ways by this loss of 
regulatory control and because of this discontent, want to act in unusual and law-violating 
ways.  
Useem (1985) viewed prison riots as collective action; the prison was treated as 
society at the micro-level. Prisons are a society of already extreme deprivation; their very 
purpose is to control the behaviors of individuals through deprivation of liberty, personal 
autonomy and security, heterosexual relationships and goods and services. Although 
prisons constitute a very controlled social structure to begin with, it is certainly possible 
for disorganization to break out and stimulate the freedom to act in illegal ways. Useem 
examined interviews of a random sample of 49 inmates and 28 guards by the New 
Mexico Attorney General’s Office as well as conducting 36 additional interviews of his 




worsening of conditions in the prison. The breakdown in the prison conditions started 
when a progressive warden was transferred out of the prison; this progressive warden had 
allowed prisoner organizations, high school and college classes and civic and charitable 
activities. In the five years after the transfer, subsequent wardens revoked all of the 
liberties and privileges that the prisoners had grown accustomed to under the prior 
warden. The loss of programming coincided with overcrowding, prisoner boredom and 
poor administration and combined to clearly increase the discontent felt by inmates. 
When the riot subsequently broke out, it was vicious and took the lives of 33 prisoners 
and involved extensive torture of many of the guards. Useem (1985) concluded that the 
breakdown model provided a fitting explanation of the events that led up to the brutal riot 
– loss of organization in prison life stimulated discontent and ultimately, riots.  
Useem (1997) continued his breakdown research agenda by examining the Los 
Angeles riots and the governmental response to the riot’s breakdown in social order and 
collective violence. He set up a theory test between breakdown and resource 
mobilization. The main point of contention was whether the state has a role in shaping the 
course of the collective action; in resource mobilization, it has little to no role but in 
breakdown, the state has a clear role.  
In general terms, the first role of the state is to choose how to react to the 
destruction of law and order – either by diplomacy or by force (Useem, 1997). In the Los 
Angeles case, the riot itself came about as a reaction to a government action – the 
acquittal of the four police officers accused in the Rodney King beating. According to 
Useem, the police department had planned to keep on-duty all officers coming off-duty 




miscommunication, this was not done. The riot broke out at the intersection of Florence 
and Normandie streets when police officers used force and arrested a stone-throwing 
youth in front of approximately 100 disorganized residents who had taken to the streets 
after the verdict. Further force was used to control the now-inflamed crowd. By early 
evening, the riot was spreading to the rest of the city. This early mistaken choice of force 
over diplomacy was compounded by further mistakes, such as placing a command post in 
the field with too few resources, improper delegation of too much responsibility to lower 
level officers, and uneven riot preparations during the trial.  
Further, there was a mistaken choice of diplomacy over force in the rest of the 
city as the riots spread, and the police chose to patrol normally and to avoid making 
arrests (Useem, 1997). The height of the riot occurred at 7pm, a time at which there was 
only one riot-ready police squad in the entire city. This squad was quickly overwhelmed 
and recalled for their safety. Finally, the police were not able to regain order until the riot 
had virtually ended, businesses had been burned and the rioters had left the streets, which 
occurred at approximately 8:30 pm. Useem concluded that the breakdown perspective 
was supported by the inadequate tactical preparations before the verdict announcement. 
In addition, the generally incompetent state of the city government at the time of the riot 
prevented it from deterring such collective violence. Overall, it was clear from this 
qualitative case study of the Los Angeles riots that the breakdown perspective was 
correct in its hypothesis that agents of social control had a role to play in the prevention 
of collective violence.  
 LaFree and Drass (1997) provided an interesting comparative test of the routin  




predict that all forms of social pathology should covary, such as antisocial behavior, 
suicide, divorce, crime and protest (Useem 1985). LaFree and Drass explicitly tested this 
notion in post-World War II America. To get at collective action, they examined reports 
from an index of the New York Times from 1955-1991. Collective action included civil 
rights-related riots, marches, sit-ins, rallies, boycotts, protests, and demonstrations. For 
social pathology, they examined arrest rates for homicide, robbery and burglary. To t uly 
get at the notion of covariation between the forms of collective action, they examined 
African American arrest rates and civil rights-related collectiv  action separately from 
arrest rates for whites, which should have been less explicitly and directly connected to 
civil rights-related collective action. Traditional breakdown would predict that arrest rates 
(crime) and all forms of collective action should not only be related, but that they should 
be symmetrically related – as one rises or falls, so should the other.  
LaFree and Drass (1997) demonstrated a clear relationship between both black 
and white arrest rates and civil rights collective action – to a point. They covaried 
symmetrically from 1955 until the early 1970s. At this point, collective action fell of  
dramatically while arrest rates stayed high. LaFree and Drass tested he significance of 
these relationships and found that arrest rates were significantly related to collective 
actions for the most part until the 1970s and then generally were unrelated for the rest of 
the series. It is not clear whether these relationships would have been different had they 
only examined non-routine collective actions (such as riots) and its relationship with 
crime, as the newer Useem (1998) formulation of the breakdown model would predict. In 
the end, though, there are certainly other predictors of arrest rates. Yet once the political 




actions independently of the state of crime. It is also alternately possible that crime 
should not be considered a collective action. LaFree and Drass generated at least partial 
support for the breakdown perspective.  
 Useem (1998) used secondary data to test whether riots (non-routine collective 
action) represent a clear breakdown in the social order to citizens, as measured by 
handgun purchasing. He examined homicide rates, handgun production for domestic sale 
and riot activity from 1964-1994 and found that homicide rates and handgun production 
rates were closely related except for the years during which there were increases in riots. 
These years, the handgun production rates increased more than expected from the 
correlation with the homicide rate alone. These were statistically significant relationships. 
Clearly, at some level, riot activity is feared by citizens enough that the option of self-
protection with handguns (which is not often used as a hunting weapon) seems attractive 
to the American citizenry. This supported the breakdown perspective that non-routine 
collective action represents a “felt” breakdown in the social order and social controls.  
 In the preceding section, I demonstrated that there is ample support for the 
breakdown model in the literature. This evidence demonstrated that it is a useful 
perspective for the current study. However, it is worthwhile to examine the work of the 
breakdown model’s greatest detractor: the resource mobilization model, which is most 
actively promoted by Charles Tilly. In the next section, I do this.  
Resource Mobilization Model 
 The vast majority of the evidence marshaled against the breakdown model comes 
from the resource mobilization area. The primary researcher in this area is Charles Tilly. 
The resource mobilization movement fundamentally disagrees with the breakdown 




since discontent and political grievances have existed at all times, in all societies, 
discontent and grievance cannot be the most important explanatory factors for collective 
action according to the resource mobilization movement. If breakdown theory is unable 
to explain the relationship between terrorism and state instability, resourc mobilization 
can provide an alternate explanation. 
Organization is at the root of collective action; collective action of nearly all t pes 
requires some sort of social organization and resources. Thus, the most important 
explanatory factor of collective action is social organization and the resources that come 
along with that organization. Isolated people are less likely to engage in collective action, 
and their collective action is not driven by discontent, because isolated individuals lack 
nearly any type of organization. Individuals need to be plugged into the social structure 
and social networks to be recruited into a movement. Finally, because collective action is 
an organized, social activity of the socially connected, crime and other social pathologies 
do not covary with collective action nor do they spring from the same causes (Lodhi and 
Tilly, 1972; Useem, 1980; 1985). Further, the resource mobilization model does not 
recognize a difference between routine and non-routine collective action; in other words, 
there is organization inherent in even a spontaneous street riot such that the model 
explains all types of collective action (but not social pathologies like crime). I turn now to 
a short review of the literature as it is relevant to the breakdown model.  
 Lodhi and Tilly (1972) examined crime and collective violence (riots, strikes, 
demonstrations) between 1830 and 1931 in France. They hypothesized that if the 
breakdown model was valuable, then crime and collective violence ought to be related to 




person communities) rather than urbanity (the proportion of the population living in 
10,000 person communities relative to the total population). This is because it should be 
the tension-producing change and not the experience of living in a city itself that is
“causing” the collective violence and crime. They found that property crimes declined 
during France’s major urbanization period. Person crimes fluctuated without any cle r 
trend. Meanwhile, collective violence varied quite a bit over the years. Thus, 
urbanization, which was steadily (and at times, dramatically) increasing could not explain 
a trendless or declining trajectory in a manner that is consistent with breakdown. Yet, 
urbanity was a strong predictor of property crime and some forms of collective violence. 
Thus, crime and collective violence constituted two separate social phenomena. Further, 
urbanity – that is, the experience of living in a city – better explained crime and some 
types of collective violence than urbanization – which represents a changing society. This 
study did not provide any clear support for breakdown.  
 Snyder and Tilly (1972) also challenged another breakdown hypothesis; does 
strife and hardship bring about discontent, which in turn leads individuals to collective 
action? Snyder and Tilly disagreed that hardships can create the discontent necessary to 
motivate collective action. They hypothesized that collective violence occurs when there 
is a shift in the locus of coercive power, manifested as repressive actions and polici g by 
the government. They felt that people who engaged in collective disturbances were 
actually contending for power in an organized and mobilized way.  
Snyder and Tilly (1972) examined the manifestations of collective disturbances in 
France from 1830 to 1960. Their breakdown variables specifically measured hardships, 




thinking that if these prices went up, it would create hardship for the majority of the 
populace. Their resource mobilization variables were intended to measure the social 
organization of the disturbance participants and included deviations from the five-year 
average of arrests, the size of the national budget and the number of persons in jail durig 
that year. They found that both of the breakdown variables were not correlated with 
collective violence. However, the resource mobilization variables were corrlated over 
time with collective violence.  
 Tilly et al. (1975) analyzed data from France, Italy and Germany to examine the 
breakdown notion that collective violence concentrates itself during periods of high 
social change. In this study, periods of high social change were proxied using growth in 
urbanization. However, they found no correlations between large changes in urbanization 
and collective violence. Further, episodes of collective violence actually tended to occur 
during ordinary non-violent gatherings of people, like festivals and meetings. Thus, 
neither the gathering nor the violence that may have resulted was actually related to 
major social changes. Rather, it was the normal social organization of people who were 
interconnected in society, both at the primary (family group) and secondary (voluntary 
associations) levels that led to the collective violence. Organization and political action, 
not isolation and anomie, were endorsed and support was not found for breakdown. 
However, even though the Tillys concluded that the participants in the collective violence 
were well-connected to the society, their conclusion does not negate the breakdown 
notion that the society itself may have been experiencing losses in social organization 




 In the end, the proponents of the resource mobilization model concluded that 
resource mobilization was the supported model, not the breakdown model. The simplest 
critique they leveled at breakdown bears repeating: social change, conflict, a d social 
disorganization exist at all times and in all societies; thus, how can a constant explain a 
change (Tilly et al., 1975; Lodhi and Tilly, 1972, Snyder and Tilly, 1972; McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977)? However, that is an open empirical question, one that I intend to test in one 
form. My test asks whether the occurrence of state instability, as a form o  social 
disorganization or rapid social change, is associated with changes in the level oft rrorism 
experienced during the instability. I turn now to review the current focus of this study 
before moving to the next chapter. 
Current Focus 
 The focus of the current study is to examine whether the distribution of terrorism 
is related to the distribution of state instability. That is, I test whether c anges in 
instability are associated with changes in terrorism incidents. This is expected given the 
theoretical orientation of this study.  
Theoretically, I adopt a modified breakdown theory to explain the distribution of 
terrorism incidents around the world. Specifically, in times of rapid social change which 
rupture the institutional and informal controls that govern society under normal 
circumstances, non-routine and often violent collective action is more likely to occur. 
State instability constitutes one form of rapid social change and is expected to cause 
ruptures in the institutions of formal and informal social control. Terrorism is one type of 




When state instability occurs, it is observed here as the outbreak of ethnic or 
revolutionary war, genocide, or an abrupt change in governance. If the society is unable 
to absorb the shock these events present to the social order, the social ties that bind the 
individual to society may be cut off. In addition, individuals may avoid making new 
conventional commitments to society. The demise of the prior attachments to sociey and 
the lack of new commitments will free individuals from the societal restraints on their 
behavior. This freeing will allow individuals to take part in non-routine collectiv  action, 
including terrorism. These are the general nation-level mechanisms I expect are at work. I 
expect that on average, a state will experience increases in terrorism when it experiences 
increases in instability. I turn now to the Methodology chapter, in which I lay out the data 






Data and Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology used to test the relationship between state 
instability and terrorism. I will describe the unit of analysis as well as the dependent 
variable, terrorism incidents. The data for the dependent variable are from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), which was the most comprehensive open-source terrorism 
database in the world when this dissertation was written. The GTD is actually omprised 
of two separately collected and recently reconciled datasets, the GTD1 and the GTD2. 
The GTD1 contains data from 1970 to 1997 and was collected by the Pinkerton Global 
Intelligence Service (PGIS). The GTD2 was collected by the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies (CETIS) and spans 1998-2007. The independent variable measures 
state instability, such as ethnic or revolutionary war, adverse regime change, and 
genocide. It is from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The control variables I 
use here come primarily from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. I conduct multiple analyses to maximize the 
number of state-years that can be included in the statistical models while balancing the 
need for control variables to guard against omitted variable bias. I use statitical analysis 
that is appropriate for count data. I turn now to the unit of analysis.  
Unit of Analysis 
 The unit of analysis for this project is the state-year. I use cross-sectional time-




country-years without the lost year 1993.2 When I add the country-level marginal 
distribution of incidents to describe terrorism incidents for 1993, then there are 4687 
state-year observations.3 It is important to note that using the marginal country-level 
distributions is not without its downsides. These will be discussed in more detail lat r in 
the chapter.  
 It is important to note that not all states were in existence for the entire
observation period. Some states became extinct, and their parts became new states. 
Examples of this include the Soviet Union and its division into the separate states of 
Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and others as well as Czechoslovakia and its division into 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In addition, some new states were born of 
independence struggles from previously sovereign states. An example of this is Eritrea, 
which formed from territory that had previously been part of Ethiopia. There are also 
states that gained independence from either a colonial territorial status or United Nations 
trusteeships, such as East Timor, under Indonesian rule, and Papua New Guinea, which 
was ruled under an international trusteeship before gaining independence in 1975. Since 
the GTD is an incident-level dataset, I am able to observe independence and deaths of 
states when they occur, provided that terrorism incidents occur in that state near the time 
of independence or death. In other words, I code any incidents that occur in a sovereign 
state down to the month, day or year of independence or death of the state.  
                                                        
2. The 1993 data were lost in an office move by the original data collectors, the Pinkerton Global 
Intelligence Service (PGIS). 
 
3. The original data collectors, PGIS, issued yearl reports on acts of terrorism around the world. 
Although the actual data for 1993 are lost, copies of the report for this year do exist. From these repo ts, I 
have reconstructed the total numbers of incidents by country, adjusted downward for the cases lost due to 
excluding incidents against military targets and for cases that were deleted during the GTD1/GTD2 





For the analysis, since the unit of analysis is at the state-year, birth of a state is 
observed at the year of occurrence. Death of a state is observed the year before. For 
example, Czechoslovakia is coded as having died in 1992 while the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia are observed as having been born in 1993. In addition, because the PITF data 
only include sovereign states over 500,000 population, I include terrorism in a territory of 
a state as terrorism against that state if that territory is evaluated as a part of the state by 
the PITF. For example, I include the incidents that occur in Corsica as a part of French 
terrorism, but I exclude the terrorism incidents that occurred in Puerto Rico as part of 
American terrorism.4 These decisions were made in consultation with Dr. Monty 
Marshall, the lead data collector on the PITF (Marshall, 2009b, email communicatio ). 
All efforts have been made to ensure that states included as the part of the dependent, 
independent and control variables are the same across these datasets. I turn now to an in-
depth explanation of the data I analyze.  
Data 
Dependent Variable 
 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is the source for my dependent variable of 
interest, terrorist incidents. The GTD1 was collected relatively contemporane usly (close 
to real-time) from 1970 to 1997 by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS). 
The GTD2 was collected for the period 1998 to 2007 by the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies (CETIS). CETIS began collection of terrorism incide ts in the open-
                                                        
4. I am able to do this for the PGIS report of 1993 data, because PGIS reported incidents down to 
the location of the incident, rather than the sovereign country. For example, PGIS reported the number of 
incidents that occurred in Northern Ireland and Corsica, rather than just including them in the totals for the 





source media for the period 1998-2007 upon receipt of funding in 2005. The divergent 
methods of collection are accounted using an indicator for the data collection agency. 5 
Collecting the GTD1 
The collection of the GTD1 involved newspapers from around the world and the 
US, news wires, US State Department reports, PGIS reports from satellite offices and 
reports from PGIS clients around the world, among other sources. Two data managers 
were in charge of the data collection process for the entire 28-year period. In ad ition, the 
information collected about each incident remained roughly equivalent although the 
actual hand-written sheet on which the information was recorded had three versions 
(LaFree and Dugan, 2007). The data collection for GTD1 remained remarkably 
consistent over the 28-year period although it should be made clear that the data likely 
suffer from reporting bias and incomplete data to differing degrees over time. These 
issues will be further discussed in the section that addresses the weaknesses of the GTD.  
 PGIS defined terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or 
intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). This excludes acts undertaken by a state 
(state terrorism), criminal acts that lacked a political, social, economic r religious goal, 
and acts of open combat between state or guerrilla armies. Yet, it is important t  note the 
GTD1 is a particularly broad database in which there was a clear effort to err on the side 
of inclusion for questionable incidents. In addition, the GTD includes both domestic and 
                                                        
5. In sensitivity analyses, I also ran a negative bnomial regression that calculated robust standard 
errors and clustered by country-group. In these analyses, an indicator for the GTD2 data was a negative and 
significant predictor of terrorism. However, when separate models were run for GTD1 and GTD2 data, no 





international acts of terrorism which is a major advantage over all of the other terrorism 
databases currently in use.  
Collecting the GTD2 
The GTD team recognized that it was important to update the data beyond 1997. 
As a result, the GTD2 was born. The data collection responsibilities were led by Gary 
Ackerman and the data were managed by Charles Blair of CETIS in association with the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 
CETIS sought to preserve the character of the GTD1 and the actual GTD1 variables but 
also, to extend the breadth of variable collection in the new GTD2, which covers the 
period from 1998-2007. The GTD2 was collected by the CETIS team for 1998-2007 
upon receipt of funding in 2005. I turn now a discussion of this type of data collection.  
 To be clear, relatively contemporaneous data collection such as the PGIS 
collection of GTD1, even before the age of extensive internet resources, is a task that 
would be expected to net a larger number of terrorism incidents than the data collection 
conducted by CETIS which did not begin until 2005, seven years past the start of the 
period they were charged with collecting, 1998-2007. Thus, GTD1 would be expected to 
have collected many more terrorism incidents simply by virtue of collecting the data 
closer in time to when the incidents occurred. For the GTD2 data collectors, who 
searched for incidents up to seven years after their occurrence, fewer incid nts would be 
expected to be netted simply based on the size of the lag in time between occurrence and 
collection. The size of the lag in data collection was a difficulty for the GTD2 collection 
team. The main difficulties are the lack of access to resources that would have been 
available if the data had been collected contemporaneously with or closer in time to the 




archiving and / or inaccessibility of media resources, government reports, and other 
sources. The most troubling evidence of the effects of the change from relatively 
contemporaneous data collection to collection begun seven years later is evidenc d by the 
gap between the levels of terrorism observed in GTD1 in 1997, 3192 incidents and 901 
incidents in GTD2 for 1998. To be fair, GTD1 had been trending downward from its 
peak of 5115 incidents in 1992, but such a large decline between 1997 and 1998 suggests 
that something more than declining terrorism levels is responsible for these diff r nces in 
level. Further, this difficulty is perhaps also reflected in lower numbers of terr rism 
incidents over the entire course of GTD2 than would be expected given the large volume 
of incidents in the GTD1. However, as already noted, the PGIS data were already 
trending downward from the 1992 peak by 1997. I turn now to the definition of terrorism 
used by the GTD2 team.  
Because there is much academic controversy over the best definition of terrorism 
(Schmid and Jongman, 1988), the GTD Criteria Committee declined to develop a specific 
definition. Instead, they chose to structure a set of criteria that included the original PGIS 
definition but also set out additional parameters that the Committee felt were important. 
All three of the first-level criteria must be met for the incident to be included in the 
GTD2. These include: 
1. “The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of 
a perpetrator.” [this is assumed prima facie to be correct in cases in which it is 
difficult to assess the intentionality of the incident (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: , 
note 23)] 
 
2. “The incident must entail some level of violence (including violence against property) 
or the threat of violence.” 
 
3. “[T]here must be sub-national perpetrators. That is, at the time of the incident, the 




demarcated territory; functioning government structures).” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 
188) 
 
The Criteria Committee further refined the cases to be included in the data by requiring 
that at least two of three of the following criteria be met. 
1. “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social g al. In 
terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this 
criterion.” 
 
2. “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other 
message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.” 
 
3. “[T]he action must be outside of the context of legitimate warfare activities; that is, 
the act must be outside the parameters set by international humanitarian law 
(particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-
combatants).” (LaFree and Dugan, 2009: 188) 
 
Note that these criteria are actually quite similar to the definition of terrorism in the 
GTD1. I turn now to the explanation of how these two different databases were merged 
into one Global Terrorism Database.  
Reconciling the GTD1 and the GTD2 
 The GTD1 and the GTD2 were combined into one synthesized database by the 
GTD data team at University of Maryland and CETIS using a combination of automated 
coding and person coding from May 2008 until March 2009. The new, synthesized data 
were released to the START research community in April 2009. There were two basic 
problems to be addressed during the synthesis process, which is explained below.  
 The first problem was reconciling the GTD1 collection definition and the GTD2 
definition-less criteria. The GTD1 was collected broadly using the PGIS definition while 
GTD2 was collected using the 6 criteria described above (3 of which were always 
mandatory with a rotating 2 more required). The criteria are remarkably simi ar to the 




restrictive manner than the GTD1 definition. For this reason, the purpose of the synthsis 
process was to examine the existing GTD1 data with the rotating GTD2 criteria in mind. 
A systematic review process was employed to evaluate all GTD1 cases from 1970 to 
1997 to ensure that they met at least two of the three rotating GTD2 criteria.  
 The following guidelines were set for evaluating each GTD2 criterion for the 
GTD dataset. For Criterion 1 (a political, social, economic or religious goal), a rebuttable 
presumption was employed, such that the data coders assumed that it was met unless 
there was specific evidence to the contrary of no political, social, economic or religious 
goal for the incident. The reasons for employing the rebuttable presumption were two-
fold. First, particularly in the early days of the GTD1, there was far less information 
regarding the goals of the perpetrators available in the open-source media or in the data 
captured by PGIS than would ideally satisfy this criterion. Second, the trained data 
collectors and coders at PGIS had already evaluated the data; it was assumed that the 
coders only collected incidents that fit their own definition. I turn now to the second 
criterion. 
 Criterion 2 addresses whether there is evidence of “an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims” (START, 2008: 10). Again, the rebuttable presumption was 
employed here for the same reasons as in Criterion 1; since PGIS’s own definition 
included a similar clause it was assumed that these incidents had already been evaluated 
for this requirement and that there were some cases with too little informati n to properly 




 Criterion 3 dictates that the attack must be in violation of the provisions regarding 
non-combatants in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Briefly, IHL defines non-
combatants as persons who do not engage in or who have stopped engaging in hostilities, 
including captured combatants, civilians, civilian “objects”, and medical personnel a d 
places, including military medics. It is important to note that there is no rebuttable 
presumption for Criterion 3; it was either fulfilled or not based on the data. Caseswith 
large amounts of unknown information were flagged for later review.  
 Automated coding was used to convert the majority of the rest of the variables in 
the GTD1 into the structure and formats of the GTD2. Few problems were encountered in 
converting existing GTD1 variables into their GTD2 counterparts because the GTD2 data 
were collected with the GTD1 variables in mind. However, the new variables colcted 
for GTD2 are missing for GTD1. Though the synthesis process was far from pefect, we 
believe that it managed to impose consistency on two differently collected databases. I 
turn now to a brief review of the strengths and weaknesses of the synthesized Global 
Terrorism Database, 1970 to 2007.  
Strengths of GTD 
 The Global Terrorism Database has four main strengths. First, starting with the 
original data collectors, GTD has included domestic terrorism incidents. This is probably 
the most important strength of the data, because the large majority of terrorism incidents 
occur within the state from which they were launched (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). 
Because the number of domestic terrorism incidents is much larger than the number of 
transnational terrorism incidents, any analysis which relies only on transnational 
terrorism incidents or domestic coverage for only certain years or regi ns of the world 




Second, the GTD has been collected over nearly four decades. This coverage is 
unparalleled in the world of unclassified terrorism event databases. In fact, this coverage 
is much better than the any of the cross-national homicide databases despite the fact that 
homicide is the best-measured crime in any nation. The old adage that it is hard to ide a 
body for very long explains why homicide is the best-measured crime in any state. 
However, as LaFree (1999) notes, the World Health Organization, which is the most 
valid source for cross-national homicide statistics, contains usable homicide stat stic  for 
only highly industrialized, mostly western nations. The coverage of the GTD data across 
the globe for thirty-seven years stands in sharper contrast when compared to homicide 
statistics, which are only available for a handful of countries over time.  
Third, over the course of the last 37 years, there have only been 4 data managers 
and two data collection agencies responsible for collecting the GTD. This helps to ensure
that the data have been collected and coded in a consistent manner.  
And finally, due to the very broad nature of the definition and collection criteria 
used, the GTD can be customized to fit many different definitions of terrorism. For 
example, in this analysis, I exclude all terrorism incidents that target the military of a 
state in order to avoid confounding the revolutionary war and ethnic war categories in my 
independent variable with a terrorism incident against a military in my dependent 
variable. This decision is discussed in more depth in the Data Appendix. There are many 
other such customized datasets that can be made simply by filtering on GTD variables.  
The GTD is far from perfect, but at the moment it is the most comprehensive 





Weaknesses of GTD 
It is important to note that the weaknesses of the GTD discussed below are serious 
but not insurmountable. After I discuss the weaknesses of the database, I lay out a plan to 
address these as best as possible. I turn now to the first and likely most serious, of the 
four major weaknesses discussed in this dissertation.  
First, any terrorism incident event database will suffer from undercounting of 
terrorism. On the one hand, most terrorists want publicity, because one of the main 
purposes of terrorism is to convey a message, to coerce, or to intimidate a largerudience 
into doing something the perpetrators find desirable as well as to inflict personal or 
property violence. On the other hand, these are illegal actions that are carried out 
covertly, and the open-source media may never learn of incidents or report them. This is 
likely to vary by country, because the distribution of open-source media outlets around 
the world is not random. It is likely that there are more media outlets in the develop d 
world and thus, more opportunity for terrorism incidents to be reported in that media. In 
addition, this means that the data are also biased not only towards more media-saturated 
nations and parts of nations (capital and major cities versus the rural countryside of a 
nation), but that media reports are biased towards more newsworthy terrorism (LaFree 
and Dugan, 2007).  
 Second, there are often missing details in GTD incidents, save for the most 
famous incidents or perpetrators. For example, the GTD collects the basic who, when, 
what, and where regarding the incident, but this information is not uniformly available 
for all incidents, in particular, the name of the perpetrator group. There can also be false 
claims of responsibility for events. Further, because the GTD is an incident-lev l 




information about terrorist groups or specific governmental responses to terrorism 
incidents though efforts are in process to incorporate this supplemental information 
(LaFree and Dugan, 2007).  
On the other hand, as discussed above, cross-national homicide data are far worse. 
Even in the United States, homicide data, though the best there is, often has little or no 
detail, including perpetrator identity information. This is despite the Supplemental 
Homicide Reports, which is supposed to contain the who, what, when, and where of each 
homicide and despite the expansive new crime reporting system, the National Incident 
Based Reporting System (NIBRS). NIBRS has been vastly underutilized by police
agencies across the country because of the expense involved in hiring and training 
individuals to complete the NIBRS reports properly (Mosher, Miethe and Philips, 2002). 
The situation is far worse in other nations (LaFree, 1999). 
Third, although efforts were made to maintain the consistency and to keep control 
of the level of bias in the Global Terrorism Database, it is impossible to ignore that data 
collection has changed from 1970 to 2007. The much wider availability of small, foreign 
news sources with the advent of the internet most likely has increased the news cov rage 
of terrorism around the world, particularly from the developing world.  
In addition, the change in collection entities between GTD1 and GTD2 with its 
associated move from a standardized definition of terrorism to a definition-like set of 
criteria created its own set of problems which were at least partially ameliorated when the 
data were reconciled during the synthesis process discussed above. In addition, although 
efforts were made to preserve the continuity of sources between PGIS and CETIS, there 




Patterns of Global Terrorism / Country Reports on Terrorism by the US State 
Department) or that were specifically internal PGIS sources (like reports from satellite 
PGIS offices around that world). Without these sources, it is impossible to say that their 
coverage is identical. However, the UMD GTD team has undertaken extensive data 
cross-validation procedures to supplement the data with outside terrorism databases.  
 As a result of the very extensive cross-validation of the GTD against other 
available terrorism datasets, the GTD has been non-systematically updated with data 
from Northern Ireland, the US, Turkey and South Africa. These changes were apart of 
efforts to update and increase the inclusiveness of the data. I will control for these non-
systematic inclusions in an effort to decrease the bias of the data by using fixed effects, in 
which only within-country variation is utilized to estimate the model and each country 
essentially serves as its own control. In this way, the non-systematic updates are 
irrelevant since between-country variation is not used to estimate the models. 
Finally, the data for 1993 were lost in an office move by PGIS many years befo e 
the team at University of Maryland acquired the data. PGIS reported country totals for 
this year in their annual risk assessment report. Efforts by CETIS and the UMD team 
were made to recover the data through recollection, but these efforts were only ever able 
to recollect 15% of the total data for the year. I use the country-level marginal totals for 
1993 in analyses, which is discussed in depth below.  
Addressing the 1993 Data 
The PGIS country-level distribution of incidents for 1993 is simply a table, which 
lists all of the countries and the number of incidents that PGIS observed in those 




table of incident totals by country to substitute for actual data in my analysis is not 
without its downsides. I discuss these below.  
First, there is always the possibility that the listed countries were not in fact, the 
places where the incidents occurred. This could happen due to the creation and break-up 
of countries in 1992 and 1993 as well as errors in coding and reporting. If there were 
actual incidents attached to the incident totals by country, the details of the incid nts, 
particularly the free-text city field, could be checked to determine whether they were 
correctly coded. This was done extensively to the existing incidents in the GTD. 
However, it is not possible to do this with the PGIS 1993 totals and this builds error into 
my model when I use this data. Second, the country-level totals were never reconciled 
with the GTD2 definition-less criteria by the GTD team as discussed above. The 
synthesis process to reconcile GTD1 incidents with the GTD2 definition-less criteria 
likely would have excluded some of these incidents and this adds another layer of error 
into my model. In addition, I have undertaken to remove all incidents from the GTD that 
included any military targets so as to provide as clean an association as possible between 
state instability and terrorism. (For more information on this, please see the Da a 
Appendix.) I simply cannot do that with the PGIS 1993 totals given the lack of incident 
details to examine, such as target type.  
Finally, the GTD team discovered that the PGIS yearly reports of the total number 
of incidents never completely matched the incident totals in the original GTD before the 
synthesis. The reports generally overestimated the amount of terrorism by an average of 
several hundred incidents per year. The possible sources for this mismatch are outlined




the GTD relative to the over-count in the PGIS reports is that when the data were 
computerized, duplicate incidents were deleted. In addition, PGIS often recorded updates 
to existing cases much like they recorded new incidents, with a separate index card. PGIS 
may have accidentally counted these update cards as new incidents. Whatever t e sou ce 
of the mismatch in counts, the fact that there is a mismatch between data in the GTD and 
the PGIS report totals indicates that there is another source of error introduced into my 
analysis with the use of the PGIS 1993 totals, which may overestimate the level of 
terrorism in that year. However, the introduction of these sources of error into my model 
is outweighed by the bias created by the loss of an entire year of data. In order to include 
the country totals for 1993 in my analysis, I undertook a cleaning process to make the 
PGIS totals as comparable as possible to what the data totals would look like. I describe 
this process below. 
First, I compared the PGIS 1992 and the GTD 1992 total counts by country. Due 
to the loss of duplicates in the computerized GTD and the synthesis process, the PGIS 
1992 and the GTD 1992 differed by 288 incidents, or 5.3% of the PGIS total for 1992. In 
addition, I must adjust the PGIS total to account for my decision to delete terrorism 
incidents that involved military targets from the GTD. When the deleted military 
incidents are accounted for, this brings the differential between PGIS 1992 and GTD 
1992 total difference to 783 incidents or 14.5% of the PGIS 1992 total. This was done for 
each country separately. I did the same for the 1994 in PGIS and 1994 GTD, which 
differed by 380 incidents or 9.9% of the total PGIS 1994 incidents. The deleted military 
incidents brought the differential up to 797 incidents, or 26.3% of the 1994 PGIS total. I 




adjust the 1993 PGIS totals downward to account for the mismatch between GTD and 
PGIS, the cases lost due to the synthesis and the deletion of military incidents.6 I 
multiplied the averaged proportion and the 1993 totals in PGIS by country to estimate 
1993 total incidents by country. I used this estimated 1993 in the analyses. Although 
there is certainly bias introduced by the use of the estimated 1993, it is outweighed by the 
bias created by the loss of the entire year of data. 7 
Dealing with the GTD Weaknesses 
The first issue to be dealt with is the variation in media reporting across countries 
due to freedom of press. Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to this problem. There 
are no data on the degree of media penetration nor on the freedom of the press across the 
world for the period from 1970 to 2005. Van Belle (1997) undertook collection of a 
dataset on press freedom that examines the period from 1970 to 1995 for 2/3 of the 
nations in my dataset, however. I am not willing to truncate my data at 1995 nor am I 
willing to lose one-third of the nations in my sample since the bias created by this da a 
loss outweigh the omitted variable bias of not controlling for press freedom. Yet, I did 
examine the correlation between this data and a related concept. Press freedom is much 
more controlled in autocratic regimes so that it is reasonable to assume that con rolling 
for autocracy would begin to control for press freedom. In fact, the concepts are quite 
related with a correlation of -.5037. This indicates a moderate, negative relationship 
                                                        
6. If the state was no longer in existence or had 0 incidents for 1992, I used the 1994 proportional 
difference between the GTD and the PGIS report and vice versa. Thus, I used both years of data to estimate 
the 1993 totals by country when both years had data. When only one year, either 1992 or 1994, had 
reported incidents, I only used that one year of data.  
 
7. I ran the models both with the adjusted 1993 PGIS totals as well as without 1993. They were 
substantively the same. Since there were no substantive differences across the models, I ran all subsequent 





between autocracy and press freedom with more autocratic states experiencing l ss press 
freedom. In addition, since I utilize the fixed effects modeling technique, which controls 
for time-stable unobserved differences between countries, the omitted variables bias 
threat only arises from changes in press freedom within-country. Although neither the use 
of the autocracy measure to proxy for press freedom nor the use of fixed effects to control 
out time-stable differences between countries on press freedom (among other time-stable 
differences between countries) are perfect solutions, they do begin to deal with the 
variation in reporting by the freedom of the press in a way that does not truncate my 
sample of countries and years.  
The second issue is the problem of missing information in reported incidents. 
Fortunately, I rely mainly on the country/location and year fields, which were quite 
complete. In fact, all incidents that were missing on either of these filds were tracked 
down and corrected by the GTD team. Thus, this is less of a concern in my analyses. 
The third and fourth issues are the change in data collection agencies and the 
methodologies of collection as well as the non-systematic updating of data for count ies 
such as the United States and South Africa. I addressed the third problem by including an 
indicator for the data collection agency in all models.8 I address the fourth problem using 
statistical controls. I use a fixed effects negative binomial regression model to analyze the 
relationship between terrorism and state instability. This method basically allows for each 
country to serve as its own control over the years of inclusion in the sample. It only 
                                                        
8. The model results I present here do include an indicator for the data collection agency. The 
results for this indicator will be presented in Chapter 4. I also ran a negative binomial regression that 
calculated robust standard errors and clustered by country-group using this indicator. In these analyses, an 
indicator for the GTD2 data was a negative and statistically significant predictor of terrorism, but no 
changes were observed in the theoretical variables of interest. In addition, I ran separate models for GTD1 





models the variation within the country to estimate the coefficients. It does not utilize the 
between-country variation when estimating the effects of state instability on terrorism. In 
this way, I am able to essentially ignore these issues since my model does not r ly on the 
problematic variation between countries that these weaknesses raise. 9 
In the end, the GTD, though an imperfect database is by far the best open-source 
dataset available to study domestic and international terrorism from 1970 to 2007. In fact,
it is surprising how the cross-national homicide statistics are unable to attain the same 
level of coverage of states across the world through official data collection chan els. Yet, 
the GTD has managed to amass data on far-flung and developing nations through the 
open-source media. I turn now to the independent variable of interest, state instability.  
Independent Variable of Interest 
 The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) data are my source for the main 
independent variable of interest, state instability. At the behest of Vice President Albert 
Gore’s office and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence, a task 
force was convened in 1994 to determine the predictors of what was then-termed state 
failure. The task force was composed of academic experts from around the countryand 
partnered with the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network and 
Science Applications International Corporation. They began by examining profound 
failures, such as that which occurred in Somalia, but they broadened their focus to 
include political instability and state fragility over time. They examined all state 
                                                        
9. In sensitivity analyses, I also ran a negative bnomial regression that calculated robust standard 
errors and clustered by country-group. In these analyses, an indicator for the GTD2 data was a negative and 
significant predictor of terrorism. However, when separate models were run for GTD1 and GTD2 data, no 
substantive differences were seen in my theoretical variables of interest. I also included controls for the 
United States, South Africa and Northern Ireland in these models, all of which were significant predictors 





instability episodes in states over 500,000 population from 1955-2007 (though here, I 
only utilize the data from 1970 to 2005 onwards to ensure the same number of state-years 
of terrorism and instability and the control variables).  
 State failure is defined by the PITF as “a label that encompasses a range of severe 
political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by macro-societal events such as those 
that occurred in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) in 
the 1990s” (Marshall, 2009a: PITF data page). Political instability is describ d as partial 
state failure (Marshall, 2009a: PITF data page). Political instability is operationalized as 
the presence or absence of four discrete events or a combination of them termed 
“complex”. The four events are: revolutionary war, ethnic war, adverse regime change, 
and genocide. 
 Revolutionary war consists of “episodes of violent conflict between governments 
and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow te central 
government, to replace its leaders or to seize power in one region. Conflicts must include
substantial use of violence by one or both parties to qualify as ‘wars’” (Marshall, Gurr 
and Harff, 2009: 5). These politically organized groups can include revolutionary groups, 
political parties, student organizations or state agents such as the military or regime 
members. The majority, however, have been guerrilla armies. There are two minimum 
thresholds for an event to qualify as a revolutionary war: mobilization and conflict 
intensity. The mobilization threshold dictates that both sides must have at least 1000 or
more people involved in the cause; this can include demonstrators or troops. The conflict 
intensity threshold directs that at least 1000 conflict deaths must occur over the full




period more than three years in a row without at least 100 fatalities. Conflict-related 
fatalities are defined rather broadly; they can result from “armed confli t, terrorism, 
rioting or government repression” (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 5).10 
 Ethnic wars are defined as “episodes of violent conflict between governments and 
national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the 
challengers seek major changes in their status” (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 6). It 
does not include warfare between different ethnic groups unless political power or 
government policy is part of the conflict. The same two minimum thresholds apply to 
ethnic wars as revolutionary wars: the mobilization and conflict intensity thresholds. The 
majority of these types of wars have involved guerilla or civil wars where t challengers 
have sought some type of independence or self-determination.11  
Adverse regime changes are “major, adverse shifts in patterns of governanc , 
including major and abrupt shifts away from more open, electoral systems to closed, 
authoritarian systems; revolutionary changes in political elites and the mod of 
governance; contested dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial are  of 
a state by extrajudicial means; and or near-total collapse of central sta e authority and the 
ability to govern” (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 10).  
                                                        
10. An example of a revolutionary war occurred in Guinea from September 2000 to March 2001 
(Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009). Rebel groups attack Guinean forces in the Parrot's Beak region from 
bordering areas of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Rebellion is crushed in March 2001 (Revolutionary war: 9/00-
3/01).  
 
11. An example of an ethnic war occurred in Chad from October 2005 to January 2007 (Marshall, 
Gurr and Harff, 2009). Dominance of the central government by President Déby's clan and ethnic-Zaghawa 
supporters led to a mutiny by elements of the army in October 2005, a coup attempt in March 2006, and an 
attack on the capital in April 2006 (Ethnic war: 10/05[-1/07]). Failing to unseat the government, FUC rebel 
forces took refuge in border regions with Sudan and Central African Republic. A peace agreement with the 
rebels was reached in December 2006 and fighting largely ended in January 2007. The FUC leader, Capt. 





Adverse regime change is operationalized first as a six point or more drop in the 
nation’s POLITY score. This is a change towards the -10 end of the POLITY scale (fully 
institutionalized autocracy) and away from the +10 end of the scale (fully 
institutionalized democracy) from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007). 
Though a six-point drop may seem arbitrary, the POLITY coders assert that it is  
meaningful metric by which to capture the associated qualitative changes in the openness 
of the executive politics or political competitiveness. They defined borderline countries 
(approximately 15% of the total number of cases) as those experiencing a four-point drop 
and reviewed them individually to assess whether they should be included.  
To assess the collapse or near-collapse of central authority, they first defined this 
collapse or near-collapse to include revolutionary changes in the central authority, 
contested state dissolutions, and a general collapse of central state authority w ich may 
have been due to internal war, corruption, poverty, failure of leadership, etc. Generally, 
this involves the inability to control at least half of the state’s territory or population by 
failing to provide basic human services (administrative incapacity) and security and the 
authority to enforce it (coercive incapacity). They used the Interregnum code in the 
POLITY IV data to identify periods during which there was a “complete collapse of 
central political authority” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007: 17). Adverse regime change 
involves either a rapid and distinct move towards autocracy and away from democracy or 
a collapse or near-collapse of central state authority.12  
                                                        
12. It is important to note that adverse regime changes are often short, usually lasting for no more 
than one month. Because these are so short in duration, my hypotheses will query whether their effects 
differ significantly from longer duration instability events, such as revolutionary war or ethnic war. 
Sometimes, these adverse regime change events occurred on their own, without stimulating another 
instability event. An example of this type of adverse egime change occurred in Bangladesh in January 
2007 (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009). Increasing tensions between the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist 




Genocide is the fourth included category. These events “involve the promotion, 
execution and / or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their 
agents – or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that result in the 
deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group” 
(Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 14). The genocide instability category includes both 
genocides and politicides, which are genocides of a people for their political beliefs. 
Victims of genocide are defined “primarily in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, 
religious) characteristics” while the victims of politicide are “defin d primarily in terms 
of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups” (Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff, 2009: 14). The purpose of genocide is to kill enough members of the reviled group 
such that they no longer pose a threat to the state’s grip on power or their interests.13  
Several criteria were used to fully get at the notion of genocide as opposed to just 
mass murder. First, there must be demonstrated a “persistent, coherent patter of ction” 
                                                                                                                                                                     
leads to a paralysis of the caretaker government and imposition of a military-backed State of Emergency on 
January 11, 2007. New elections are delayed while military government conducts "anti-corruption" 
campaign to diminish patronage structures built by party leaders Hasina and Zia (Adverse regime change: 
1/07 – 1/07).  
Other times, an adverse regime change stimulated a s cond instability, such as in Chile. There was 
an adverse regime change there in September 1973, which stimulated the onset of a genocide of people for 
their political beliefs from September 1973 until December 1976 (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009). 
President Allende's democratically elected socialist government is overthrown in military coup. General 
Pinochet consolidates power, dissolves Congress, and suppresses left and center opposition (Adverse 
regime change: 9/73-9/73). Supporters of former regim  and other leftists are arrested, tortured, 
disappeared, exiled, and summarily executed (Genocide: 9/73-12/76).  
Still other times, an adverse regime change was of long duration without stimulating any other 
instabilities. This occurred in Armenia from July 1995 until September 1996 (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 
2009). President Ter Petrossian suspends country’s most influential opposition party. Electoral malpractice 
and government intimidation tarnish subsequent legis ative and presidential elections. Generally, adverse 
regime changes are of short duration, however. Thatthis short duration could have an influence on the 
terrorism expected when they occur is precisely whythe effects of adverse regime change will be explicitly 
examined in the second set of hypotheses.  
 
13. An example of a genocide (of a political group) occurred in Uganda from February 1971 to 
April 1979 (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009). Gen. Idi Amin seizes power in 1971 and systematically 
exterminates political opponents and personal enemies. Tribes closely associated with his predecessor al  





(Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 15) by the government, a dominant social group or one 
of the parties to an internal war to intentionally end the existence of a set of people living 
in that state. It must be a sustained pattern of action covering six months or more. Third, 
the victims must be unarmed civilians. Fourth, they chose not to specify a threshold of 
casualties in order to allow for the inclusion of genocides of groups that were quite small. 
It simply needed to be a substantial portion of the existing group.  
The last instability type is the complex category. This includes any combination of 
the instabilities occurring at the same time or within a five-year period of one another. 
This catch-all was created and used in the coding scheme partially because it wa  
determined that instabilities which occurred so close in time to one another could not be 
analytically separated from one another when searching for causation.  
I also created several new concepts, which ought to be defined in this study. I use a 
country-year dataset, which contains one row in the data for each year for every stat  in 
the sample. The unit of analysis is the state-year. St bility refers to a state-year in which 
instability did not occur. Instability describes a state-year in which instability did occur. 
A non-complex singular instability is just one episode of the four types of instability 
within a five-year period (ethnic war, revolutionary war, adverse regime change, and 
genocide). In contrast, a complex singular instability describes a state-year in which an 
instability occurred in that year and then, another within five years. These epi odes did 
not occur in the same year, however. Finally, a same-year complex instability is 
composed of a state-year in which multiple instabilities occurred in that year, such as 




Strengths of the PITF Data  
There are four main strengths of the PITF data. First, regional and subject matter 
experts collected the PITF data. These experts were overseen in the collection process by 
a widely respected panel of academic scholars who consulted on matters of definition and 
specific case collection and coding. This depth of expertise makes these data 
extraordinarily valuable. Second, the PITF, like the GTD, has global coverage, over a 
long period of time. The data used in this analysis span 1955 to 2007, and annual updates 
are offered approximately one to two years behind real time. The coverage with r gards 
to states is also quite wide. Though there is a population minimum of 500,000 persons, 
when a state passes this minimum threshold, it is added to the sample of states and data 
are collected for the time frame.  
Third, the PITF data were collected and coded by type of instability. This is unlike 
the POLITY state failure code, which is a single unitary code that does not allow for 
disaggregation by type of instability nor does the POLITY data clearly lay out what types 
of events would count as a complete collapse of the central government (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2008). Because the PITF data separate the events by type, such as ethnic war, 
revolutionary war, adverse regime change and genocide, it is possible to run analyses by 
type of instability. This is important, because there are likely different causes and 
different effects of each type of instability. Most important here are the different effects; 
it is reasonable to expect that ethnic war will have a much different effecon levels of 
terrorism as an outcome than adverse regime change due to the differing levels of control 
exerted by the state over the actions of individuals in those situations. I take advantage of 
this disaggregation and will run the analysis accounting for type of instability so as to 




And finally, the PITF provides clear information on the definitional and operational 
criteria used to collect and code the data and the data narratives. The narratives provide a 
small paragraph with the basic details of the instability for each state. The narratives even 
break down the complex category into the component types that make up that instability 
period. There is a separate paragraph for each period of instability. The clear oper tional 
criteria and the narrative paragraphs make the data customizable to the user. For example, 
to avoid confounding the independent variable of state instability with the dependent 
variable, terrorism, I have excluded all terrorism campaigns from the data as  period of 
instability. I have also excluded all government reactions that are a dict result of the 
terrorism campaign from being counted as a period of instability. These ar  discussed in 
depth in the Data Appendix. This would not be possible without the final strength of this 
data, the clear operational criteria and data narratives. I turn now to the weakness s of the 
PITF data.  
Weaknesses of the PITF Data 
 It is important to note that the weaknesses of the PITF data discussed below are 
serious but not insurmountable. After I discuss the weaknesses of the data for each typ  
of instability, I lay out a plan to address these as best as possible. I turn now to a criticism 
of the overall PITF data before criticizing the data for each type of instability.  
The first and most obvious weakness of the PITF data is the broadness of its 
definition and operationalization. The definition and operationalization is extremely 
broad and covers two types of war, change in governance type and complete collapse of 
the central government and indiscriminate slaughter of civilians based on ethnic or 




operationalization encapsulates only one definition of state instability or if it contains a 
mixture of several of them.  
Second, the data were collected by subject matter and regional experts whose 
methodology and source material have not always been clear, though the definitions a d 
operational criteria have been. To guard against the effects of lack of clarity in 
methodology, I use the discrete event data rather than relying on the more subjective 
ratings of the intensity and magnitude of the instability. Further, only thosestates which 
have achieved and maintained a 500,000 person population are eligible for inclusion in 
the dataset. This biases the data and does not allow it to speak to the workings of smaller 
states. In addition, there are individual weaknesses for the ways in which each type of 
instability were operationalized and collected. I review these below.  
Ethnic and Revolutionary War 
 The PITF uses a minimum conflict deaths threshold to regulate the inclusion of 
conflicts into the ethnic war and revolutionary war categories. To review, the threshold is 
1000 or more conflict deaths over the full conflict, with at least 100 fatalities in a year 
and no period longer than three years without 100 fatalities. In addition, there must be at 
least 1000 persons mobilized in the conflict. This high bar means that the data are biased 
against smaller conflicts and those conflicts that occurred in states with poorer data 
collection procedures for recording conflict deaths. Although there are datasets which use 
a lower threshold for inclusion (such as the Uppsala data discussed in Gleditsch et al., 
2002), they were compiled by different individuals. Relying upon those data would 
introduce a bias in the independent variable by virtue of the different collectors. This is 
undesirable. As Gleditch et al. (2002) discuss, the issue is primarily a methodological one 




‘not enough wars’ for statistical analyses over shorter periods of time” (Glditsch et al., 
2002: 617).  
Further, the accuracy of the counts of mobilized individuals and conflict-related 
deaths may be questioned. As LaFree and Tseloni (2006), among many others, note, 
cross-national homicide statistics in stable countries are often poor. Yet, the counts relied 
upon to form the basis of inclusion as an ethnic or revolutionary war are collected and 
reported in conflict-ridden states. This likely means that conflicts that ought to have been 
included may have been inaccurately excluded from the independent variable’s ethnic 
and revolutionary war category, and vice versa. Thus, clearly, this category includes 
biased data.  
To guard against this problem in the analysis, I have disaggregated the 
independent variable by instability type and will be able to observe the independent 
effects of ethnic war and revolutionary war. I choose to use the PITF data although I 
recognize that it is biased against smaller wars as well as those that occurred in nations 
with poorer data collecting capabilities. I turn now to the weaknesses of the genocide 
data.  
Genocide 
 The genocide dataset, originally compiled by expert Barbara Harff, is basically 
the only one in existence due to its coverage over time and space. The major weakness of 
the genocide data is the highly subjective nature of the collection criteria. Unfortunately, 
demonstrating a “persistent, coherent pattern of action” (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009: 
15) for six or more months by the government, a social group or combatants in a civil war 
may prove difficult to execute consistently over the entire sample. In addition, the lack of 




mass murder of tiny social groups to be included in the sample as genocide. On the other 
hand, it also means the data are not uniform across social groups. In addition, it is not 
clear what proportion of the group needs to be killed in order for it to meet the 
“substantial portion” of the group threshold. These subjective collection criteria will 
likely lead to data inconsistency across nations and regions. I use it knowing that the d ta 
are likely inconsistent but also that it is unparalleled in the field. I turn now to adverse 
regime change. 
Adverse Regime Change  
 Adverse regime change draws upon a well-established political dataset on the 
regime characteristics of states and their place on the continuum of governance. POLITY, 
currently in its fourth incarnation, is a well-established expert review dataset which 
scores regimes from -10 for a full autocracy to +10 for a full democracy (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2007). A weakness of the PITF data is that it uses an admittedly arbitrary cutoff 
on this scale to identify an adverse regime change. Although Marshall, Gurr and Harff 
(2009) assert that a six-point drop in a POLITY score (always towards autocracy) is 
meaningful, they offer no evidence to support its substantive meaning. However, the 
PITF staff review all borderline cases, which are defined as four-point drops, for potential 
inclusion in the adverse regime change category; these borderline cases constitute 15% of 
the total. The second criterion for inclusion in the adverse regime change cate ory is also 
decided by expert review. This second criterion is the interregnum code in POLITY (-77) 
and is called upon when the central government suffers a complete collapse (Mar hall 
and Jaggers, 2007). This criterion may suffer from inconsistent coding across natins and 




the weakness of the adverse regime change category stem primarily from the arbitrariness 
of the cut-off.  
 Overall, the largest concern over the PITF data stems from the use of expert 
review without significant information regarding the methods used to build the dataset. 
Since the portion of the PITF that I use here simply categorizes the fairly public discrete 
events that have occurred, I have less concern over the lack of publicity regarding their 
methods. Over the course of the analyses to follow, I will conduct sensitivity anal ses 
and robustness checks to ensure the robustness of my results.  
The Dependent and Independent Variables 
 For the dependent variable, I use the total number of terrorism incidents per state-
year for the states and years included in this analysis (see table 12 in the Data Appendix). 
In order to avoid confounding the independent and dependent variables, I exclude all 
terrorism incidents in which any target type identified is a nation’s military. I exclude the 
military targets, because two of the state instability categories involve war. This is a 
conservative way to avoid double-counting an incident against a military as part of a war 
instability event. The exclusion of military-targeted incidents is necessary, because if I 
did not, I could be running the risk of using events to code times of instability to predict 
terrorism incidents that are composed of those same events. This strategy is discussed in 
more depth in the Data Appendix.  
 For Hypothesis 1, I use a state-year indicator of instability as my main instability 
variable, which is a 1 for the state-years in which there is an ongoing instability event in 
that nation, and 0 for all other years. To test Hypotheses 2, 2a and 2b, I use dichotomous 
variables for each type of instability, which are coded as a 1 for each year that type of 




dichotomous variables to indicate complex singular instability, non-complex singular 
instability, same-year complex instability and stability when each occurs. I turn now to a 
description of the control variables.  
The Control Variables 
 Attaining adequate control variables for the period from 1970 to 2007 for all 
states over 500,000 population is a difficult task. Unfortunately, the states of greatest 
interest here, the ones suffering a state instability and / or terrorism, ae perhaps the least 
likely to have reliable and valid data collected about their political, social and economic 
characteristics. For this reason, I have decided to take a multi-pronged approach to 
maximize the number of state-years that can be included in the analysis while balancing 
the need to include control variables to guard against omitted variable analysis.  
The first model, Model 1, includes basic control variables that have the most 
states and years with complete data on the country’s demographics, governance and 
information on whether states that are contiguous via a land border or a river border are 
contemporaneously suffering state instability. There are 147 countries and 35 years of 
data, from 1970-2005, in the sample for Model 1, which I call Sample 1. The next model, 
Model 2, includes population age structure and social and economic development 
variables from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database for 116 nations 
from 1981-2005. I call this sample of countries and years Sample 2. The final model, 
Model 3, includes data on the characteristics of ethnic minorities at risk from the 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset for 82 nations from 1990-2005. This final sample of 
countries and years is called Sample 3. In order to justify statistical inferences across the 
three models, I will replicate the Model 1 analysis on Samples 2 and 3. The comparisn 




the effects of sample selection bias in Models 2 and 3 results as well as the effects of 
omitted variable bias on Models 1 and 2. I describe all three sets of control variab es 
below, and I mark which variables are included in each model. I describe the summary 
statistics for each sample in the first section of Chapter Four, where I describe the results, 
and in tables 4-7, which contain these summary statistics. 
It is important to note that the country-year coverage is also contained in table 12 
in the Data Appendix. The first column is a listing of all of the states included in Sample 
1. The second column includes all of the years each state has data on the country’s 
demographics, governance and contiguity characteristics. In essence, this olumn either 
includes the entire observation period (1970–2005) or the first year of data collection 
after the birth of the state and the final year of the observation period as the end year or 
the first year of the observation period and the final year of data collectin upon the death 
of the country. The next two tables in the Data Appendix contain the countries and years 
for which there are available data for Sample 2 and Sample 3.  
It is important to include control variables in my analyses to guard against omitted 
variable bias, because if these variables are excluded from the model and are related to 
both terrorism and other independent variables that are included in the model, the 
coefficients for the included variables will be biased. The domains that I test wi h the 
control variables I use in my models have all been demonstrated to have important effects 
on terrorism and / or terrorism. These domains include country-level demographics 
(Piazza, 2008), governance characteristics (Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005), instability in a 
neighboring state (Iqbal and Starr, 2008), population age demographics (LaFree and 




ethnic minority group characteristics (Marshall, 2002; Gurr and Marshall, 2000). I turn 
now to the description of the control variables. I expand on these prior works by 
including some new innovative measures of economic development, such as the Food 
Price Index, and the level of carbon dioxide emissions in the state, which to my 
knowledge have not been used in the instability and terrorism literature. Further, I 
examine the effects of many controls on domestic and transnational terrorism back to 
1970, which to my knowledge has not been done before while testing the instability – 
terrorism relationship. A listing of the variables and the domains they measure is found in 
table 1. 
Table 1. Variables and their domains 
Variables Domain 
Terrorism incidents Dependent variable of interest 
Instability Main theoretical variable of interest; tests breakdown theory 
Hypothesis 1 Instability 
Hypothesis 2 Instability by type 
  Complex instability (complex singular and same-year) 
  Ethnic war 
  Genocide 
  Adverse regime change 
  Revolutionary war 
Hypotheses 3 & 4 Multiple instabilities & temporal density 
  Stability 
  Complex singular instability 
  Non-complex singular instability 
  Same-year complex instability 
    
Model 1: Governance, contiguity and country demographics 
Governance Type of governance on terrorism 
Full autocracy An autocratic government (-6 through -10 on polity2) 
Full democracy A democratic government (+6 through +10 on polity2) 
Transitional Neither fully democratic nor autocratic (-5 through +5, -66, -77) 
    
Contiguous state instability Possible diffusion of violence across contiguous state borders 
    





Total population Total size of the population 
Population change Percent change in population size 
Population density  The dispersion of the population per square kilometer 
Urbanity The percentage of citizens living in cities 
Land area  Total land area 
    
Data collection agency Divergent methods of collection for GTD1 & GTD2 
    
Model 2: Population age structure and social and economic development. 
Population age structure Bulges in certain age groups ought to effect terrorism differently 
% Population aged 0-14 Percent of the population from 0-14 
% Population aged 15-65 Percent of the population from 15-65 
% Population aged 65+ Percent of the population from 65+ 
    
Social and economic 
development   
Telephone lines Proxies for social development of the society 
GDP per capita Size of the current economy 
Change in GDP per capita Change in the size of the current economy 
Food production index Represents a more agriculturally based economy 
CO2 emissions Proxies for an industrial or industrializing society 
    
Model 3: Ethnic minority group characteristics 
Religious restrictions Religious discrimination may generate the motive for terrorism 
None None 
Informal Informal restriction on the group's practice of their r ligion 
Some  Some restriction on the group's practice of their rl gion 
Sharp Sharp restriction on the group's practice of their r l gion 
    
Political discrimination Political discrimination may generate the motive for terrorism 
None None 
Neglect with help 
Historical neglect of the group's political participation but policies to 
right this 
Neglect 
Historical neglect of the group's political participation but no policies to 
right this 
Social exclusion Social exclusion of the group from political participation 
Formal exclusion Formal exclusion of the group from political participation or repression 
    
Economic discrimination Economic discrimination may generate the motive for terrorism 
None None 
Neglect with help 
Historical neglect of the group's participation in the economic sphere 
but policies to right this 
Neglect 
Historical neglect of the group's participation in the economic sphere 
but no policies to right this 






Formal exclusion of the group from participation in the economic 
sphere 
    
Protest Political protest activity of the group may lead to or replace terrorism 
None None 
Verbal 
Verbal or written forms of political protest, such as letter writing or 
petitions 
Symbolic 
Sabotage, symbolic destruction of property or political activity like sit-
ins 
Small Participation in demonstrations, etc. with 10,000 or less people 
Medium Participation in demonstrations, etc. with 10,000 - 100,000 people 
Large Participation in demonstrations, etc. with 100,000+ people 
    
Group spatial distribution 
Distribution of ethnic minority groups may influence the amount of 
terrorism 
Dispersed Group is widely dispersed 
Urban Group is primarily urban or the minority in one region 
Regional Majority of the group is in one region 
Concentrated Group is concentrated in one region 
 
Model 1 Control Variables: Country Demographics, Governance and Contiguity 
Characteristics 
First, I control for regime type. Regime type has been demonstrated in much of 
the previous literature as an important predictor of terrorism (Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005). I 
use the POLITY data to control for regime type. Specifically, I include dichotom us 
indicators of Full Autocracy and Full Democracy. Full autocracy is constructed from 
values of -10 through -6 on the polity2 scale and is a binary variable, with a 1 indicating 
that it is scored as a full autocracy and 0 otherwise. Full democracy is coded as +6 
through +10 on the same scale and is a binary variable, with a 1 indicating that it is 
scored as a full democracy. The reference category is the transitional government, -5 
through +5 on the same scale as well as the foreign interruption and interregnum codes. 14 
                                                        
14. It is important to note that the adverse regime change category of the state instability data was 
coded primarily from the POLITY data. As noted in the data section, it was primarily coded as a six-pont 




Next, I control for instability in a contiguous state. I utilize the Correlates of War 
Project’s Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006 to determine which countries share a land or 
river boundary (Correlates of War Project, 2009). I then use the contiguous nation’s own 
instability data (PITF) to code a dichotomous variable, 1 if any of the contiguous nations 
(those with a land or river shared border) were unstable in that year, and 0 if none of the 
contiguous nations were unstable in that year. 
I also control for the effects of some basic country demographic characteristi s. 
First, I control for the total size of the population. I use the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) population data here. I also examine annual percent 
change in population using WDI data to capture the effects of changing population levels 
on terrorism levels. I also look at the effects of p pulation density (per square kilometer) 
on terrorism levels using WDI data (World Bank, 2009). All three variables are 
continuous variables. I adjust the scale of the total population variable by dividing each 
observation by 100,000 so the standard errors and coefficients in my models are more 
easily estimated and are on-par with the rest of the variables in the model. 
I control for population size due to prior findings that a larger population size, a 
growing population and more densely packed population ought to increase levels of 
terrorism simply by increasing the number of potentially motivated offenders circulating 
                                                                                                                                                                     
an interregnum. Naturally, this shared coding brings up concerns about collinearity between the instability 
variables and the governance variables. The correlation between the full autocracy variable and the adverse 
regime change categories is -.0591, indicating onlya very small, negative relationship between them, and a 
correlation between the adverse regime change categories and full democracy of -.1491, indicating only a 
small, negative relationship between them. The correlation of .2442 between the adverse regime change 
categories and transitional governance variable that is the reference category in the analyses indicates  
small to moderate positive relationship. These small to moderate correlations indicate that including them 
in the same model is certainly possible without plaguing the model with multicollinearity issues. It is more 
important to include them and risk a small amount of multicollinearity than risk the larger omitted variable 





in the population as well as by increasing the probability that such motivated offenders 
will converge in time and space with unguarded targets in the absence of capable 
guardianship (Cohen and Felson, 1979). I also control for these population demographics 
based on prior literature on both state instability and war, two types of which are included 
as state instability types.  
I use World Bank data to control for the well-established relationship between 
urban dwelling and non-routine collective action (Snyder and Tilly, 1972). I control for 
the effects of urbanity, which is measured as the percentage of the total population which 
reside in cities. I also control for the size of the land area of the state (World Bank, 
2009). Both of these demographics are continuous variables. I divide the land area 
observations by 1,000,000 so that the standard error and the coefficient for this variable 
are on a similar scale as the rest of the variables in the model.  
I control for the degree of urbanity and the size of the land area of the state 
because of the extant literature. Crime rates and rates of non-routine collective action are 
higher in cities than in rural areas so all else equal, terrorism rates should be higher in 
highly urbanized societies (Snyder and Tilly, 1972). I control for the size of the land area 
of the state, because a larger land area may allow perpetrators of terrorist incidents or 
rebel groups to have more room to hide in the state (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). It may 
also indicate that the government may have a harder time maintaining its state integrity 
and may predispose the state to instability (Menkhaus, 2003).  
I also control for the data collection agency (GTD2) since I expect differences in 
the results based on the different ways in which the data were collected. This variable is 




 Please refer to table 12 at the end of the text for a list of the states and years 
included in Sample 1. I turn now to the variables included in Model 2.  
Model 2: Population Age Structure and Social and Economic Development 
 I describe the control variables I use in Model 2 below. I control for the age 
structure of the population – specifically, percent of the population aged 0-14, percent of 
population aged 15-64, and / or percent population aged 65 and over (World Bank, 
2009). These are continuous variables. The reference category is the over-65 age group.  
The idea behind controlling for the age-structure of the society is that crime and is
disproportionately committed by younger people. There are indications that the younger 
age groups disproportionately engage in terrorism as well (LaFree and Ackerman, 2009). 
If a society has an unusually large young-adult population, all else equal, the society
should have higher levels of terrorism.  
Unfortunately, the World Bank data are not structured such that the violent crime-
prone years (18-25) can be isolated, but it does begin to control for societies with a good 
deal of very young people, very old people and all of those in-between. An additional 
reason why it is important to control for the age structure of the state is thatthe typical 
recruitment pool for those committing both terrorism and the ethnic and revolutionary 
war types of state instability are younger people, certainly those under 65. A society with 
a surplus of these younger people in society should have a larger volume of both 
terrorism and instability, all else equal (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). However, it is 
important to note that these variables do not actually tap the ages of individuals 
committing terrorism. It is only an indicator of the distribution of the population in the 




 Social and economic development is often discussed as an important predictor of 
terrorism and as such ought to be controlled (Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2008; Marshall, 
2002). Regarding social development, I examine tel phone lines per 100 people, which is 
a continuous variable (World Bank, 2009). More landline telephones is used as a proxy to 
indicate that a society is more technologically and socially advanced. Such social 
development ought to affect terrorism levels and thus should be controlled.  
To get at the idea of economic development, I use several proxy indicators of the 
concept. I examine indicators of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the GDP 
change rate (World Bank, 2009) since more economically developed states may be less 
likely to experience terrorism. I also use the food production index, which measures the 
agricultural production of edible food, excluding coffee and tea (World Bank, 2009); this 
measure may indicate a more agriculturally based economy. I also use carbon dioxide 
emissions in kilotons to proxy for newly industrializing nations or fully industrialized 
economies versus primarily agrarian economies. These are all continuous variables. I 
adjust the scale of both the GDP per capita variable and the carbon dioxide emissions 
variable by dividing by 10,000.  
 It is generally acknowledged that economic development and strength ought to 
play some role in determining where terrorism occurs. However, GDP has never truly 
been shown as a consistent predictor of terrorism, with some studies reporting positive 
significant relationships (Piazza, 2008) and others reporting no relationship (Abadie, 
2006). To delve into this relationship, I have included a whole host of economic 
variables. With GDP per capita, I intend to tap the effects that the current siz  of the 




to capture the effects of changes in the size of the economy, both positive and negative. 
Both a rapidly growing or shrinking economy can create the motive for more terrorism. 
With the food production index, I try to capture the effects of a more agrarian economy. 
All else equal, I would expect less terrorism in a more agrarian society. F nally, the 
carbon dioxide emissions are intended to capture a rapidly changing industrial sec or or a 
well-developed industrial sector in comparison to a low-industry society. All else equal, I 
would expect more terrorism in a rapidly industrializing or an industrialized nation than 
in a non-industrial society. These economic variables are intended to capture the eff cts 
of the economy on the occurrence of terrorism.  
Table 12 at the end of the text lists the states and years available for the 
population age structure and social and economic development variables. I turn now to 
the control variables that will address the ethnic minority group characteristi s included 
in Model 3. 
Model 3: Ethnic Minority Group Characteristics  
I utilize the Minorities at Risk data (Minorities at Risk, 2008) to control for ethnic 
majority – ethnic minority relations within a state that may play a role in the outbreak of 
ethnic war and genocide on the one side and terrorism on the other. The Minorities at 
Risk dataset examines ethnic groups they term minorities at risk. A minority at sk is a 
group with definable hereditary cultural characteristics, such as custom, language or 
religion, whose membership in the group is recognized by others in the society, with a 
membership of at least 100,000 members (or 1% of a state’s population), and who is 
targeted by either malevolent or benevolent systematic differential treatment. Finally, the 




MAR data team has identified 282 ethnic minorities at risk from 1945-2006.15 Table 12 at 
the end of the text contains the list of states and years in this analysis.  
Using the MAR data, I control for group spatial distribution because a more 
concentrated group may be better able to mobilize for terrorism than a more widely
dispersed group. 16 Conversely, a dispersed group may be able to coordinate attacks in 
many more regions of the country. This is a scale variable in the original MAR data. I 
operationalize it for my analysis as a series of binary variables as follows. The reference 
category is a dispersed population, with no concentration. The next binary variable, 
Urban, is coded as a 1 when the group is either primarily in an urban area or constitutes 
the minority in one region in a country and is 0 otherwise. The next binary variable, 
                                                        
15. The MAR data are organized with group-country-year as the unit of analysis; that is, groups 
can cross countries so that country-year is not unique as a unit of analysis. In addition, there can be multiple 
MARs per country. In order to deal with the fact that there can be multiple MARs per country at the same 
time that there can be multiple countries per MAR, I chose to select one MAR per state. Following 
common practice (Pate, 2009, personal communication), I chose the MAR within a multiple-MAR state 
that had the highest level of political discrimination leveled against it. In the case of ties, I broke the tie by 
choosing the MAR with the highest level of economic discrimination leveled against it. When even that 
tied, I chose the MAR with the highest number unique id as a pseudo-random selection procedure. The 
unique ids were assigned by me while the data were sort d to within country-year and ascending levels of 
political discrimination. Given a double tie, I see no way in which the data are systematically made biased 
by the pseudo random selection procedure.  
It is important to note that this method of choosing MARs allows the MAR to vary per state-year 
so that the most discriminated against MAR per state-year will be chosen. By allowing the MAR chosen 
per state-year to vary, this introduces error into the model, but it also provides for a stricter testof the 
independent variable when the control variable is chosen at its highest level of political and / or economic 
discrimination. It also capitalizes on the state-year as the unit of analysis.  
 
16. For 229 of the 1242 observations for the group spatial distribution scale, there was missing 
data. I utilized the carry-forward method of missing data imputation in which the prior year’s data are
utilized to fill in the missing data. I did so with e advice and consultation of the MAR Research Director 
on the appropriateness of this method of imputation (Pate, 2009, personal communication). It is important 
to note that these data are missing because the data were not collected, not because they were unavailable. 
For 217 of the observations, it was one year of data missing. For 9 observations, I needed to fill in two
years of data with the non-missing observation coming from 2 and 3 years prior. For 3 observations, I 
needed to fill in three years of data with the non-missing observation coming from two, three and four years 
prior. The listwise deletion of these cases carried with it a higher risk of bias through sample selection than 
the error inherent in carrying forward the prior year’s data which would only introduce error if the 
observation would have changed values had it been observed. Pate (2009, personal communication) assured 





Regional, is coded as a 1 when the group constitutes a majority in one region and others 
are dispersed and is 0 otherwise. The final category and variable is Concentrated, which 
is coded as 1 when the group is concentrated in one region and is 0 otherwise.  
Next, I control for the degree of restrictions placed on the group’s practice of 
their religion. Restrictions on the practice of the group’s religion may create the motive 
for terrorism so it is important to include this variable in my analysis. This is a scale 
variable in the original MAR data.17 I disaggregate it into a series of dichotomous 
variables. The reference category is no religious restrictions, which is coded as 1 when no 
restrictions are placed on the group’s practice of religion. The next variable is Informal 
Restriction, which is coded as 1 when there is an informal but prevalent discrimination 
against the group’s practice of their religion and 0 otherwise. The next variable is Some 
Restriction, which is coded as 1 when there are some restrictions placed on the group’s 
practice of their religion and 0 otherwise. The final variable is Sharp Restriction, which 
as coded as 1 when the group’s practice of their religion is sharply restricted (CIDCM, 
2008).  
I also control for the degree ofeconomic and political discrimination faced by the 
group.18 It is important to control for these types of discrimination, because they may 
                                                        
17. I also utilized carry-forward imputation for the same 229 missing observations for this 
variable. See prior footnote.  
 
18. The economic and political discrimination variables were updated and the missing data that 
had not previously been collected were collected by members of the MAR team (Asal and Pate, 2005). I 
use this data to update the original MAR data on these variables so that there are no missing observations 
on economic and political discrimination. Error is introduced by using a separate source to update the 
missing observations. However, MAR team resources wre utilized in this update collection, and it was 
overseen by the MAR Research Director. Thus, the error introduced by using the updated data is 
outweighed by the costs of listwise deletion. It is al o outweighed by the costs of using carry-forward 
imputation with this variable as it is not a slowly-changing variable (Pate, 2009, personal communication). 
The tie-breaking procedure to choose the MAR group f r that year was performed again. The data are 





manufacture the motive for terrorism incidents. These are scaled variables, and they 
range from no discrimination, neglect with remedial policies intended to right this 
neglect, neglect without such policies, social exclusion and ineffective positive or neutral 
policy to right the effects of this social exclusion and finally, formal exclusion (from 
either political or economic participation) and repression (CIDCM, 2008). I break th se 
into a series of dichotomous variables as follows.  
The reference category for economic discrimination is no discrimination, which is 
coded 1 when there is no economic discrimination aimed at the group and 0 otherwise. 
The next variable is Economic Neglect with help, which is coded as 1 when the group 
suffers from historical neglect, such as being underrepresented in valued occupati ns or 
significant poverty, but the government has introduced policies to make the group’s 
economic situation better and 0 otherwise. The next variable is Economic Neglect, which 
is coded 1 when the group suffers from historical neglect, such as being underrepresented 
in valued occupations or significant poverty, but the government has not introduced 
policies to make the group’s economic situation better and 0 otherwise. The next variable 
is Economic Social Exclusion, in which a 1 means that the group has been excluded from 
valued occupations or is in significant poverty by social practice but not by formal 
government practice and 0 otherwise. The final economic discrimination variable is 
Economic Formal Exclusion and is 1 when the government takes formal steps to exclude
the group from meaningful economic participation compared to other groups and is 0 
otherwise. 
The reference category for political discrimination is no discrimination, which is 




next variable is Political Neglect with help, which is coded as 1 when the group suffers 
from historical neglect, such as being underrepresented in the public sphere, but the 
government has introduced policies to make this neglect better and 0 otherwise. The next 
variable is Political Neglect, which is coded 1 when the group suffers from historical 
neglect, but no government policies have been undertaken to right this wrong and 0 
otherwise. The next variable is Political Social Exclusion, in which a 1 means that the 
group has been excluded from the political process by social practice but not by formal 
government practice and 0 is otherwise. The final political discrimination variable is 
Political Formal Exclusion and is 1 when the government takes formal steps to exclude 
the group from the political sphere or represses the group and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, I will control for group political activity. Finally, I will control for 
whether the group engages in group protest (MAR, 2008).19 Protest is a scaled variable, 
which ranges from verbal opposition, civil disobedience and small, medium and large 
physical gatherings of group members (including riots, strikes and rallies) (CIDCM, 
2008). It is important to control the political protest activity of a group since it will likely 
affect the levels of terrorism in a state by providing a legitimate altern tive to terrorism. 
Groups that are able to actively protest activities of the state may not need to turn to 
terrorism.  
I operationalize protest as a series of dichotomous variables as follows. The 
reference category is no protest. The next category and variable is Verbal Protest, which 
                                                        
19. Rather than carry-forward imputation, I also updated the 229 missing observations that were 
not collected for this variable with an updated MAR dataset that was assembled by Steven Saideman upon 
the advice of the MAR Research Director (Pate, 2009, personal communication). The data are referenced 
here (Saideman and Lanoue, In Process). The error int duced by using a third source to update the missing 
observations is outweighed by the costs of listwise del tion. It is also outweighed by the costs of using 






is coded 1 when the group engages in verbal or written forms of political protest, such as 
letter writing or petitions, to gain regional independence or autonomy and 0 otherwise. 
The next category is Symbolic Protest which involves “[s]abotage, symbolic destruction 
of property OR political organizing activity on a substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage 
of traffic)” (CIDCM, 2008: 22) and 0 otherwise. Small Protest is coded as 1 when the 
participation in the protest activity does not number above 10,000 people and 0 
otherwise. Medium Protest is coded 1 when the number of protest participants is between 
10,000 and 100,000 and 0 otherwise. Finally, Large Protest is coded 1 when the 
participation is more than 100,000 persons and 0 otherwise. I turn now to the central 
hypotheses in this study.  
Hypotheses 
 I have four main hypotheses in this study. The breakdown model predicts that 
non-routine collective action is more likely to occur after rapid social change. This is 
because the rapid social change may sever the social ties that bind the individual to the 
society and induce conformity. The rapid social change and the disruption to current 
social bonds also may inhibit the creation of new ties to the society. The disintegration of 
existing ties and the lack of creation of new ties are what suggest that terrorism, a form of 
non-routine collective action, may be more likely to occur during state instability, a form 
of rapid social change (Durkheim, 1930 [1951]; Useem, 1998). Thus, I hypothesize that 
changes in instability status will coincide with changes in terrorism. That is, the very 
same state should experience higher levels of terrorism when it changes to instability than 
during changes to stability. This leads me to H1, formally stated below.  





Breakdown suggests that once a rapid social change occurs, non-routine collective 
action may occur. However, not all rapid social change is created equally (Durkheim, 
1930 [1951]; Useem, 1998). Wars are likely to loosen controls on individuals’ behavior 
more dramatically and should increase levels of non-routine collective action more than 
other instability types. Adverse regime changes towards autocracy are likely to increase 
controls over the behavior of individuals because autocracies by their very nature control 
their citizens more than any other form of government. This high level of control may 
decrease the level of terrorism observed. Further, adverse regime changes tend to be 
short, usually contained during one month of a year. This would also suggest that the 
effects of adverse regime change on terrorism would be smaller. This difference by 
instability type is why it is important to analyze the relationship between instability and 
terrorism by type of instability. I have disaggregated all types of instability out to the 
state-year. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effects of changes in instabil ty status will 
vary by the type of instability that the state experiences. I expect that changes in adverse 
regime change should be associated with small increases in terrorism while changes in 
ethnic war or revolutionary war status should be associated with large increases in 
terrorism incidents. I have developed these expectations from the tenets of breakdown 
theory. This leads me to H2, formally stated below.  
H2: The effects of changes in instability status on changes in terrorism will vary 
by the type of instability experienced.  
 
H2a: Increases in adverse regime change should be associated with the smallest 
increases in terrorism.  
 
H2b: Increases in ethnic war or revolutionary war should be associated with larger 





 To review, complex singular instabilities refer to multiple instabilities hat 
occurred within five years but not within the same year. For example, a revolutionary war 
followed by an adverse regime change two years later would constitute two complex 
singular instabilities: complex-revolutionary war and complex-adverse regime change. A 
non-complex singular instability is the occurrence of ethnic war, or any other type, 
without any other form of instability occurring in that five-year period. Same-year 
complex instability is when a state experiences more than one instability in the same 
year. For example, this is when a state experiences an ethnic war in the same year as a 
genocide. It is possible to experience all four types within the same year. This hypothesis 
is a logical extension of breakdown theory and is intended to explore the effects of 
multiple instabilities on terrorism. When multiple rapid social changes occur, they should 
disintegrate the ties that bind individuals to society more than when one rapid social 
change occurs within a short time. Thus, one state instability should open the door to 
non-routine collective action like terrorism; more than one should create more breakdown 
in the society and create more terrorism due to the grating down of social ties. Finally, 
stability ought to be associated with less terrorism, because the state has not lost control 
over the actions of its citizens. H3 and its sub-hypotheses are stated below.  
H3: Increases in terrorism ought to occur when a state experiences increaes in 
complex singular instability as opposed to non-complex singular instability. 
 
H3a: Increases in terrorism ought to occur when a state experiences increaes in 
same-year complex instabilities relative to non-complex singular instablity. 
 
H3b: Decreases in terrorism ought to occur when a state experiences increases in 
stability relative to non-complex singular instability.  
 
For my final hypotheses, I examine not whether multiple instabilities produce 




implications for how much terrorism should occur. Temporal density refers to the number 
of instabilities that occurred within a time period; in this case, I refer to the number of 
instabilities within one year. The comparison is between state-years in which more than 
one instability occurred and state-years in which only one instability occurred (but 
multiple instabilities within five years). Here, I make a second logical extension to 
breakdown theory to hypothesize that a state should be even more at risk of terrorism 
when it is experiencing more than one instability in a year than when it is experiencing 
more than one instability within five years but not within the same year. This is because 
when multiple instabilities occur within the same year, the state should be in a downward 
spiral of problems caused by the disintegration of existing social ties and the lack of
creation of new social ties. This downward spiral ought to include plenty of terrorism so 
that more than one instability within the same year should be associated with more 
terrorism than multiple instabilities within a five-year period but not within te same 
year. That is, more terrorism should occur during same-year complex instabilities than 
complex singular instability if the temporal density of instability matters. Further, 
stability should be clearly associated with less terrorism than complex singular instability. 
I formally state my fourth hypothesis and sub-hypothesis below.  
H4: Increases in terrorism ought to occur when a state experiences increaes in 
same-year complex instability relative to complex singular instability. 
 
H4a: Decreases in terrorism ought to occur when a state experiences increa es in 
stability than when a state experiences complex singular instability.  
 
 I have hypothesized four sets of relationships here, with several sub-hypotheses. 




hypotheses are logical extensions of the breakdown model. In the next section, I describe 
my analytic strategy for testing these hypotheses.  
Analytic Strategy 
 Because the dependent variable is a count of the number of terrorism incidents 
within a given state-year, I use a statistical method that models count data appropriately. 
Linear regression is inappropriate for count data, because it can provide inefficie t, 
inconsistent and biased estimates (Long, 1997). There are several appropriate models to 
consider. I review these below. 
First, there is the classical Poisson model. This model treats the conditional 
variance as equal to the conditional mean, which is often unrealistic given the nature of 
most count data. In addition, Poisson often underpredicts the number of zeros (state-years 
with no terrorism) that should be in the sample (Long, 1997). Upon further examination 
of my data, I discovered that my data are in fact overdispersed and that there are many 
more zero country-years in my data than can be handled by the Poisson regression model 
(see table 3 for the frequency distribution of terrorism and table 4 for summary statistics 
of terrorism by sample). When I use a pooled Poisson regression with standard errors that 
take into account the clustering by country, the model under-predicts the volume of 
zeroes in the data and slightly overpredicts the counts of 1, 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2 
demonstrates the model fit of the four analytical strategies tested in thissection. The lines 
represent the difference between the observed and the specific model’s prediction of that 
count of terrorism incidents. The solid line with the closed circle represents the Poisson 
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Figure 2. Model fit of observed and predicted counts for four count models. 
Second, I tested a pooled negative binomial regression model (NBRM) with 
clustered standard errors. The negative binomial separately models the conditional 
variance from the conditional mean to account for overdispersion (Hilbe, 2007). In fact, 
in a pooled negative binomial regression model with standard errors that take into 
account the clustering by country, the likelihood ratio test for nested models rejects the 
null hypothesis of equidispersion, meaning that there is likely overdispersion (p <.000). 
In addition, it does not underpredict zeros as dramatically as the Poisson model. It 
achieves the best fit of all the models, as demonstrated in Figure 2. The solid line with the 
open circle represents the NBRM model, and it achieves the smallest differences between 
the observed and predicted counts 0 through 10. In addition to the good fit achieved by 
the pooled NBRM model, this model type is able to incorporate more rigorous controls 
for dependence of observations, such as fixed and random effects. Since this model was 
chosen, these extensions are explored later. I move next to the zero-inflated Poisson and 
negative binomial models. However, it is important to note that these zero-inflated 




The concept behind the zero-inflated models is simple. Statistically, they assume 
that two different data generation processes and thus statistical distribut ons underlie the 
observations that are zeros, states-years that have never experienced the depend nt 
variable, and the non-zeros, those that have experienced terrorism, possibly multiple 
times (Long, 1997). That is, those state-years that are a zero are allowed to follow their 
own distribution and are estimated separately using the logit or probit while the state-
years with greater than zero values follow their own distribution and are estimated 
separately using either Poisson or negative binomial. A downside to the zero-inflated 
models is their inability to incorporate fixed or random effects to control for 
dependencies within country-groups in the sample. They do allow for clustering by state 
so that I can start to control for the dependency.  
The zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) is better able to handle the volume of zeros than 
the PRM as evidenced in Figure 2. The dashed and dotted line with the closed triangle
represents the ZIP model. This line shows that the ZIP model provides a better fit to the 
data than the PRM, but it does not provide the best fit overall. The Vuong test, which is a 
test to determine whether the zero-inflation is necessary, rejects the Poisson model in 
favor of the ZIP model (p<.0000) (Erdman, 2008; Young and Dugan, Forthcoming). I 
turn now to the zero-inflated negative binomial model. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) demonstrates adequate mod l 
fit (see Figure 2). The dashed line with the open triangle represents the ZINB model, and 
it follows the NBRM line closely although the NBRM model fits slightly better. The 
Vuong test preferred the ZINB model over the NBRM (p<.0000). This suggests that I 




Figure 2, it is clear that the NBRM model provides a very adequate fit to the data as well. 
However, there are three other important criteria to consider. I turn to these now. 
First, I must consider whether I expect a theoretical and essentially qualitative 
difference between the processes that drive country-years with terrorism and those 
without (Long, 1997). I do not. My theoretical model predicts that any country-year can 
experience terrorism if it experiences breakdown, such as state instability, nd that 
breakdown does not influence how many incidents they suffer (counts) differently fom 
whether they experience terrorism (0/1). Without a theoretical model that predicts two 
different data generating processes, there is little reason to move to the zero-inflated 
model. The second criterion to consider is parsimony and the ease of interpreting model 
results (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The zero-inflated models are computationally 
complex as well as conceptually difficult to interpret. The final criterion to consider is the 
ZINB model’s inability to incorporate fixed and random effects. Fixed and random 
effects allow one to address the dependence between observations in addition to reducing
the omitted variables bias in the most rigorous way currently available. Thus, based on 
the three criteria discussed above as well as the adequate model fit provided by th  
NBRM, I have chosen the negative binomial regression model. 
Negative Binomial Regression Model 
Random Effects 
 The random effects negative binomial regression model (RENBRM) uses both 
within-country variation and between-country variation to estimate the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. This estimation technique allows the 
user to preserve the data for countries in which there is no variation on the dependent 




the variation between countries to produce the estimates. It assumes that thedifferences 
across countries and time are essentially random processes. The RENBRM also allows 
the user to examine independent variables that do not vary over time, which can be quite 
useful. However, the RENBRM does not allow for the independent variables to be 
correlated with the time-invariant portion of the error term (Dugan, 2010). In addition, 
the RENBRM may provide inconsistent estimators in cases in which the dependence 
between observations overwhelms the model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). I turn now to 
an explanation of the fixed effects negative binomial regression model before providing 
model fit statistics for each. 
Fixed Effects 
 In contrast, the fixed effects negative binomial regression model (FENBRM) only 
uses within-country variation to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variables. This type of analysis allows the purest theoretical test in thi  case, 
because it only uses the within-country variation to estimate the coefficients; specifically, 
it uses the deviations from the country-specific mean to estimate the coefficients. It 
essentially creates a series of dichotomous variables that allow the model to control for 
all of the time-invariant differences without knowing what those differences a tually are. 
The FENBRM reduces the correlations between the independent variables and the time-
stable unobserved differences (fixed effects) from the error term by absorbing them into 
the fixed effects. This is a much more realistic assumption in the prediction of terrorism 
than the no correlation assumption in the RENBRM model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
If there is enough variation in the dependent and independent variables to successfully 
estimate the model and to include time fixed effects, then, it is preferred because it llows 




concept, because it gets at the effects of instability itself most cleanly and most 
conservatively without contaminating the effect with between-country variation nd by 
using changes in instability to predict changes in terrorism. Thus, the FENBRM fits my 
theoretical model the best.  
There are three main downsides of using the FENBRM to control for dependence 
between observations. One is that since the model only uses within-country variation to 
produce the coefficients, it drops any observations that do not vary on the dependent 
variable over time. This is a serious drawback. Due to this lack of variation on the
dependent variable, four countries are lost in my model (from 151 countries to 147).20
Because the model only uses within-country variation to estimate the coefficients, the 
FENBRM model can produce larger standard errors. 21 The second downside is that the 
                                                        
20. The following countries were dropped from Model 1 because they did not experience any 
terrorism incidents over the observation period: Bhutan, Mongolia, Oman, and Turkmenistan. In addition, 
of these, only Oman experienced any instability which was a revolutionary war from 1970-1976. 
Fortunately, this is only a minor threat to my hypotheses and theoretical framework, because for threeof 
the four countries, no instability and no terrorism over the observation period is what I would expect given 
my theoretical framework. However, the case of Oman is slightly more problematic. Given my theoretical 
framework, I would expect that during the years of revolutionary war, Oman would have experienced 
terrorism incidents. This is not true. Since this only occurred in one country of my original 151 country 
sample, I am not very concerned that it constitutes a major threat to the validity of either breakdown theory 
or my model. Nonetheless, it is still an important contradiction of breakdown theory.  
 
21. I have also rerun all of my models by using an unconditional fixed effects negative binomial 
model by manually including time and country fixed ffects with clustered robust standard errors in a 
standard (NB2) negative binomial model. All theoretical variables of interest behaved as expected. 
However, in some models, the model was clearly losing efficiency (inflated standard errors) upon the 
inclusion of so many parameters. (Allison, 2009). I also ran the Allison (2009) hybrid unconditional fixed 
and random effects models. This model manually includes the means and deviations from means that are 
the hallmark of the fixed effects model in a random effects negative binomial model that includes time 
fixed effects. The story remained substantively the same and my theoretical variables behaved as expected. 
Since my theoretical variables of interest behaved as expected and the story remained the same, I do not 
present these models.  
To address potential serial correlation above and beyond that which the fixed effects negative 
binomial is already designed to handle (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009), I ran the standard Stata command for 
fixed effects negative binomial regression with bootstrapped standard errors. Bootstrapped standard errors 
at least theoretically control for serial correlation by sampling across clusters during the bootstrapping 
process when the standard errors are calculated (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The story remains 




FENBRM requires many degrees of freedom to compute, and it requires a good deal of 
variation on the independent and dependent variables to estimate the model. The third 
downside is that the model cannot estimate coefficients for independent variables th t do 
not vary over time. However, the advantages of reducing the correlation between the 
independent variables and the errors through the fixed effects as well as essentially 
controlling out across-country variation as an alternate explanation of any observed 
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable outweigh the inability to 
use time-invariant regressors. I turn now to a discussion of model fit indices.  
Model Fit Indices 
 I analyzed Model 1 using both the RENBRM and the FENBRM. The model fit 
indices indicate a clear preference for the fixed effects variant of the negative binomial 
regression model. I discuss these now. Hausman provides a test for this purpose. The null 
hypothesis is that the time-invariant part of the error term is uncorrelated with the 
regressors. If the null cannot be rejected, this means that the RENBRM is a con istent 
estimator. Since the RENBRM can be much more efficient than the FENBRM, this 
would provide strong support for the RENBRM (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). However, 
the null hypothesis is rejected (p<.01). This means that the RENBRM provides 
inconsistent estimates of the effects of the independent variables for Model 1. This is 
evidence in support of the selection of the FENBRM. 
Further, there are two model fit indices that are appropriate for non-nested models 
such as the FENBRM and the RENBRM. They are the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Both of these tests provide 
                                                                                                                                                                     
terrorism incidents. For simplicity’s sake, I present the results using the standard Stata command for fixed 





comparative fit indices, in which the log of the likelihood function is examined for each 
model, and then the model that provides the smallest values on either index, BIC or AIC, 
provides the best fit. In both cases, the AIC and the BIC prefer the FENRBM over the 
RENBRM as demonstrated in table 2. Given that both sets of model indices endorse the 
FENBRM and that I prefer the FENBRM as discussed above, I have chosen to estimate 
the remaining models with the FENBRM.22 Equation 1 describes the model I will be 
using for the rest of the study (StataCorp LP, 2009: 368).  
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The conditional log likelihood is contained in Equation 2.  
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where   exp./  011234 ,  is the weight for the ith group, and  
., … , .. In addition, I include time fixed effects in each model with 2005 excluded 
as the reference year. I include the time fixed effects because there are likely many 
changes over time between 1970-2005 that are likely to influence both instability and 
terrorism (Dugan, 2010).  
Table 2. RENBRM and FENBRM Fit Statistics 
                                                        
22. I reran Models 1, 2 and 3 excluding the 10 highest and lowest residuals, and I also reran the 
models excluding outliers (defined as more than 400 reported incidents per country-year). All models 





Criteria FENBRM RENBRM 
BIC 18176.58 20065.22 
AIC 17892.67 19767.24 
      
Hausman Test χ2(43) =72.83 p < .01  
 
I present my results with raw coefficients, in incidence rate ratios, and in the
predicted probability, expressed as the expected counts of terrorism incidents gv  that 
the control variables are held at certain values. Incidence rate ratios report exponentiated 
coefficients. The predicted probabilities I present actually predict the number of expected 
events which is more meaningful in this context, rather than the linear prediction, while 
holding certain interesting dichotomous control variables at 0 or 1 and all other 
continuous control variables at their median.23 I turn now to an explanation of the 
changes in data coverage across the control variables.  
Accounting for Differences in Data Coverage across Control Variables 
 In a perfect data world, I would be able to include as many control variables as I 
felt were needed to allow for the cleanest inferences about the relationship between 
political instability and terrorism. Unfortunately, the coverage in data sources does not 
allow for this for all states included here from 1970 to 2007. For these reasons, I have 
divided my analysis into three models, each with their own sample of nations and years.  
Model 1 uses country demographics, governance and contiguity characteristics 
control variables for Sample 1, which is composed of 147 nations from 1970 to 2005. 
Sample 1 contains a total of 4687 observations. It is important to understand that even 
this group of countries and years is a sample of the possible nation-states in the world. Of 
                                                        
23. I use the median because many of the control vaiables are skewed and the use of the median 





a possible 164 nations evaluated by PITF, only 147 are included in Model 1. I am unable 
to include such countries as Afghanistan and Iraq in Sample 1 due to the lack of basic 
country demographics from the World Bank data. This is particularly unfortunate, 
because these are perhaps the two countries in which state instability and terrorism are 
discussed the most in the policy and practitioner domain in recent years. However, due to 
the decade of war that each experienced, in Afghanistan the war to repel the Soviets fr m 
1979 to 1989 and in Iraq, the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, control variable data 
simply does not exist for these states. Further, the PITF data simply does not examine 
countries with less than 500,000 population, which they term micro-nations. These states 
are simply excluded from Samples 1, 2, and 3. In addition, the selection of 1970 as a 
starting year for countries that existed before this date is only a sample of possible years 
that is predicated on the beginning of the GTD data. In this way, even this large group of 
nations and years constitute a sample of the possible countries and years. However, to 
date, this is the most comprehensive examination of the relationship between domestic 
and transnational terrorism and state instability and represents a distinct improvement 
over prior efforts and a contribution to the literature.  
Model 2 adds population age structure and social and economic development 
control variables for Sample 2, 116 states from 1981 to 2005, with a total of 2624 
observations. Model 3 adds the ethnic and minority group characteristics for control
variables on Sample 3, 82 nations from 1990 to 2005, with a total of 1242 observations. I 
also replicate the Model 1 analysis on Samples 2 and 3. The comparison between the 
results of Models 2 and 3 allows me to examine the effects of omitted variable bias on the 




on Sample 1 and the Model 1 analysis on Samples 2 and 3 allow me to comment on the 









In this chapter, I begin by reviewing the summary statistics for terrorism and 
instability in each of my three samples. The samples varied from 147 nations from 1970 
to 2005 in Sample 1 to 116 nations from 1981 to 2005 in Sample 2 and finally, 82 nations 
from 1990 to 2005 in Sample 3. I also compare the samples to one another via the 
summary statistics for terrorism, instability and the common control variables, which are 
the variables that measure the country-level demographics, governance and contiguity of 
unstable nations. Then, I present the results for Hypothesis 1 for all three models. I also 
review the results of each model’s control variables in the context of Hypothesis 1. I u e 
these results as well as the results of the Model 1 replication on Samples 2 and 3 to 
comment on the degree of omitted variable and sample selection biases present in my 
models. Then, I conclude the chapter. I turn now to the summary statistics for the three 
samples. 
Summary Statistics Review for Sample 1 
In this section, I review the summary statistics for terrorism and instability for my 
three samples. Then, I compare across the samples to demonstrate the differences 
between each of them using the summary statistics on terrorism, instability nd he 
common control variables. I turn now to Sample 1. The summary statistics for each 
model and sample are contained in separate tables while the distribution of terrorism 





Table 3. Distribution of terrorism incidents for all samples (truncated at 47) 
Incidents  Sample 1 %a Incidents Sample 2 %a Incidents  Sample 3 %a 
0 2,358 50.31 0 1,105 42.11 0 434 34.94 
1 514 61.28 1 299 53.51 1 136 45.89 
2 286 67.38 2 168 59.91 2 98 53.78 
3 190 71.43 3 105 63.91 3 51 57.89 
4 136 74.33 4 86 67.19 4 38 60.95 
5 102 76.51 5 69 69.82 5 39 64.09 
6 83 78.28 6 51 71.76 6 29 66.43 
7 56 79.48 7 37 73.17 7 18 67.87 
8 42 80.37 8 25 74.12 8 11 68.76 
9 41 81.25 9 26 75.11 9 10 69.57 
10 44 82.18 10 32 76.33 10 17 70.93 
11 39 83.02 11 25 77.29 11 17 72.30 
12 28 83.61 12 18 77.97 12 10 73.11 
13 25 84.15 13 18 78.66 13 7 73.67 
14 24 84.66 14 17 79.31 14 8 74.32 
15 24 85.17 15 17 79.95 15 10 75.12 
16 28 85.77 16 18 80.64 16 7 75.68 
17 22 86.24 17 19 81.36 17 13 76.73 
18 23 86.73 18 16 81.97 18 9 77.46 
19 17 87.09 19 11 82.39 19 7 78.02 
20 15 87.41 20 8 82.70 20 4 78.34 
21 14 87.71 21 13 83.19 21 8 78.99 
22 19 88.12 22 13 83.69 22 10 79.79 
23 24 88.63 23 16 84.30 23 8 80.43 
24 9 88.82 24 6 84.53 24 1 80.52 
25 11 89.05 25 8 84.83 25 7 81.08 
26 9 89.25 26 8 85.14 26 5 81.48 
27 11 89.48 27 10 85.52 27 6 81.96 
28 11 89.72 28 9 85.86 28 4 82.29 
29 12 89.97 29 9 86.20 29 7 82.85 
30 12 90.23 30 9 86.55 30 8 83.49 
31 8 90.40 31 3 86.66 31 1 83.57 
32 6 90.53 32 3 86.78 32 1 83.66 
33 9 90.72 33 7 87.04 33 5 84.06 
34 5 90.83 34 3 87.16 34 2 84.22 
35 7 90.98 35 6 87.39 35 4 84.54 




Incidents  Sample 1 %a Incidents Sample 2 %a Incidents  Sample 3 %a 
37 8 91.27 37 5 87.80 37 3 85.10 
38 18 91.66 38 14 88.34 38 12 86.07 
39 4 91.74 39 3 88.45 39 2 86.23 
40 6 91.87 40 6 88.68 40 1 86.31 
41 8 92.04 41 6 88.91 41 4 86.63 
42 3 92.11 42 2 88.99 42 1 86.71 
43 6 92.23 43 5 89.18 43 3 86.96 
44 5 92.34 44 5 89.37 44 4 87.28 
45 6 92.47 45 5 89.56 45 2 87.44 
46 6 92.60 46 5 89.75 46 4 87.76 
47 7 92.75 47 4 89.90 47 1 87.84 
 
a Percentage is cumulative. 
Sample 1 contains 147 states with data from 1970 to 2005. There are a total of 
4687 state-year observations in Sample 1. Sample 1 is the largest sample of countries and 
years of domestic and transnational terrorism that have been used in the literature thus far 
to test the instability – terrorism relationship. The summary statistics for Sample 1 are 
shown in table 4. 
Terrorism incidents 
 Terrorism is a count variable. The minimum is 0 incidents per country-year which
constitutes 50.3% of the sample of country-years. The maximum is 645 incidents, which 
0.02% of the sample of country-years experienced. The average number of terrorism 
incidents experienced in Sample 1 is 14.293. The standard deviation is 49.17, 
demonstrating that there is a good deal of variation in the sample. The distribution of 
terrorism incidents is highly skewed to the right. Nearly 11% of the country-yeas in the 
sample record only 1 incident, followed by 6% of the sample with a record of 2 incidents. 














      
Terrorism incidents Count 14.293 49.17 0 645 
Instability      
H1: instability 1/0 0.172 0.377 0 1 
H2: instability type      
Complex instability (complex 
singular and same-year) 
1/0 0.137 0.344 0 1 
Ethnic war 1/0 0.014 0.117 0 1 
Genocide 1/0 0 0 0 0 
Adverse regime change 1/0 0.007 0.086 0 1 
Revolutionary war 1/0 0.014 0.116 0 1 
H3 & H4: multiple instability & 
timing 
     
Stability 1/0 0.828 0.377 0 1 
Complex singular instability 1/0 0.08 0.272 0 1 
Non-complex singular instability 1/0 0.035 0.184 0 1 
Same-year complex instability 1/0 0.057 0.231 0 1 
      
Model 1: governance, contiguity & country demographics 
Governance      
Full autocracy 1/0 0.377 0.485 0 1 
Full democracy 1/0 0.399 0.49 0 1 
Transitional Reference 0.224 0.417 0 1 
      
Contiguous state instability 1/0 0.431 0.495 0 1 
      
Country demographics      
Total population Continuous  
(divided by 
100,000) 
357.966 1225.21 1.225 13037.2 
Population change Continuous 1.929 1.599 -7.855 17.738 
Population density  Continuous 90.8 127.991 1.116 1177.546 
Urbanity Continuous 46.89 23.202 2.4 95.4 
Land area  Continuous  
(divided by 
1,000,000) 
0.835 1.888 0.001 16.390 
Data collection agency      
Gtd2 period 1/0 0.250 0.433 0 1 





year. 90% of country-years in Sample 1 recorded fewer than 29 terrorism incidents. The 
full distribution of terrorism incidents is contained in table 13 in the Data Appendix; here, 
I present the distribution up to 47 incidents in table 3 to save space. 
Instability 
 I operationalize instability as a series of dichotomous variables for the four 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 uses a dichotomous measure that simply measures when 
instability occurs at the state-year level. 17% of the sample, or 806 state-years, are 
instability state-years. For Hypothesis 2, I use a series of dichotomous measures for 
instability by type. Complex instability, which includes instabilities thatoccurred in the 
same year as well as instabilities that occurred within five years of one another but not 
during the same year, constitutes the modal type of instability; there are 642 instances of 
complex instability. Ethnic war occurs less frequently than complex instability; only 65 
of the 4687 state-years had an ethnic war occurring for that year. There are no genocide 
years of instability, because this instability type never occurred on its own. Genocide 
always occurred during other instabilities so that genocide is always contained in the 
complex category. Adverse regime change is very rare; there are only 35 country-years of 
adverse regime change. Finally, there are 64 country-years of revolutionary war.  
For hypotheses 3 and 4, I use the same operationalizations of instability. Stability 
is the reverse coding of instability so that there are 3881 observations of instability of the 
4687 total. Complex singular instability, when multiple instabilities occur within the 
same five-year period but not within the same year, constitutes 376 observations. There 
are 164 instances of non-complex singular instability, when instability occurs only once 
during a five year period. Finally, there are 266 occurrences of same-year complex 




Sample 2. Note that I will review the Model 1 control variables later in this section, when 
I compare the samples.  
Summary Statistics Review for Sample 2 
Terrorism incidents 
Sample 2 contains data for 116 nations from 1981 to 2005. The summary statistics 
for Sample 2 are shown in table 5. There are 2624 country-year observations in Sample 2. 
The minimum of terrorism incidents in Sample 2 is 0 incidents, which is experienced by 
42% of the sample or 1105 country-years. The maximum is 645 incidents, 0.04% of the 
sample or one country-year. The mean of terrorism incidents for Sample 2 is 20.195, with 
a standard deviation of 60.095 incidents. The distribution of incidents has a clear right 
skew. Approximately 42% of the sample experiences no terrorism incidents in that year. 
299 country-years or 11% of the sample report just 1 terrorism incident. 75% of the 
sample experiences fewer than 9 terrorism incidents. 90% of the sample of country-years 
reports fewer than 48 incidents. I turn now to the distribution of instability for Sample 2. 
The distribution of terrorism incidents is contained in table 3. 
Instability 
As in Sample 1, the instability variables are measured as dichotomous indicator 
variables. For Hypothesis 1, I use a dichotomous indicator for the occurrence of 
instability. Sixteen percent of Sample 2, or 426 observations, are country-years of 
instability. For Hypothesis 2, the dichotomous variables measure the occurrence of the 
different types of instability. Complex instability is the most common form of instability; 
12% of the sample, or 311 observations, are country-years of complex instability. Ethnic 
war occurred in 52 country-years, or just less than 2% of Sample 2. Genocide is only 




Table 5. Summary statistics for sample 2 
  Sample 2: Sample 2: Sample 2: Sample 2: 
Variables Measurement Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
      
Terrorism incidents Count 20.195 60.095 0 645 
Instability      
H1: instability 1/0 0.162 0.369 0 1 
H2: instability type      
Complex instability (complex 
singular and same-year) 
1/0 0.119 0.323 0 1 
Ethnic war 1/0 0.02 0.139 0 1 
Genocide 1/0 0 0 0 0 
Adverse regime change 1/0 0.005 0.07 0 1 
Revolutionary war 1/0 0.019 0.137 0 1 
H3 & H4: multiple instability & 
timing 
     
Stability 1/0 0.838 0.369 0 1 
Complex singular instability 1/0 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Non-complex singular instability 1/0 0.044 0.205 0 1 
Same-year complex instability 1/0 0.041 0.198 0 1 
      
Model 1: governance, contiguity & country demographics 
Governance      
Full autocracy 1/0 0.258 0.438 0 1 
Full democracy 1/0 0.501 0.5 0 1 
Transitional Reference 0.241 0.428 0 1 
      
Contiguous state instability 1/0 0.444 0.497 0 1 
      
Country demographics      
Total population Continuous 448.885 1459.057 3.608 13037.2 
 (divided by 
100,000) 
Population change Continuous 1.778 1.377 -7.855 11.181 
Population density Continuous 106.969 149.154 1.498 1177.546 
Urbanity Continuous 49.337 22.324 4.48 92.3 
Land area Continuous 0.891 2.018 0.001 16.389 
 (divided by 
1,000,000) 
Data collection agency      
Gtd2 period 1/0 0.3536585 0.4781959 0 1 




  Sample 2: Sample 2: Sample 2: Sample 2: 
Variables Measurement Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
      
Model 2: population age structure and social and economic development. 
Population age structure      
% Population aged 0-14 Continuous 34.617 10.578 13.884 51.462 
  (Percentage)     
% Population aged 15-65 Continuous 59.001 6.767 46.184 79.048 
  (Percentage)     
% Population aged 65+ Reference 6.382 4.557 1.083 19.747 
      
Social and economic development 
Telephone lines Continuous 14.061 18.113 0.012 74.462 
 (per 100 people)     
GDP per capita Continuous 0.529 0.811 0.008 4.419 
 (divided by 
10,000) 
    
Change in GDP per capita Continuous 1.395 5.108 -47.085 37.573 
Food production index Continuous 89.062 19.639 11.18 199.39 
CO2 emissions Continuous 16.529 59.591 0 577.643 
 (divided by 
10,000) 
    
      
 
change is quite rare in Sample 2. There are only 13 country-years of adverse regime 
change, or 0.5% of the sample. There are 50 country-years of revolutionary war, or 1.9% 
of Sample 2.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 utilize the same set of dichotomous measures of instability. 
There are 2198 instances of stability, the reverse of instability; this constitutes 83.77% of 
Sample 2. Complex singular instability, when just one instability occurs within a year but 
more than one instability occurs within a five year period, accounts for 7.7% of the 
sample, or 204 country-years. Non-complex singular instability, just one instability in a 
five-year period, accounts for 4.4% of the sample, which is 115 state-years. Same-year 




constitutes 107 observations in Sample 2, which is 4.1% of the country-years. I turn now 
to Sample 3. 
Summary Statistics for Sample 3 
Terrorism incidents 
 Sample 3 contains data from 82 nations, from 1990 to 2005, with a total of 1242 
observations. The descriptive statistics for Sample 3 are shown in table 6. Thirty-five 
percent of these observations, 434 country-years, record 0 terrorism incidents. The 
maximum observation, as in the prior samples is 645 incidents in one country-year, 
which constitutes 0.08% of the sample. The mean for terrorism incidents in Sample 3 is 
22.415, with a standard deviation of 58.83 incidents. Approximately 11% of the sample, 
or 136 country-years, report 1 incident. Seventy-five percent of the sample experiences 
less than 14 incidents per country-year while 90% of the sample experiences less than 64
terrorism incidents per country-year. I turn to the distribution of instability for this 
sample.  
Instability 
 Instability is distributed as follows in Sample 3. Seventeen percent of the 1242 
observations in Sample 3 experience instability, which constitutes 214 country-years of 
instability. This is the measure for Hypothesis 1. For Hypothesis 2, instability by type, 
157 state-years, or nearly 13% of Sample 3 experiences complex instability. Ethnic war 
occurs in 34 country-years, or 2.74% of Sample 3. As before, genocide never occurs on 
its own but only nested within the complex category. Adverse regime change is the rarest 
of the instability types with only 5 occurrences, a scant 0.4% of Sample 3. Finally, 














      
Terrorism incidents Count 22.415 58.83 0 645 
Instability      
H1: instability 1/0 0.172 0.377 0 1 
H2: instability type      
Complex instability (complex 
singular and same-year) 
1/0 0.126 0.332 0 1 
Ethnic war 1/0 0.027 0.163 0 1 
Genocide 1/0 0 0 0 0 
Adverse regime change 1/0 0.004 0.63 0 1 
Revolutionary war 1/0 0.014 0.12 0 1 
H3 & h4: multiple instability & 
timing 
     
Stability 1/0 0.828 0.377 0 1 
Complex singular instability 1/0 0.09 0.287 0 1 
Non-complex singular instability 1/0 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Same-year complex instability 1/0 0.036 0.187 0 1 
      
Model 1: governance, contiguity & country demographics 
Governance      
Full autocracy 1/0 0.17 0.376 0 1 
Full democracy 1/0 0.595 0.491 0 1 
Transitional Reference 0.235 0.424 0 1 
      
Contiguous state instability 1/0 0.483 0.5 0 1 
      
Country demographics      
Total population Continuous 599.03 1778.27 4.93 13037.2 
 (divided by 
100,000) 
Population change Continuous 1.488 1.381 -7.855 11.181 
Population density Continuous 112.95 167.652 1.712 1177.55 
Urbanity Continuous 53.298 21.414 5.4 92.3 
Land area Continuous 1.171 2.482 0.001 16.389 
 (divided by 
1,000,000) 
      
Data collection agency      













      
      
Model 2: population age structure and social and economic development. 
Population age structure      
% Population aged 0-14 Continuous 32.481 10.541 13.884 51.348 
  (Percentage)     
% Population aged 15-65 Continuous 60.548 6.542 46.184 71.919 
  (Percentage)     
% Population aged 65+ Reference 6.971 4.728 2.23 19.747 
      
 Social and economic 
development 
     
Telephone lines Continuous 16.25 18.211 0.018 74.462 
 (per 100 
people) 
    
Gdp per capita Continuous 
(divided by 
10,000) 
0.507 0.806 0.008 3.897 
Change in gdp per capita Continuous 1.942 5.166 -47.09 37.573 
Food production index Continuous 97.117 14.725 46.58 199.39 
Co2 emissions Continuous 
(divided by 
10,000) 
24.119 74.606 0.001 577.643 
 
Model 3: ethnic minority group characteristics 
Religious restrictions      
None Reference 0.825 0.38 0 1 
Informal 1/0 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Some 1/0 0.06 0.237 0 1 
Sharp 1/0 0.019 0.135 0 1 
      
Political discrimination      
None Reference 0.084 0.277 0 1 
Neglect with help 1/0 0.164 0.371 0 1 
Neglect 1/0 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Social exclusion 1/0 0.273 0.446 0 1 
Formal exclusion 1/0 0.332 0.471 0 1 
      
Economic discrimination      
None Reference 0.168 0.374 0 1 
Neglect with help 1/0 0.11 0.312 0 1 













      
Social exclusion 1/0 0.359 0.48 0 1 
Formal exclusion 1/0 0.166 0.372 0 1 
      
Protest      
None Reference 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Verbal 1/0 0.14 0.347 0 1 
Symbolic 1/0 0.209 0.406 0 1 
Small 1/0 0.224 0.417 0 1 
Medium 1/0 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Large 1/0 0.16 0.126 0 1 
      
Group spatial distribution      
Dispersed Reference 0.206 0.405 0 1 
Urban 1/0 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Regional 1/0 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Concentrated 1/0 0.462 0.499 0 1 
      
  
For Hypotheses 3 and 4, I examine the effects of stability, complex singular 
instability, non-complex singular instability and same-year complex instability. Stability 
is the norm, with 83% of country-years or 1028 observations. There are 112 observations 
of complex singular instability, which is 9% of Sample 3. Non-complex singular 
instability constitutes 4.59% of the sample, or 57 country-years. Same-year complex 
instability is observed 45 times in the sample and makes up 3.62% of Sample 3. I turn to 
a comparison of the three samples with respect to terrorism, instability and the con rol 
variables that are common across the models.  
Comparing the Samples 
Introduction 
 I compare the samples used in this study here via their distributions on terrorism, 




country demographics, governance and contiguity characteristics. The purpose of 
comparing across the samples is to understand the important similarities and differences 
between them. This will help to inform my analyses and the extent to which the 
differences between models may be due, in part, to any differences across smples. In 
addition, if the samples are very similar, any model results that differ cannot be attributed 
solely to the observed differences across samples.  
Terrorism 
 A close examination of the distribution of terrorism incidents in table 3 
demonstrates that although the samples decrease in size, they increase in terrorism. In 
Sample 1, 50% of the sample experiences no terrorism incidents. In Sample 2, this is 
down to 42% of country-years. In Sample 3, only 35% of the sample observes 0 
incidents. Interestingly, the percentage of observations that report 1 incident remains 
constant across the 3 samples at approximately 11%. That is where the similarities end, 
however. The number of incidents at the seventy-fifth percentile increases steadily when 
I look across samples. In Sample 1, 75% of the country-years experience less than 5 
incidents; in Sample 2, this increases to less than 8 incidents. In Sample 3, this has
increased to less than 14 incidents. Further, the 90th percentile shows the same pattern. In 
Sample 1, this threshold occurs at less than 30 incidents; for Sample 2, it increases to le s 
than 48 incidents. For Sample 3, this threshold is at fewer than 64 incidents. In addition, 
although the minimums and maximums remain the same, the means increase across the 
samples. The mean of terrorism incidents increases monotonically across the sampl s, 
from 14 incidents in Sample 1 to 22 incidents in Sample 3. Interestingly, the change in 
standard deviations is not a monotonic increase; Sample 2 evidences the largest 




statistics demonstrate that the loss of country-years as I change samples conc ntrates 
terrorism by primarily deleting country-years in which no incidents occur. These samples 
become more serious with regards to their average levels and overall distribution of 
terrorism incidents. It is unknown exactly what effect this increasing seriousness of 
terrorism across samples will have on my analyses. I turn now to examine the changes for 
instability as I look across samples.  
Instability 
 Examination of the summary statistics for instability across the thresamples 
shows little change in the means of each dichotomous indicator. This shows that the loss 
of country-years from sample to sample pulled from observations of both stability and 
instability. The proportion of instability to stability country-years remained roughly the 
same even though the absolute number of observations decreased dramatically. Across 
the samples, roughly 17% of observations were instability country-years. The 
distributions by type of instability did vary a bit, particularly for Sample 2. Roughly 
speaking, complex instability was the most common in Sample 1. Ethnic war country-
years as a percentage of all of the country-years were most common in Sample3 and 
least in Sample 1. The opposite was true for adverse regime change. Revolutionary war 
country-years were more consistent in distribution across the three samples, with Samples 
1 and 3 being the most similar. Complex singular instability was least common for 
Sample 2. Non-complex singular instability and same-year complex instability ev denced 
monotonic changes in distribution in opposite directions across the samples; Sample 1 
experienced the least non-complex singular instability percentagewise and the most 




distributed quite similarly in the three samples. This should mean that the effects of 
instability ought to remain roughly consistent across the changes in samples.  
Model 1 Control Variables: Country Demographics, Governance and Contiguity 
Characteristics 
 Table 7 contains summary statistics for the Model 1 control variables for the three 
samples. These are the control variables that have data for all three sampls. These show 
a clear and monotonic pattern across the three samples. Sample 1 shows that, on average, 
it has less populous, less densely packed populations, less urban and smaller land area 
observations. On average, it contains more observations of full autocracy and less of full 
democracy and fewer years of contiguity to an unstable state. On the other hand, Sample
3 is made up of more populous, more densely packed, more urban and larger land area 
observations, on average. They also generally show more variation on these 
characteristics. Sample 3 observations are least likely to be fully autocr tic and show a 
clear trend towards full democracy, on average. They are also more likely to be 
contiguous to an unstable state, on average. For any of these control variables, Sample 2 
is usually in the middle of the two samples. Overall, Samples 1 and 2 are the most similar 
of the three. Sample 3 demonstrates some important differences from both Samples 1 and 
2.  
Conclusions 
 Several important differences and similarities have been demonstrated across the 
three samples. Interestingly, the changes are generally monotonic across the samples; as 
the sample size decreases, the differences become apparent in order from Sample 1 to 2 
to 3. The most important difference for this analysis is that they vary quite a bit with 
regards to terrorism. Sample 3 has a much lower percentage of observations with no 
 
 



















           
Measurement Continuous  
(divided by 
100,000) 
Continuous Continuous Continuous Continuous  
(divided by 
1,000,000) 
1/0 1/0 Reference 1/0 1/0 
Sample 1:  
Mean 
357.966 1.929 90.8 46.89 0.835 0.377 0.399 0.224 0.431 0.250 
Sample 2:  
Mean 
448.885 1.778 106.969 49.337 0.891 0.258 0.501 0.241 0.444 0.354 
Sample 3:  
Mean 
599.026 1.488 112.951 53.298 1.171 0.17 0.595 0.235 0.483 0.528 
Sample 1:  
Std. Dev. 
1225.209 1.599 127.991 23.202 1.888 0.485 0.49 0.417 0.495 0.433 
Sample 2:  
Std. Dev. 
1459.057 1.377 149.154 22.324 2.018 0.438 0.5 0.428 0.497 0.478 
Sample 3:  
Std. Dev. 
1778.265 1.381 167.652 21.414 2.482 0.376 0.491 0.424 0.5 0.499 
Sample 1: 
 Min 
1.225 -7.855 1.116 2.4 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample 2: 
 Min 
3.608 -7.855 1.498 4.48 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample 3: 
 Min 
4.93 -7.855 1.712 5.4 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample 1: 
 Max 
13037.2 17.738 1177.546 95.4 16.390 1 1 1 1 1 
Sample 2: 
 Max 
13037.2 11.181 1177.546 92.3 16.389 1 1 1 1 1 
Sample 3: 
 Max 
13037.2 11.181 1177.546 92.3 16.389 1 1 1 1 1 




recorded terrorism incidents than either Samples 1 or 2. The mean of terrorism incidents 
is the highest in Sample 3. Thus, terrorism is more concentrated, that is, with fewer no-
terrorism observations, in Sample 3 than in Sample 1. With terrorism more common in 
Sample 3, it is possible that it will be easier to see an effect in the instability variables as 
well as in the control variables in that sample. It may be more difficult to see an ffect in 
Sample 1. Instability is more similarly distributed between the three samples although 
this breaks down a bit by type. For example, adverse regime change is least likely to 
occur in Sample 3 while same-year complex instability is proportionally more likely to 
occur in Sample 1. The overall instability indicator remains quite steady across the 
samples, which should mean that the overall instability effect will not vary much across 
the samples. However, there will likely be variation across type of instability in 
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4, because the distribution of these indicators varies across samples.  
Demographically, Sample 3 is distilled down to the most populous, most urban, 
largest and most democratic state-years. These differing demographics cros  the samples 
potentially means that there will be differing model results across the thre samples. 
These differences and similarities show that it is important to be cautious when 
comparing model results. These samples vary enough that differential results may be due 
to sample selection bias. The comparison across the three samples revealed important 
differences across samples for terrorism, type of instability and the Mod l 1 control 
variables. These differences suggest that we should be cautious in extrapolating any 
results between models, because they may be due to sample selection. This will be 
discussed in further depth later in the chapter. I turn now to the results for my hypotheses 




Results for Hypothesis 1 
Introduction 
 In this section, I review the results of the first hypothesis for all samples. The 
samples varied from 147 nations from 1970 to 2005 in Sample 1 to 116 nations from 
1981 to 2005 in Sample 2 and finally, in 82 nations from 1990 to 2005 in Sample 3. I first 
review the results of the first hypothesis from Model 1, which contains the country 
demographics, governance and contiguity characteristics control variables. I th n turn to 
Model 2, which has population age structure and social and economic development 
control variables in addition to the country demographics, governance and contiguity 
characteristics. I then examine Hypothesis 1 for Model 3, which contains the ethnic 
minority group control variables in addition to the earlier control variables. I then 
conclude by summarizing the support for Hypothesis 1 across the three models. Please 
note that the results for the control variables and the Model 1 replications across samples 
are reviewed later in this chapter.  
Model 1: Country Demographics, Governance, and Contiguity Characteristics:  
Hypothesis 1 
Theoretical variable of interest 
Hypothesis 1 states that increases in instability status will be accompanied by 
increases in terrorism. I expect this because as the rapid social change of political 
instability sets in, the ties that bind individuals to society may disintegrate. As this 
process sets in fully, the actions of individuals in the state may be uncontrolled, and they 
may do non-routine collective action. This non-routine collective action may take the 
form of terrorism. This means that I expect that during times of instability, a state will 




its simplest form for Hypothesis 1; it is a dichotomous indicator where 1 is coded when 
instability occurred in that year and a 0 when it did not. Recall that because I use the 
fixed effects negative binomial regression model (FENBRM), the proper interpre ation of 
results involves changes in instability on changes in terrorism within-cou try, rather than 
across. I present the results for instability, the theoretical variable of interest first, 
followed by incidence rate ratios and the predicted counts of terrorism incidents. I turn to 
the results now, which are contained in table 8. 
 This model shows, first, that instability is important. Instability is accompanied by 
statistically significantly greater levels of terrorism. This increase in levels of terrorism is 
made up of a 2.6 times greater rate of terrorism. Thus, increases in instability result 
coincide with increasing terrorism levels within a state. 
 I have broken down the predicted counts of terrorism incidents from this model as 
follows. Because governance type and instability in contiguous states have been 
demonstrated as important predictors of terrorism and instability (Eyerman, 1998; Li, 
2005; Iqbal and Starr, 2008), I present the predicted counts over various combinations of 
these binary variables, while holding the continuous control variables constant at their
medians.24 The largest increase in the expected count of terrorism incidents when 
instability is present in a state is for a fully democratic state that is contiguous to an 
unstable state while the smallest increase in the expected count of terrorism incidents is 
for a fully autocratic state without an unstable contiguous state. In the former, when a 
state experiences instability, terrorism is predicted to increase by 0.19 terrorism incidents  
                                                        
24. There are 568 country-years in which a full democracy is contiguous to an unstable nation. 
The list of nations who satisfy both conditions is long and varied. It includes India, Israel, Pakistan, 




Table 8. Model results for hypothesis 1 for all three models 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Hypothesis 1               
Instability 0.943 ***  0.058 2.566  1.048 ***  0.079 2.853  0.997 *** 0.130 2.711 
               
 Model 1: governance, contiguity and country demographics 
Governance & contiguity              
Full autocracy -0.663 ***  0.067 0.515  -0.675 ***  0.092 0.509  -0.845 *** 0.167 0.430 
Full democracy 0.086  -0.064 1.090  0.152  0.079 1.164  0.283 * 0.113 1.328 
Contiguous state instability 0.206 ***  0.052 1.229  0.228 ** 0.071 1.256  -0.137  0.100 0.872 
Country demographics               
Total population 0.000 ** 0.000 1.000  0.000 * 0.000 1.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
Population change -0.018  0.019 0.982  -0.066  0.034 0.936  0.049  0.044 1.050 
Population density  0.001 * 0.000 1.001  0.000  0.000 1.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
Urbanity 0.023 ***  0.002 1.023  0.015 ***  0.003 1.015  0.008  0.004 1.008 
Land area  -0.009  0.018 0.991  -0.051 * 0.026 0.950  0.067  0.042 1.069 
Data collection indicator               
Gtd2 period 0.145  0.224 1.156  -1.016 ***  0.201 0.362  -1.112 *** 0.218 0.329 
Constant -2.949 ***  0.213   4.405 * 2.166   7.851 * 3.291  
               
Model 2: population age structure and social and economic development. 
Population age structure              
% Population aged 0-14      -0.052 * 0.020 0.949  -0.082 ** 0.030 0.921 
% Population aged 15-65      -0.062 * 0.026 0.940  -0.071  0.039 0.932 
 
 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Social and economic development              
Telephone lines      -0.002  0.006 0.998  -0.004  0.008 0.996 
Gdp per capita      -0.011  0.110 0.989  -0.317 * 0.155 0.728 
Change in gdp per capita      -0.011 * 0.005 0.989  0.008  0.007 1.008 
Food production index      -0.001  0.002 0.999  -0.013 *** 0.003 0.988 
Co2 emissions      0.003 ** 0.001 1.003  0.002  0.001 1.002 
               
Model 3: ethnic minority group characteristics            
Religious restrictions               
Informal           -0.239  0.128 0.787 
Some            0.359 * 0.149 1.431 
Sharp           0.790 ** 0.289 2.204 
Political discrimination               
Neglect with help           0.202  0.273 1.224 
Neglect           0.179  0.274 1.196 
Social exclusion           0.732 ** 0.261 2.079 
Formal exclusion           0.799 ** 0.266 2.223 
Economic discrimination               
Neglect with help           -0.549 * 0.232 0.577 
Neglect           -0.580 ** 0.216 0.560 
Social exclusion           -0.613 ** 0.202 0.541 
Formal exclusion           -0.513 * 0.221 0.599 
Protest               
Verbal           -0.238  0.124 0.788 
 
 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Symbolic           0.194 * 0.096 1.214 
Small           0.099  0.091 1.104 
Medium           0.095  0.133 1.100 
Large           0.093  0.225 1.098 
               
Group spatial distribution               
Urban           -0.070  0.166 0.932 
Regional           -0.182  0.182 0.833 
Concentrated           -0.518 *** 0.147 0.596 
***=p<.000               
**=p<.01               





(p<.000). In the latter, when instability occurs, only 0.07 more incidents are predicted 
(p<.000). Although the predicted increase in the expected count of incidents is small, 
countries that experience instability have a much higher average level of terrorism in 
general. The mean of terrorism incidents for unstable country-years is 39.3 incidents 
while the mean for stable country-years is 9.1 incidents. These are non-trivial differences 
in terrorism incidents between instability and stability. I turn now to my conclusions for 
Hypothesis 1 in Model 1.  
Conclusions 
Overall, Model 1 demonstrates that instability matters when it comes to terrorism. 
When instability occurs, terrorism also increases, and this increase is of a substantial 
magnitude. I turn now to the results for Model 2.  
Model 2: Population Age Structure and Social and Economic Development Variables: 
Hypothesis 1 
Introduction 
I test the first hypothesis, that increases in instability should be accompanied by 
increases in terrorism with an expanded set of control variables in this model. There are 
116 states with data from 1981 to 2005 in Sample 2.  
Theoretical variable of interest 
 In this smaller sample of countries and years with the expanded set of controls, 
state instability still matters. Instability is accompanied by statistically significant 
increases in terrorism incidents. The rate of terrorism is expected to increase by 2.85 
times during instability. I turn now to the predicted counts of incidents for Model 2. 
 I present the predicted counts of incidents as before, with the governance and 




social and economic demographics held constant at their medians. As in Model 1, the 
Model 2 predicted counts are highest for a full democracy with an unstable contiguous 
state and lowest for a full autocracy without an unstable contiguous state. When 
instability occurs in a full democracy with an unstable contiguous state, terrorism is 
predicted to increase by 0.74 terrorism incidents (p<.000). For a full autocracy without an 
unstable contiguous state, the occurrence of instability is predicted to result in 0.26 more 
terrorism incidents (p<.000). The magnitude of the instability effect appears to be slightly 
greater in Sample 2 than in Sample 1. The increase in the magnitude of the instability 
effect for a smaller sample of countries and years but a larger set of social and economic 
demographic control variables is an interesting effect and suggests that the chang  in 
sample may strengthen the effect of instability in Model 2. However, given that 
instability was positive and statistically significant in Model 1, the continued robustness 
of instability in the face of more rigorous controls suggests that it is an important effect. 
Conclusions 
 Overall, Model 2 demonstrated the robustness of the instability effect in a smaller 
sample of countries with more extensive control variables. Instability remain d a positive 
and statistically significant predictor of terrorism incidents. There was an increase in the 
magnitude of its effects on terrorism incidents though at least some of this increase in the 
size of the effects can surely be attributed to the change in samples. The chang in 
samples allowed me to subject the instability effect to an even wider host of controls. As 
the instability effect survived this more rigorous test, I am more confide t in my results 
that instability is related to terrorism. I turn now to Model 3.  





I examine the results of the first hypothesis, that increases in state instbil ty is 
associated with increased terrorism levels with a set of control variables that measure the 
distribution and characteristics of ethnic minority groups within their state. To be clear, 
the following analysis only includes a sample of states with an ethnic minority group at 
risk and thus, applies only to this group of states. Unfortunately, the MAR data do not 
allow for comparison between countries with minorities at risk with those that do not 
have minorities at risk, because the MAR team only collected data on a sample of 
countries that contain MARs and did not assess all nations for MARs (Pate, 2000, 
personal communication). This means that this analysis cannot provide information about 
the risk of terrorism due to the occurrence of instability for a state with MARs versus a 
state without MARs. I turn now to the results for the theoretical variable of interest; all 
model results are shown in table 8.  
Theoretical variable of interest 
 In Sample 3, state instability is still an important predictor of terrorism. Instability 
is accompanied by a positive and statistically significant increase in terrorism levels. The 
occurrence of instability in a state is associated with a 2.71 times larger rate of terrorism 
incidents. I turn now to the predicted counts of incidents for Model 3. 
 Again, I present the predicted counts of terrorism incidents broken down by 
governance type and instability in a contiguous state with the continuous variables held at 
their medians. However, since some of the ethnic minority group characteristi s proved 
quite important, I added these significant factors into the calculation as well, rather than 
simply holding them at their medians, and I obtained the highest and lowest predicted 




state that is contiguous to an unstable state in which an ethnic minority group there is t  
victim of the highest level of political discrimination and is not subject to economic 
discrimination; terrorism is predicted to increase by 2.46 incidents in such an unstble 
period (p<.01). The lowest predicted count of incidents is for a fully autocratic state that 
is not contiguous to an unstable state and subjects an ethnic minority group within its 
boundaries only to economic discrimination (social exclusion from the economic sphere). 
In this scenario, terrorism levels are predicted to increase by .22 additional incidents 
during instability (p<.01). Instability remains a robust and statistically significantly 
positive predictor of terrorism events even in this third sample of countries and years with 
the largest set of control variables.  
In the end, the most important result through all of the changes in models and 
samples, is that instability, the main theoretical variable of interest, remains positive and 
statistically significant. This means that the instability effect is quite robust. I turn now to 
the presentation of the results of the control variables for Models 1, 2 and 3 as well as th  
Model 1 replications. These results will allow me to comment on the effects of omitted 
variable and sample selection biases in my results. 
Results for Control Variables and Model 1 Replications 
Introduction  
 In this section, I review two sets of results. First, for each model, I review the 
results for the control variables. Then, I review the results of Model 1 replicated using 
Samples 2 and 3. Taken together, these two sets of analyses will help to clarify the degree 
to which sample selection bias and omitted variable bias may affect my substantive and 
theoretical results. I turn now to a presentation of the Model 1 control variables on 




Model 1, Sample 1: Control Variables 
Governance and contiguity control variables 
First, governance type does matter. Compared to a transitional government, a 
fully autocratic regime is statistically significantly likely to have fewer terrorism 
incidents. However, relative to a transitional government, a fully democratic regime does 
not experience statistically significantly different levels of terrorism though the 
relationship is positive.25 A state that is contiguous to one that is currently experiencing 
instability is statistically significantly likely to experience more terrorism incidents than 
when there are no contiguous unstable nations.  
Country demographics  
Total population size is a positive and statistically significant predictor of 
terrorism incidents. Change in a state’s population is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Note that this variable actually captures deviations from the country-
specific average changes in population given the fixed effects modeling approach. An 
increase in the population density of the state is a statistically significant predictor of 
terrorism incidents. Increases in the urbanity of the state, which measures increases in the 
percentage of citizens living in cities, is statistically significantly concomitant with 
increases in terrorism. Total land area is negative but is statistically non-significant. 
Data collection agency 
In Model 1, the indicator for the later GTD2 period collected by CETIS (1998-
2005) was positive and statistically non-significant. This means that the 1998-2005 time 
period was no more likely to report terrorism incidents than the period from 1970-1997. 
                                                        
25. When the model is run with full democracy as the reference category and the transitional 
democracy category as the included effect, the incidence rate ratio for transitional democracy is 0.917, 





The IRR implied a 1.16 factor increase in the rate of terrorism incidents for the period 
from 1998-2005. I turn now to the results of the Model 1 replication on Sample 2; the 
original Model 1 results and all replication results are shown in table 9. 
Model 1 Replication on Sample 2 
 The purpose of reviewing the results of the Model 1 replication on Sample 2 (116 
countries from 1981 to 2005) is to gain an understanding of the role of sample selection 
bias based on the degree of difference between the results from Sample 1 to Sample 2. If 
the results are basically the same from Sample 1 to Sample 2, I feel safer making 
statistical inferences about the effects of the variables. I turn now to these results. 
Theoretical variable of interest 
Most importantly, the theoretical variable of interest, the dichotomous indicator of 
instability, is positive and statistically significant. This is also of asimilar magnitude as it 
is in Model 1. Political instability remains a robust predictor of terrorism incidents, even 
on a smaller sample of countries and year. I turn now to the results for the control
variables. 
Control variables 
When Model 1 is replicated using Sample 2, there is some similarity. Full 
autocracy, relative to a transitional government, remains negative and statistically 
significant. Instability in a contiguous state remains a statistically significant predictor of 
more terrorist incidents in Sample 2. In addition, total population remains positive and 
statistically significant while total land area remains negative and sttistically 
insignificant. Urbanity is a positive and statistically significant predictor of terrorism 




Table 9. Model 1: Replication on all three samples 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Hypothesis 1 
Instability 0.943 *** 0.058 2.566  1.019 *** 0.077 2.770  0.990 *** 0.118 2.691 
               
 Model 1: Governance, contiguity and country demographics 
Governance & contiguity              
Full autocracy -0.663 *** 0.067 0.515  -0.690 *** 0.091 0.502  -0.904 *** 0.153 0.405 
Full democracy 0.086  -0.064 1.090  0.175 * 0.077 1.191  0.126  0.114 1.135 
Contiguous  
State instability 
0.206 *** 0.052 1.229  0.169 * 0.068 1.184  -0.008  0.098 0.992 
               
Country demographics 
Total population 0.000 ** 0.000 1.000  0.000 *** 0.000 1.000  0.000 *** 0.000 1.000 
Population change -0.018  0.019 0.982  -0.114 *** 0.029 0.892  -0.043  0.037 0.958 
Population density  0.001 * 0.000 1.001  0.000  0.000 1.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
Urbanity 0.023 *** 0.002 1.023  0.016 *** 0.002 1.017  0.009 ** 0.003 1.009 
Land area  -0.009  0.018 0.991  -0.005  0.023 0.995  0.025  0.028 1.025 
               
Data collection indicator 
GTD2 period 0.145  0.224 1.156  -1.065 *** 0.185 0.345  -1.325 *** 0.192 0.266 
               
Constant -2.949 ***  0.213   -1.220 *** 0.193   -0.469 *** 0.253  
***=p<.000               
**=p<.01               




There are four main changes in Model 1 results between Samples 1 and 2. In 
Sample 2, being a full democracy relative to a transitional government does attain 
statistical significance, and it is positive.26 This governance paradox has been discussed 
extensively in the academic literature (see Eyerman, 1998; Li, 2005). The basic idea s 
that although democracies provide more outlets for legitimate political activity, they also 
provide more opportunities to succeed at a terrorist incident for those who wish to do 
violent political action. This is because of government restraints on the infringement of 
civil liberties in a full democracy, thereby increasing the levels of terrorism in full 
autocracies relative to transitional governments and full autocracies. Change in 
population stayed negative but attained statistical significance. Populatin density stayed 
positive but lost its statistical significance. Further, the indicator for the data collection 
agency is negative and statistically significant, which demonstrates that wi in country, 
less terrorism is predicted in the 1998-2005 period. There is a 0.34 factor decrease in the 
rate of terrorism during this time period. It is possible that this decline is partly due to a 
real trend down in terrorism incidents as well as a data artifact. These c anges 
demonstrate the potential of sample selection bias in the smaller Sample 2 relative to the 
larger Sample 1 when the same Model 1 is run on both samples.  
 Although there are important similarities here, there are also differences. The 
differences are clearly substantial enough so that it would be unwise to make across-
sample statistical inferences. In the end, though, what is most important is that my main 
                                                        
26. When the Model 1 replication for Sample 2 is run with full democracy as the reference 
category and transitional government included in the model, the incidence rate ratio indicates a moderate 
magnitude effect. The terrorism rate decreases by a factor of 0.839 in a transitional government relative o 
full democracy. This effect is statistically significant (p<.05). A full autocracy experiences a 0.421 factor 





variable of interest, instability, remains positive and statistically significant in the face of 
sample changes, year fixed effects and an indicator for the GTD2 period data collection 
agency. I feel confident that the instability effect is not due to the chosen sample. 
However, the effects of the control variables in any of the samples ought to be viewed 
with caution since they may be due to sample selection effects. I turn now to the Model 2 
results. 
Model 2, Sample 2: Control Variables 
Population age structure control variables 
Both of the population age structure variables are statistically significant. These 
variables refer to the percentage of the population of the state within a certain age-ra ge. 
The reference category is the percentage of the population greater than age 65. A 
decrease in the percentage of the population from age 0 to 14 and a decrease in the 
percentage of the population from age 15 to 64 are both associated with statistically 
significant increases in terrorism incidents relative to the percentage of th population 
greater than 65. This finding requires some unpacking; a declining youthful and middle-
aged population relative to the older population is associated with more terrorism 
incidents. I turn now to the results of the social and economic development variables. 
Social and economic development control variables  
Having more telephone lines per 100 people predicts less terrorism, but it is not a 
statistically significant effect. Although telephone lines are a verybasic indicator of 
social development, this model cannot provide support for the idea that less terrorism 
may occur in more socially developed societies. The economic development control 




The first economic control variable, GDP per capita, is intended to capture the 
current size of the state’s economy; it exerts a negative influence on terrorism levels, but 
this effect is not statistically significant.27 In contrast, the change in GDP per capita is 
negative and statistically significant. Recall that this variable actually measures 
deviations from the within-country average change in GDP per capita. This effect 
suggests that a declining economy occurs alongside increases in terrorism incidents. The 
food production index is an attempt to capture whether the economy is more 
agriculturally based, and it demonstrates a negative but statistically non-significant 
relationship with terrorism incidents. Further, a higher volume of carbon dioxide 
emissions, representing a more industrialized or an industrializing economy coincides 
with statistically significantly more terrorism incidents. Overall, these results demonstrate 
that the economic domain may be important. I turn now to the governance and contiguity 
control variables. 
Governance and contiguity control variables  
A fully autocratic state is expected to experience statistically significantly less 
terrorism relative to a transitional government. However, a fully democratic st te is not 
expected to experience higher terrorism levels relative to a transitional g vernment 
although the effect is not statistically significant at the traditional .05 evel (p<.10). 
Instability in a contiguous state remains a positive and statistically significant predictor of 
terrorism incidents. I turn now to the results for country demographics.  
                                                        
27. GDP per capita does not achieve statistical significance despite extensive sensitivity analyses 
including sequentially excluding the three other economic measures. In this context, GDP per capita does 
not appear to be significantly related to terrorism. However, across sensitivity analyses, both carbon 





Country Demographics  
There are some important similarities in the effects of the country demographics 
as compared to their effects in Sample 1. Total population size remained positive and 
statistically significant as did urbanity. Change in population size remained negative and 
statistically insignificant. However, there were also important differences between 
Models 1 and 2 for these control variables. The data collection indicator was negative and 
statistically significant in this sample, indicating a 0.36 factor decrease in the terrorism 
rate for the 1998-2005 period. Population density switched signs, from positive to 
negative and lost its statistical significance. Total land area switched signs, from positive 
to negative and just barely attained statistical significance (p<.05). I turn now to my 
conclusions for Model 2. 
Conclusions 
Model 2 featured an additional batch of control variables that tested new domains, 
such as the age effect at the state level and the effects of social and economic 
development. In Model 2, many of these control variables were statistically significant. 
The statistical significance of this new batch of control variables suggested that there is 
omitted variable bias in Model 1 as well as many of the models in the literature that do 
not include them. Despite the effects of omitted variable bias on Model 1, Model 2 
continued to support the instability effect for Hypothesis 1 and shows that this effect is 
not sensitive to the increase in the number of control variables and the reduction in 
sample size. I turn now to the results of the Model 1 replication on Sample 3. 
Model 1 Replication on Sample 3 
 The purpose of reviewing the results of Model 1 on Sample 3, that is the sample 




MAR dataset from 1990 to 2005, is to assess the degree to which there may be sample 
selection issues at work. If there are substantial similarities in the mod l results across 
samples, then it is safe to conclude that these are fairly robust effects and are not the 
result of the sample I have chosen. If there are substantial differences, then, it is not safe 
to conclude that the effects are robust and the effects may in fact be due to the chosen 
sample. I turn now to these results. 
Theoretical variable of interest 
As in all previous models, the effect of instability is positive and significant. In 
this reduced sample of countries and years, instability accompanies an increse in the 
levels of terrorism in that year. The robustness of this finding across the models is 
reassuring and demonstrates that the effect cannot simply be written off to sample 
selection. The main theoretical variable of interest in this study, instability, remains 
robust no matter the chosen sample. I turn now to the results for the control variables. 
Governance and contiguity control variables  
The effects of the governance and state-level demographic control variables are 
not uniformly as robust as the instability effect. Full autocracy relative to a transitional 
government does retain a negative, statistically significant effect, and full democracy 
relative to a transitional government remains positive and statistically insignificant. Yet, 
instability in a contiguous nation changes signs to negative and loses its statistical 
significance.  
Country demographics 
Total population size remains positive and statistically significant and change in 
population remains negative and statistically insignificant. In addition, urbanity remains 




effects. Population density remains positive but loses its statistical significance. Total 
land area switches signs from negative to positive but continues to be statistically non-
significant.  
Data collection agency 
The indicator for the collection agency is negative and statistically significant. 
This shows that for this sample, statistically significantly less terrorism was reported for 
the 1998-2005 period. For the period 1998-2005, the terrorism rate decreases by a factor 
of 0.27.  
The Model 1 replication on Sample 3 demonstrates that for the control variables 
there may be serious sample selection issues at work. From the comparison of three
samples conducted earlier, I know that Sample 3 is composed of the most populous, 
largest land area, most urban and most densely populated observations of the three 
samples. This likely plays a role in explaining the differences between Model 1 run on 
Sample 1 and replicated on Sample 3. It is heartening that in the face of these potential 
sample selection issues, the main theoretical variable of interest remains a robust 
predictor of terrorism. I turn now to the results of control variables for the full Model 3.  
Model 3, Sample 3: Control Variables 
Ethnic minority group characteristics  
There are three domains of MAR control variables. The first is the degree to 
which the group suffers political, economic and religious discrimination. The set of
discrimination variables is measured as a series of dichotomous variables, in which the 
reference category is always no discrimination regardless of the type. Overall, th  




First, political discrimination of all types against an ethnic minority at risk,
relative to no discrimination, coincides with more terrorism incidents. This effect is 
statistically significant at the higher levels of political discrimination, which are social 
exclusion from the political sphere and formal exclusion from the political sphere. In 
contrast, economic discrimination exerts a negative influence on terrorism incidents, all 
of which are statistically significant. Finally, both some restrictions and sharp restrictions 
on a group’s practice of its religion are statistically significantly re ated to terrorism, and 
these effects are positive. Overall, there are important discrimination effects, and their 
results are opposite. When a state denies an ethnic minority group access to the political 
sphere or restricts a group’s practice of their religion, there is increased risk of terrorism 
while economic discrimination is associated with a decrease in terrorism. These divergent 
effects are interesting. I turn now to the second domain of ethnic minority group control 
variables, political protest activity. 
 The political protest set of binary variables measure the effects of the full gamut 
of political protest, from only verbal protest to physical gatherings of people with more 
than 100,000 participants. The reference category again is no protest activity. All but the 
verbal protest category have positive effects on terrorism, but only symbolic protest is 
able to achieve statistical significance. Symbolic protest activity, like sit-ins are 
statistically significantly associated with higher levels of terrorism incidents relative to no 
protest. Vocal protest like letter writing and small, medium or large protests are not 
statistically significantly associated with changes in terrorism. I turn now to the effects of 
the final domain of ethnic minority group characteristics, concentration of the ethnic 




 The final ethnic minority group characteristic measures how the ethnic minority 
group lives within the state. For example, the reference category is dispersion, meaning 
that the ethnic group resides all over the state. The categories included in the model all 
show a negative relationship with terrorism. However, only concentration, that is an 
ethnic minority group which lives concentrated in one region, evidences a statistically 
significant relationship with terrorism; this effect is negative, relative to a dispersed 
population. I turn now to the population age structure and social and economic 
development variables.  
Population age structure control variables  
The population age structure variables demonstrate some predictive utility in 
Model 3. The population demographics, relative to the over-65 age group, remain 
negative, but only the youngest age group retains statistical significance at the traditional 
.05 level (p<.10). Overall, the effects of the population age structure control variables 
stayed the same in this model but did not both retain statistical significance. I turn now to 
the social and economic development control variables. 
Social and economic development control variables  
Regarding social development, the amount of telephone lines per 100 people 
retains a negative and statistically insignificant relationship with terrorism. The economic 
control variables demonstrate mixed effects in Model 3. GDP per capita attans st tistical 
significance, and this effect remains negative while change in GDP switches signs from 
negative to positive and loses its statistical significance. On the other hand, te alternative 
economic measures switch statistical significance while retaining their original signs. 
Higher food production in a state predicts statistically significantly less t rrorism. Higher 




effect loses statistical significance. I turn now to the governance and contiguity control 
variables.  
Governance and contiguity control variables 
The governance and contiguity control variables experience some similarites nd 
some changes from Model 1. Full autocracy remains a negative and statistically 
significant predictor of terrorism incidents. However, full democracy is a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of terrorism for the full Model 3.28 Instability in a 
contiguous state switches signs from positive to negative and loses its statis ical 
significance. I turn now to the results of the country demographics.  
Country demographics  
The country demographics retain no statistical significance in Model 3. Total 
population size remains positive, as do urbanity and population density. Total land area 
and change in population size both switch signs and are positive now. As predictors of 
terrorism, the country demographics do not fare well in Model 3.  
Data collection agency 
The indicator that measures the 1998-2005 data collection agency (GTD2) is 
negative and statistically significant. The terrorism rate decreases by a factor of 0.33 
                                                        
28. Interestingly, full democracy does not attain stati tical significance in the Model 1 replication 
on Sample 3 but does so in the full Model 3. These r ults seem to be due to a combination of 
multicollinearity with total population, population density, change in population and urbanity in the Model 
1 replication and a suppression effect in Sample 3 that requires the inclusion of infringement of the MAR’s 
practice of their religion and the political discrimination variables in the full Model 3 for the variable to 
attain statistical significance. I determined this t rough extensive sensitivity analyses. The lack of 
robustness of the full democracy effect to changes in samples and the inclusion and exclusion of sets of 
variables demonstrates that the results for this operationalization of full democracy suffer from both sample 






during the GTD2 time period.29 I turn now to a discussion of the changes in effects for 
the Model 3 control variables. 
Omitted variable bias, multicollinearity and sample selection bias 
 There are some distinct differences in the results, both in direction and 
significance when I replicated the Model 1 analysis using Samples 2 and 3. To explore 
the differences, particularly those found in the Sample 3 replication, I conducted 
extensive sensitivity analyses, including sequentially excluding variables, particularly 
highly intercorrelated variables, and replicating Model 2 on Sample 3. After extensive 
analyses and model comparisons, I conclude that these differences are due to a 
combination of omitted variable bias in the earlier models and sample selection bias i
the case of the Sample 3 analyses.  
Although there is a non-trivial amount of intercorrelation and potential 
multicollinearity between many of my control variables, such as land area and carbon 
dioxide emissions, through the sensitivity analyses, I have determined that it is unl kely 
that these correlations are the only cause of the changes. In fact, despite sequentially 
excluding the highly correlated variables and then, excluding whole sets of control 
variables, including all of the ethnic minority group control variables (essentially running 
Model 2 on Sample 3), I have been unable to replicate Model 1 results using Sample 3. 
This leads me to believe that the differential behavior of these variables is partly due to 
the differences between samples. Recall that Sample 3 contains only 43% of the years 
                                                        
29. Although the time fixed effects are necessarily correlated with the data collection agency 
indicator (which is 1 during the period between 1998-2005), the correlations never rise above 0.3 (negative 
or positive). This demonstrates a moderate correlation. However, it is necessary to include the time fix d 
effects due to the vast amount of changes that haveoccurred over the time series that must be controlled. In 
addition, it is also necessary to include the indicator for the data collection agency since there were non-
trivial differences between the GTD1 and GTD2 collection efforts. To obtain the best model, I include both 





and 46% of the countries in Sample 1 and that of these, Sample 3 contains the most 
populous, most democratic, largest land area, most urban and most densely populated 
observations. In addition to the potential of sample selection bias, omitted variable bias 
may also be responsible for the changes from the earlier models to Model 3. There are 
many significant results in Model 3 which are of high magnitude. This means that the 
results of the earlier models must have suffered from omitted variable bias since these 
models did not include those variables. It is clear that it was both useful and informative 
to utilize the multi-stage analysis technique in order to find a balance between omitted 
variable bias and sample selection bias.  
In the end, the most important result through all of the changes in models and 
samples, is that instability, the main theoretical variable of interest, remains positive and 
statistically significant. This means that the instability effect is quite robust and is 
unchanged by the omitted variable bias and sample selection bias that has influenced th  
results for many of the other variables. I turn now to the chapter conclusions. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have presented many results. First, I presented the descriptive 
statistics for terrorism and instability for each sample. I also compared the samples on 
their distributions and summary statistics for terrorism and instability. I compared the 
samples using the common control variables across the samples, the country 
demographics, governance and contiguity characteristics. Second, I presented th  results 
of the first hypothesis for all three models. Across all of these models, even with the 
additional control variables, instability continued to be a positive and statistically 
significant predictor of terrorism incidents. Third, I presented the results for each 




Samples 2 and 3. This enabled me to begin to understand the role that omitted variables 
and sample selection biases may have played in the results. These results have continu d 
to support an instability effect for Hypothesis 1. I turn now to the next chapter in which I 
present the results for Hypotheses 2-4.  
Results for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4  
 In this chapter, I present the results first for Hypothesis 2 for each sample. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the effects of instability should vary by type. I also present the 
results for the third set of hypotheses for each sample. These hypotheses explore whether 
complex singular instability episodes and same-year complex instability ep sod s have 
differing effects on terrorism levels compared to non-complex singular instb lity. I turn 
next to the results for the fourth set of hypotheses. These hypotheses suggest that the 
temporal density of multiple instabilities ought to have differing effects on terrorism. For 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, there is also the question of the effects of stability on terrorism. 
Finally, I conclude the final chapter of model results. I turn now to the results for 
Hypothesis 2. 
Results for Hypothesis 2 
In the following section, I review the results of the rest of the second set of 
hypotheses for all three samples. The second hypothesis proffers that the effects of 
instability on terrorism ought to vary by instability type. I also hypothesize that increases 
in the adverse regime change instability type ought to be associated with small increases 
in terrorism incidents while increases in the ethnic and revolutionary war types should be 
associated with large increases in terrorism incidents. I turn now to the results of the 




Model 1: Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 2a, and Hypothesis 2b 
Theoretical variables of interest 
 In order to assess the effects of the different kinds of instability on terrorism, I use 
stability as the reference category in this analysis. These results are shown in table 10. 
First, all four instability types statistically significantly predict increased levels of 
terrorism relative to stability in Sample 1. In terms of magnitude, I turn to the incidence 
rate ratios and present those results from highest magnitude to lowest. Revolutionary war 
results in a 5.73 times greater rate of terrorism incidents, the largest rat  increase in of 
any of the types, relative to stability. The occurrence of ethnic war is accompanied by a 
2.68 times greater rate of terrorism incidents relative to stability. When adverse regime 
change instability occurs, a 2.37 times increased rate of terrorism incidents relative to 
stability. When a complex instability is ongoing, that is when more than one of the types 
occurred within the same year or within five years of the last, there is also a 2.37 times 
greater rate of terrorism relative to stability. Again, all of these effects are statistically 
significant.  
In addition, I conducted Wald tests for the differences between coefficients in 
order to assess whether they were statistically different from one another. I found that all 
four types were statistically significantly different from one another (in all cases, 
p<.0000). However, I also conducted equality of regression coefficients tests per 
Paternoster et al. (1998) who provide a corrected formula for this test and argue that this 
is the proper test for assessing the equality of regression coefficients. Using this test, only 
the revolutionary war type is statistically distinguishable from the other typ s in terms of 
increases in terrorism. Specifically, revolutionary predicts statistically significantly more 
terrorism than the other types, including ethnic war and adverse regime change(all  
 
 
Table 10. Results for hypotheses 2, 2a, and 2b for all three models 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Hypothesis 2 
Complex instability 
 (same-year & complex singular) 
0.863 *** 0.065 2.370  0.995 ***  0.092 2.704  1.026 ***  0.159 2.791 
Ethnic war 0.986 *** 0.167 2.681  0.907 ***  0.196 2.476  0.785 ** 0.249 2.193 
Adverse regime change 0.864 *** 0.227 2.373  0.604  0.326 1.829  0.431  0.592 1.539 
Revolutionary war 1.746 *** 0.170 5.733  1.781 ***  0.192 5.938  1.648 ***  0.385 5.194 
               
 Model 1: Governance, contiguity and country demographics 
Governance & contiguity               
Full autocracy -0.678 *** 0.067 0.507  -0.700 *** 0.092 0.497  -0.826 ***  0.170 0.438 
Full democracy 0.074  0.064 1.077  0.138  0.079 1.148  0.255 * 0.116 1.290 
Contiguous state instability 0.217 *** 0.053 1.242  0.243 ** 0.072 1.276  -0.123  0.101 0.884 
Country demographics               
Total population 0.000 ** 0.000 1.000  0.000 * 0.000 1.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
Population change -0.021  0.019 0.979  -0.069 * 0.034 0.933  0.051  0.043 1.052 
Population density  0.001 * 0.000 1.001  0.000  0.000 1.000  0.000  0.000 1.000 
Urbanity 0.023 *** 0.002 1.023  0.015 *** 0.003 1.015  0.007  0.004 1.007 
Land area  -0.009  0.019 0.991  -0.048  0.026 0.954  0.073  0.043 1.075 
Data collection indicator               
GTD2 period 0.111  0.224 1.118  -1.017 *** 0.199 0.362  -1.11 ***  0.218 0.329 
Constant -2.906 *** 0.213   5.067 * 2.168   8.834 ** 3.307  
               
               
 
 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Model 2: Population age structure and social and economic development. 
Population age structure               
% Population aged 0-14      -0.058 ** 0.020 0.944  -0.091 * 0.031 0.913 
% Population aged 15-65      -0.070 ** 0.026 0.932  -0.082 * 0.040 0.921 
Social and economic development               
Telephone lines      -0.003  0.006 0.997  -0.003  0.008 0.997 
GDP per capita      -0.013  0.110 0.987  -0.340 * 0.155 0.712 
Change in GDP per capita      -0.010  0.005 0.991  0.007  0.007 1.007 
Food production index      -0.001  0.002 0.999  -0.012 ***  0.003 0.988 
CO2 emissions      0.003 ** 0.001 1.003  0.002  0.001 1.002 
               
Model 3: Ethnic minority group characteristics 
Religious restrictions               
Informal           -0.240  0.129 0.787 
Some            0.359 * 0.149 1.433 
Sharp           0.758 ** 0.289 2.134 
Political discrimination               
Neglect with help           0.169  0.271 1.184 
Neglect           0.169  0.273 1.184 
Social exclusion           0.699 ** 0.261 2.012 
Formal exclusion           0.788 ** 0.265 2.199 
Economic discrimination               
Neglect with help           -0.533 * 0.234 0.587 
Neglect           -0.542 * 0.219 0.582 
 
 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Social exclusion           -0.612 ** 0.203 0.542 
Formal exclusion           -0.498 * 0.221 0.608 
Protest               
Verbal           -0.241  0.123 0.786 
Symbolic           0.167  0.097 1.182 
Small           0.077  0.092 1.080 
Medium           0.089  0.131 1.093 
Large           0.097  0.228 1.102 
Group spatial distribution 
Urban           -0.048  0.168 0.953 
Regional           -0.149  0.185 0.861 
Concentrated           -0.501 ** 0.152 0.606 
***=p<.000               
**=p<.01               





p<.01). However, the other types are not statistically distinguishable from one an ther in 
their effects on terrorism incidents. This evidence generally supports the second 
hypothesis and the sub-hypotheses, although it does not demonstrate that all of the types 
are different from one another. Instability is important overall, but the type of instability 
that occurs seems to matter, particularly with reference to revolutionary war. 
Revolutionary war seems to be a singularly dangerous form of instability with respect to 
terrorism incidents. I turn to the final piece of evidence, the presentation of the changes in 
the predicted counts of incidents. 
 As before, I present the predicted counts of incidents from Model 1 broken down 
by governance type and contiguity of an unstable nation with all continuous country 
demographics held at their medians. I also present the predicted counts by instability type 
from highest to lowest. When revolutionary war occurs in a fully democratic regime 
which is contiguous to an unstable state and with all other control variables held at their 
medians, terrorism is predicted to increase by an additional 0.36 incidents relative to 
stability (p<.000). For ethnic war, the increase is predicted to consist of 0.20 more 
incidents relative to stability (p<.000). The smallest predicted increases in t rrorism 
incidents were for adverse regime change and for complex instability, both of which are 
predicted to be associated with 0.18 additional incidents relative to stability (p<.01).  
On the other end of the spectrum, for full autocracies that are not contiguous to an 
unstable state, the inference remains the same but the magnitude differs. Revolutionary 
war instability is predicted to have the largest increase in terrorism incidents p r year, but 
the magnitude is only 0.13 more incidents relative to stability (p<.000). Ethnic war in a 




which is followed by the incidence of complex instability in a country and the occurrence 
of 0.07 more incidents relative to stability (p<.000). When a state experiences adver e 
regime change, the model predicts an increase of 0.07 more incidents relative to stabili y
(p<.000).  
Conclusions 
The second hypothesis and the two sub-hypotheses are somewhat supported. Both 
the incidence rate ratios and the predicted counts of terrorism incidents demonstrate some 
clear differences between the types of instability and their effects on terr rism levels, 
relative to stability. Further, the Wald tests demonstrate that these differences are 
statistically significant and the Paternoster et al. (1998) test demonstrated hat 
revolutionary war is statistically significantly associated with more te rorism than any of 
the other types. Ultimately, all of the instability types are associated with statistically 
significant increases in terrorism levels. The occurrence of adverse regime change 
instability is associated with small increases in the amount of predicted terrorism 
incidents, though these are of similar magnitude as those experienced for complex 
instability, while the happenings of revolutionary war and ethnic war are consiste tly 
predicted to be associated with the large increases in terrorism incidents. Cl arly, the type 
of instability does matter relative to stability. I turn now to the results of he second 
hypothesis for Model 2, which contains more rigorous control variables such as the 
population age structure and the social and economic development variables.  
Model 2: Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 2a, and Hypothesis 2b 
Theoretical variables of interest 
In Model 2, all four instability types except for adverse regime change are 




expected to coincide with an increase in the levels of terrorism within a state, rel ive to 
stability. With regards to magnitude, in this sample, as in Sample 1, the incidence rate 
ratios show that revolutionary war is associated with the largest increase in terrorism 
relative to stability followed by complex instability. Ethnic war has the third highest 
magnitude. This partially contradicts Hypothesis 2b, which suggested that both 
revolutionary war and ethnic war instabilities ought to exert the most influence on 
terrorism. Adverse regime change has the smallest magnitude and does not attai  
statistical significance at the traditional .05 level (p<.10). However, it should be noted 
that adverse regime change is particularly rare in this sample, with only 13 country-years 
of occurrence. This suggests that the lack of statistical significance for adverse regime 
change may at least be partially due to its rarity.  
Specifically, when revolutionary war occurs in a nation, it is accompanied by a 
5.94 times increase in the terrorism rate. Complex instability within a state follows with 
an increase of 2.70 times the terrorism rate relative to stability. For the occurrence of 
ethnic war in a state, the rate of terrorism also increases by 2.47 times relative to stability. 
This partially contradicts Hypothesis 2b, which suggested that both revolutionary war and 
ethnic war instabilities ought to exert the most influence on terrorism. Finally, the 
occurrence of adverse regime change demonstrates the smallest increase in the terrorism 
rate at 1.83 times relative to stability; in addition, this rate increase is not statis ically 
significant. Further, utilizing the Wald test for the differences betwen the coefficients 
shows that all of the types are statistically significantly different from one another (all 




partially supported even though adverse regime change did not attain statistical 
significance.  
I also conducted tests to assess the statistical significance of the regression 
coefficients against one another using the formula offered by Paternoster et al. (1998). 
The Paternoster et al. formula for equality of regression coefficients demonstrates that the 
only statistically significant differences between regression coeffiients are between 
revolutionary war and all the other types. According to this test, revolutionary war 
predicts significantly more terrorism than any other type including ethnic war (all p<.01). 
The other coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from one another. For example, 
the ethnic war type is not statistically distinguishable from the adverse rgime change 
type in terms of terrorism. Overall, the significance of the revolutionary w types 
provides some support for the sub-hypotheses. I turn now to the prediction of counts of 
terrorism incidents to further assess the sub-hypotheses. 
 The sub-hypotheses proffer that the occurrence of adverse regime chang
instability ought to be associated with the smallest increase in incidents while 
revolutionary war and ethnic war ought to be associated with the largest increase relativ  
to stability. As before, I assess the predicted counts at the largest and smllest changes. 
For a full democracy that is contiguous to another unstable state and with all continuous 
control variables held at their medians, the occurrence of revolutionary war is predicted 
to increase the count of terrorism incidents in a state by 1.24 additional incidents relative 
to stability (p<.000). Complex instability within a country is predicted to increase 
terrorism by 0.69 more incidents than stability (p<.000). Ethnic war in a nation follows 




fewest additional incidents, 0.42 additional incidents relative to stability, which is 
unsurprising since the effect is not statistically significant (p<.10). The order remains the 
same for full autocracies without an unstable contiguous state. Revolutionary war is 
predicted at 0.42 additional incidents relative to stability (p<.000) followed by complex 
instability with 0.23 additional incidents (p<.000). Ethnic war within a state is predicted 
at 0.21 more incidents than stability (p<.000) while adverse regime change is predicted to 
be accompanied by an increase of 0.14 incidents relative to stability (p<.10).  
Conclusions 
 Hypothesis 2 and the sub-hypotheses are partially supported in Model 2, which 
adds the population age structure and social and economic development control variables. 
The instability effect is shown to be robust in this model. Instability type does matter in 
terms of the size of the effects. The war types, revolutionary war and ethnic war, are 
associated with increases in terrorism relative to stability. However, only revolutionary 
war predicts statistically significantly more terrorism than the otr ypes. In addition, 
when adverse regime change occurs, there is a statistically insignificant n rease in 
terrorism. This does not support Hypothesis 2a. There is some evidence that this my be 
due to the rarity of adverse regime change in Sample 2. Hypothesis 2 and the sub-
hypotheses are partially supported. I turn now to the results of Hypothesis 2 for Model 3, 
which contains the largest suite of control variables in the analyses.  
Model 3: Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 2a, and Hypothesis 2b 
Theoretical variables of interest 
I examine the results of Model 3 for hypotheses 2, 2a and 2b. As it was in Model 
2, the effect of an adverse regime change on terrorism is statistically indistinguishable 




the instability types all show positive and statistically significant effects on terrorism 
incidents. With regards to magnitude, when revolutionary war instability sets in, there is a 
5.19 times greater rate of terrorism incidents relative to stability. The occurrence of 
ethnic war sees a 2.19 times greater rate of terrorism incidents relative to stability. 
However, the magnitude of the ethnic war effect is surpassed by the magnitude of the 
onset of complex instability, which demonstrates a slightly larger increase at a 2.79 times 
greater terrorism rate relative to stability. As in Model 2, this partially contradicts 
Hypothesis 2b, which suggested that both revolutionary war and ethnic war instabilities 
ought to exert the most influence on terrorism. Using the Wald test again, I find that all of 
the types of instability have statistically significantly different coefficients from one 
another (all p<.000). However, the Paternoster et al. (1998) equality of regression 
coefficients do not demonstrate any statistically significant differencs between the types 
for this sample. I turn now to the presentation of the predicted counts of terrorism 
incidents by type for Model 3. 
 I present the highest and lowest predicted counts of terrorism incidents by 
instability type from Model 3. The highest predicted counts corresponds to a full 
democracy contiguous to an unstable nation in which the ethnic minority group at risk 
there suffers the highest level of political discrimination but no economic discrim nat on 
with all other variables held at their medians. Under these conditions, once again, the 
revolutionary war type is predicted to have the largest effect, with a predicted increase of 
3.85 incidents (p<.01). Complex instability is expected to have an increase of 2.4 




incidents relative to stability (p<.05). Adverse regime change is expected to result in an 
additional 1.00 incidents, but this effect is far from statistically significant.  
The lowest predicted counts occur in a full autocracy without an unstable 
contiguous state in which the ethnic minority group at risk is subject to only economic 
discrimination rather than political. The predicted count for revolutionary war instability 
is still the highest at 0.36 additional incidents relative to stability (p<.05). Complex 
instability follows with an expected increase of 0.23 additional incidents (p<.01). Ethnic 
war is predicted to occur alongside an additional 0.17 incidents relative to stability 
(p=.05).  
Conclusions 
 Model 3 demonstrates quite similar results as Model 2. All of the instability types, 
save for adverse regime change resulted in statistically significant and positive effects on 
terrorism. As in Sample 2, adverse regime change is quite rare in Sample 3, with only 5 
state-years. There are only 18 state-years of revolutionary war and 34 of ethnic war. The 
rarity of the individual types may help to explain how the Paternoster el al. (1998) 
coefficients were unable to detect statistically significant differences between the types.  
In the model itself, however, the effects of all but adverse regime change are 
positive and statistically significant. Further, if I rely on the incidence rate ratios, I can 
conclude that Hypothesis 2b is partially supported in that revolutionary war has the 
largest magnitude effect on terrorism incidents. Perhaps because there are only 5 state-
years of adverse regime change in Sample 3, it is statistically indistingui hable from 
stability in its effects on terrorism. Although Model 3 clearly suffers because certain of 
the instability types are very rare, it is reasonable to conclude that the second set of 





 The results for the second set of hypotheses demonstrate that they are partially
supported. These hypotheses were examined in all three models, meaning they were 
tested with a large set of control variables. They were also tested in decreasing sample 
sizes. Overall, instability types do differ to varying degrees with regards to terrorism 
levels. Generally speaking, when revolutionary or ethnic war occurs, both low-control 
instability types, there will be more terrorism incidents; this effect is s atistically 
significant for revolutionary war in 2 of the 3 models. When a high-control and generally 
short-term instability like adverse regime change occurs, the increases in terrorism 
incidents will generally be smaller or statistically insignificant. I turn now to the results 
for the third set of hypotheses.  
Results for Hypothesis 3 
I assess the results of Hypothesis 3 and its sub-hypotheses for all models and their 
associated samples below. The third hypothesis proffers that increases in terror sm will 
be more likely to occur when a state experiences increases in complex singular stability 
as opposed to non-complex singular instability. Complex singular instability refers to the 
occurrence of two or more instability episodes within five years of one another but not 
within the same year. For example, a revolutionary war followed by an adverse regime 
change two years later would constitute two complex singular instabilities: complex-
revolutionary war and complex-adverse regime change. A non-complex singular 
instability is the occurrence of ethnic war, or any other type, without any other form of 
instability occurring in that five-year period. The first purpose of this hypothesis is to 
delve into whether there are qualitative differences in the level of terrorism experienced 




expectation from breakdown theory, because one instability episode should be associated 
with a non-zero level of terrorism, but two in a short period of time should be associated 
with even higher levels of terrorism. The sub-hypotheses build on these ideas. First, 
increases in same-year complex instability should be associated with more terr rism than 
just one instability in a five-year period. Second, increases in stability should be clearly
associated with less terrorism because breakdown has not occurred in a stable sta e. I turn 
now to the results for Hypothesis 3 in Model 1. 
Model 1: Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b 
 In order to test Hypothesis 3, I have run my models changing the reference 
category from stability to non-complex singular instability so as to test whether complex 
singular instability and non-complex singular instability are significantly different from 
one another. I also do this to test whether same-year complex instabilities are statistically 
significantly different from non-complex singular instability. Finally, I also examine 
whether stability is significantly different from non-complex singular instability as it 
ought to be if breakdown theory is to be believed. The results for the third set of 
hypotheses are shown in table 11, along with the results for the fourth set of hypotheses.  
Theoretical variables of interest 
For Model 1, I find that complex singular instability predicts significantly less 
terrorism than non-complex singular instability. When a complex singular instb lity 
occurs, there is also a 0.68 factor decrease in the rate of terrorism relative to a non-
complex singular instability. As before, I present the predicted counts of terr rism broken 
down by governance type and contiguity of an unstable nation. For a full democracy that 
is contiguous to an unstable nation and all other values held at their medians, complex 




Table 11. Results for hypotheses 3 and 4 for all samples 
 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Hypothesis 3: Complex singular instability v. Non-complex singular instability 
Complex singular instability -0.390 ** 0.124 0.677   -0.283   0.157 0.753  0.052   0.242 1.054 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Same-year complex instability v. Non-c mplex singular instability 
Same-year complex instability -0.254   0.130 0.775   0.039   0.166 1.040  0.293   0.261 1.341 
               
Hypothesis 3b: Stability v. Non-complex singular instability 
Stability -1.206 ***  0.107 0.299   -1.181 *** 0.130 0.307  -0.935 *** 0.197 0.393 
               
Hypothesis 4: Same-year complex instability v. Complex singular instability 
Same-year complex instability 0.136   0.089 0.775   0.322 ** 0.112 1.380  0.241   0.152 1.273 
               
Hypothesis 4a: Stability v. Complex singular instability  
Stability -0.816 ***  0.074 0.299   -0.898 *** 0.100 0.407  -0.987 *** 0.164 0.373 
               
 Model 1: Governance, contiguity and country demographics 
Governance & contiguity               
Full autocracy -0.659 ***  0.067 0.517   -0.680 *** 0.092 0.507  -0.821 *** 0.168 0.440 
Full democracy 0.103   0.064 1.108   0.199 * 0.081 1.220  0.304 ** 0.114 1.355 
Contiguous state instability 0.212 ***  0.053 1.236   0.234 ** 0.071 1.264  -0.148   0.099 0.863 
Country demographics               
Total population 0.000 ** 0.000 1.000   0.000 * 0.000 1.000  0.000   0.000 1.000 




 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Population density  0.001 * 0.000 1.001   0.000   0.000 1.000  0.000   0.000 1.000 
Urbanity 0.023 ***  0.002 1.023   0.014 *** 0.003 1.014  0.008   0.004 1.008 
Land area  -0.012   0.018 0.988   -0.050   0.026 0.952  0.075   0.043 1.078 
Data collection indicator               
GTD2 period 0.158   0.224 1.172   -1.028 *** 0.200 0.358  -1.116 *** 0.217 0.328 
               
H3 constant -1.764 ***  0.230     5.452 * 2.172    9.312 ** 3.305  
H4 constant -2.154 ***  0.218     5.169 * 2.179    9.364 ** 3.330  
               
Model 2: population age structure and social and economic development 
Population age structure               
% population aged 0-14      -0.052 * 0.020 0.950  -0.088 ** 0.031 0.916 
% population aged 15-65      -0.061 * 0.026 0.941  -0.077   0.040 0.925 
Social and economic development               
Telephone lines      -0.002   0.006 0.998  -0.004   0.008 0.996 
GDP per capita      -0.016   0.110 0.984  -0.336 * 0.155 0.715 
Change in gdp per capita      -0.010 * 0.005 0.990  0.010   0.007 1.010 
Food production index      -0.001   0.002 0.999  -0.012 *** 0.003 0.988 
CO2 emissions      0.003 ** 0.001 1.003  0.002   0.001 1.002 
               
Model 3: Ethnic minority group characteristics 
Religious restrictions               
Informal           -0.243   0.128 0.785 
Some            0.350 * 0.149 1.419 




 Sample 1: 147 states  Sample 2: 116 states  Sample 3: 82 states 
 B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR  B  SE IRR 
               
Political discrimination               
Neglect with help           0.171   0.273 1.187 
Neglect           0.160   0.274 1.174 
Social exclusion           0.713 ** 0.261 2.040 
Formal exclusion           0.793 ** 0.265 2.210 
Economic discrimination               
Neglect with help           -0.513 * 0.232 0.599 
Neglect           -0.573 ** 0.216 0.564 
Social exclusion           -0.595 ** 0.201 0.552 
Formal exclusion           -0.526 * 0.219 0.591 
Protest               
Verbal           -0.237   0.124 0.789 
Symbolic           0.195 * 0.096 1.215 
Small           0.093   0.091 1.097 
Medium           0.107   0.133 1.113 
Large           0.098   0.226 1.103 
               
Group spatial distribution               
Urban           -0.049   0.165 0.952 
Regional           -0.163   0.182 0.850 
Concentrated           -0.500 ** 0.146 0.607 
***=p<.000               
**=p<.01               




non-complex singular instability (p<.05). For a full autocracy that is not contiguous to an 
unstable nation, complex singular instability in a state is predicted to lower that state’s 
terrorism by 0.09 fewer incidents relative to a non-complex singular instability (p<.05). 
These results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
effects of a complex singular instability and a non-complex singular instability, ut it is 
in the opposite direction than that predicted by Hypothesis 3. That is, multiple 
instabilities within a five-year period are individually associated with statistically 
significantly less terrorism than one instability during a five-year period. With the first 
part of Hypothesis 3 completely unsupported, I turn to the rest of the results from this 
model for the sub-hypotheses.  
 A state which experiences multiple instabilities within a year, same-year complex 
instabilities, does not experience levels of terrorism that are statistic lly significantly 
distinguishable from a state which experiences non-complex singular instability. This 
contradicts Hypothesis 3a, which stated that same-year complex instabilities would be 
associated with significantly more terrorism than non-complex singular instability. In 
addition, the effects are in the opposite direction than that predicted by Hypothesis 3b. 
The effect size is relatively small.  
Hypothesis 3b is supported, however. Stability is statistically significantly 
associated with less terrorism than complex singular instability; stability relative to non-
complex singular instability is associated with a 0.29 factor decrease in the rate of 
terrorism incidents. A stable full democracy that is contiguous to an unstable nation (and 
all other controls held at their medians) is predicted to have a decrease of 0.24 incidents 




contiguous to an unstable state (and all other controls held at their medians) is expected 
to have a predicted decrease of 0.09 incidents relative to a non-complex singular 
instability (p<.000). I turn now to my conclusions for Hypothesis 3 for Model 1.  
Conclusions 
 Hypothesis 3 is completely unsupported. The results show that the effect is in the 
opposite direction than that expected in my extrapolation from breakdown theory. 
Further, Hypothesis 3a is unsupported as well; there is no statistically significant 
difference between same-year complex instability and non-complex singular instability in 
the effects on terrorism. However, Hypothesis 3b is supported; stability is statistically 
significantly associated with less terrorism than non-complex singular inst bility. Of 
three hypotheses, only one is supported in this model. 
These results suggest two things. One, when instability occurs one time in a state, there is 
enough breakdown to produce terrorism and potentially, increased terrorism relative to 
two or more instabilities within a five year period. This means that it is not necessarily 
the states that are having more problems that experience more terrorism. These results 
also imply that the impact of instability does not appear to be additive. Second, these 
results suggest that for terrorism to occur, perhaps the state cannot be compltely broken 
down, such as when same-year complex instabilities occur. These ideas will be exp or d 
further in the presentation of Hypothesis 4 and the discussion chapter. For now, I 
conclude that Hypotheses 3 and 3a are unsupported in Model 1 while Hypothesis 3b is 




Model 2: Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b 
Theoretical variables of interest 
In this model, complex singular instability demonstrates a negative and 
statistically non-significant effect on terrorism relative to non-complex singular 
instability (p<.10). That is, when a state experiences instability that occurs along with one 
or more other instabilities in five years, there also occurs less terrorism than that 
experienced during one instability in a five-year period, but this effect is nottatistically 
significant. The confidence interval around the coefficient includes zero (-0.59-.02). For 
Model 2, Hypothesis 3 is still unsupported, as it predicts the opposite direction for the 
relationship though this effect is not statistically significant. 
 As in Model 1, the occurrence of same-year complex instability within a state i  
not statistically distinguishable from non-complex singular instability in its effects on 
terrorism. Though not statistically significant, same-year complex stability is predicted to 
increase terrorism incidents relative to non-complex singular instability in Model 2. Also, 
as in Model 1, stability in a state is associated with statistically significantly fewer 
terrorism incidents than non-complex singular instability. For stability, there is also a 
0.31 factor decrease in the rate of terrorism than that experienced during non-complex 
singular instability. For a full democracy that is contiguous to an unstable nation and all 
other variables held at their medians, the occurrence of stability in a nation is predicted to 
be accompanied by 0.87 fewer incidents relative to non-complex singular instability 
(p<.000). For a full autocracy that is contiguous to only stable nations and all other 
continuous control variables held at their median, a stable state is predicted to have 0.28 





 The findings discussed above demonstrate that Hypotheses 3 and 3a are 
completely unsupported while Hypothesis 3b is supported. Regarding Hypothesis 3, 
although there is not a statistically significant difference between the effects of complex 
singular instability and non-complex singular instability on terrorism, it is in the opposite 
direction than that predicted by Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, a state which experiences one 
instability within five years is predicted to experience no difference in terrorism levels 
than multiple instabilities within five years. In addition, there was no statistic lly 
significant difference between the effects of same-year complex instab lity and non-
complex singular instability. This model suggests that one instability episode within five 
years is just as detrimental as multiple instabilities within the same year. Finally, stability, 
as should be expected, demonstrated a negative and statistically significant ef ect on 
terrorism relative to non-complex singular instability. I turn now to the results of 
Hypotheses 3, 3a and 3b from Model 3, which contains even more control variables, 
including the ethnic minority group characteristics. I turn to Model 3 now.  
Model 3: Hypotheses 3, 3a and 3b 
Theoretical variables of interest 
I examine the results of Hypotheses 3, 3a and 3b in Model 3. The experience of 
complex singular instability is not statistically distinguishable from non-complex singular 
instability with respect to terrorism, but the direction is positive. The confide ce interval 
around the coefficient includes zero (-0.42-0.53). Same-year complex instability remains 
statistically indistinguishable from non-complex singular instability thoug in Model 3, it 
is positive relative to non-complex singular instability. The only statistically significant 




instability. During stability, there is also a 0.39 factor decrease in the terrorism rate 
(p<.000). For a full democracy that is contiguous to an unstable nation and which has 
ethnic minorities at risk which are subject to political discrimination but not economic 
discrimination, a stable state is predicted to have 2.23 fewer terrorism incidents relative 
to a non-complex singular instability (p<.05). In contrast, a full autocracy without a 
contiguous unstable nation and which has an ethnic minority group that is subjected to 
only economic discrimination is predicted to have 0.21 fewer incidents during stable 
times relative to non-complex singular instability.  
Conclusions 
 The results of Model 3 demonstrate that Hypotheses 3 and 3a are completely 
unsupported. Hypothesis 3b is supported. In Model 3, the only statistically significant 
theoretical variable was stability, relative to non-complex singular instability. This 
instability effect remained robust. I turn now to the conclusions for Hypothesis 3.  
Conclusions 
In the end, the only important finding that emerges from this set of hypotheses is 
that instability itself matters; the number of instabilities within a five year period, whether 
in the same year or in different years, is unable to consistently predict the level of 
terrorism experienced by that state. Overall, it seems that the clearest take-away from all 
of the models for Hypothesis 3 is that the occurrence of instability itself is the most 
important. Whether there are multiple instabilities or not, when instability occurs, there 
are concomitant increases in terrorism incidents. I turn now to examine the results for 




Results for Hypothesis 4 
In the previous hypotheses, I tried to determine whether the occurrence of 
multiple instabilities was associated with more terrorism compared to one instability. In 
the next hypothesis, I try to determine whether the temporal density of those multiple 
instabilities is important. In Hypothesis 4, I hypothesize that increases in t rrorism will be 
more likely to occur when a state experiences increases in same-year complex 
instabilities relative to two or more instability episodes within a five-year p riod (but not 
in the same year). I derived from breakdown theory that a state experiencing two or more 
instability episodes in the same year should be in a downward spiral of negative 
consequences, of which terrorism ought to be prevalent. Both same-year complex 
instability and complex singular instability involve multiple instabilities, and Hypothesis 
4 tries to determine whether the temporal density of the multiple instability episodes 
matters. Theoretically, more than one instability in a year should produce more 
breakdown and then, more breakdown should produce more terrorism. Hypothesis 4a 
examines whether stability is associated with less terrorism than complex singular 
instability, as it should if breakdown is empirically supported. I turn now to testing th s in 
the context of Model 1. These results are shown in table 11 with the Hypothesis 3 results.  
 Model 1: Hypothesis 4 and 4a 
Theoretical variables of interest 
In Model 1, same-year complex instabilities are not statistically distinguishable 
from complex singular instability regarding terrorism. The effect is po itive but small. In 
contrast, when stability occurs, there is also a decrease in terrorism incidents, and this 
decrease is statistically significant and of a substantial magnitude. There is a 0.44 factor 




full democracy that is contiguous to an unstable nation and all else held at the median, th  
predicted count of terrorism for stability is expected to decrease by 0.16 incidents relative 
to complex singular instability (p<.000). For a full autocracy that is not contiguous to a 
nation experiencing instability and all else at the median, the expected count for stability 
is predicted to decrease by 0.06 incidents (p<.000).  
Conclusions 
 Hypothesis 4 is not supported while Hypothesis 4a is supported in Model 1. This 
model demonstrates that the temporal density of instability may not matter with respect to 
terrorism. It may be enough that instability has occurred to observe differences in the rate 
and predicted count of terrorism incidents. I turn now to the results for these hypotheses 
in Model 2. 
Model 2: Hypotheses 4 and 4a 
Theoretical variables of interest 
For Model 2, the temporal density of multiple instabilities does play a role in the 
distribution of terrorism incidents. The occurrence of same-year complex instability 
accompanies an increase of 1.38 times the rate of terrorism incidents relative to complex 
singular instability. For a full democracy that is contiguous to an unstable nation and with 
all else held at the median, the occurrence of multiple instabilities within a year is 
predicted to coincide with 0.58 additional terrorism incidents in a state relative to 
complex singular instability (p<.01). For a full autocracy that is not contiguous to an 
unstable nation and all else held at the median, a country in which there are multiple 
instabilities within the same year is predicted to experience 0.19 additional terrorism 
incidents relative to complex singular instability (p<.01). Interestingly, for this sample, 




year is also victimized by more terrorism when compared to multiple instab lities over 
five years but never within the same year. I turn now to the results of Hypothesis 4a. 
 A stable country experiences statistically significantly less terrorism relative to a 
country with complex singular instability. The rate of terrorism incidents is expected to 
decrease by a factor of 0.41 for stability relative to complex singular instab lity. When a 
full democracy that is contiguous to an unstable nation and all other control variables 
held at the median experiences stability, it is predicted to be victimized by 0.65 fewer 
incidents relative to more than one instability per five-year period (p<.000). When a full 
autocracy that is contiguous to only stable nations and all other control variables held at 
their medians is stable, the predicted count of terrorism incidents is reduced by 0.22 
incidents relative to complex singular instability (p<.000).  
Conclusions 
 For this sample of 116 nations from 1981 to 2005, both Hypotheses 4 and 4a are 
supported. Temporal density does seem to matter for this sample, such that when there 
are multiple instabilities within the same year, there is a predicted increase in terrorism 
incidents. When a country experiences stability, it is also expected to decrease in 
terrorism incidents relative to a complex singular instability. Since the temporal density 
of the multiple instabilities did not statistically significantly predict more terrorism in 
Model 1, I am cautious with regards to these results as they may be the result of sample 
selection. I turn now to the results for Model 3 for these Hypotheses. 
Model 3: Hypotheses 4 and 4a 
Theoretical variables of interest 
In Model 3, the occurrence of same-year complex instability is not statistic lly 




magnitude is quite small. However, stability is statistically significantly different from 
complex singular instability. A stable state is also expected to have a 0.37 factor decrease 
in the rate of terrorism incidents. For a full democracy in which an ethnic mi ority group 
at risk which is subject to political discrimination but not economic discriminatio  in a 
state that is contiguous to an unstable nation, when the state is stable, it is predicted to 
have 2.35 fewer terrorism incidents relative to a state in complex singular instability 
(p<.01). Meanwhile, a stable full autocracy that is not contiguous to any unstable states 
and in which there is only economic discrimination against an ethnic minority group at 
risk is predicted to experience 0.22 fewer terrorism incidents (p<.01).  
Conclusions 
 In Model 3, only Hypothesis 4a is supported. This model shows that the temporal 
density of instabilities is unable to meaningfully distinguish between the effects of 
multiple instabilities. Models 1 and 3 demonstrate that the Model 2 finding, that the 
temporal density of multiple instabilities matters, may be the result of sample selection. It 
also demonstrates the strength of the multi-pronged analytical approach utilized here. By 
running my models on multiple samples, I am able to detect unexpected results and 
weigh them against the results of the other models. I conclude that it is likely that 
Hypothesis 4 is unsupported while Hypothesis 4a is supported. The temporal density of 
multiple instabilities is not a consistent predictor of increased levels of terr rism. The 
occurrence of instability itself, rather than how many or when, is far more consistently 
associated with increased levels of terrorism. I turn now to the chapter conclusions. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have presented many results. I presented results that 




the type that occurs. For example, for two of the three models, revolutionary war 
instabilities were associated with the largest statistically significant predicted increases in 
terrorism incidents while adverse regime change was associated with either the smallest 
increase or lacked statistical significance. These findings generally supported the second 
set of hypotheses. Further, I presented results in this chapter that contradicted the third set 
of hypotheses. Specifically, there does not appear to be a greater risk of terrorism when a 
state experiences two or more instability episodes within five years rel tive to just one 
episode. In addition, there is likely no additional risk of terrorism incidents when two or 
more instabilities occur within the same year relative to one instability in five years. 
Stability always demonstrated a negative relationship with terrorism. Only one 
hypothesis from the third set was supported. The fourth set of hypotheses showed slightly 
inconsistent results across models, which appear to be the result of sample selection. In 
Sample 2 alone, the temporal density of instability demonstrated positive and statistically 
significant power. For all other models, there was no statistically distinguishable effect of 
two or more instability episodes within one year on terrorism relative to one instab lity 
episode within a year. Finally, the occurrence of stability always predicted less terrorism 
incidents relative to complex singular instability. For the most part, breakdown theory 
was supported by the results presented in this chapter, but the theoretical extensions were 






Discussion and Conclusions 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I discuss my findings regarding the relationship between political 
instability and terrorism. I review the results of each of the hypotheses acro s the three 
samples. I also summarize my thoughts on the roles that omitted variable and sample 
selection biases may have played in this study. I then summarize the state of the support 
for breakdown theory and the cases that do not fit breakdown theory. I also review the 
limitations of this study. I then consider the policy implications of this study. I end with 
some suggestions for future research topics regarding political instability nd some final 
conclusions. I turn now to a discussion of my findings regarding instability and terrorism.  
Discussion 
Instability and Terrorism 
 In this dissertation, I sought to complete an exhaustive test of the instability nd 
terrorism relationship. I examined the relationship between instability and terrorism over 
four sets of hypotheses and three different models and samples. The samples varied from 
147 nations from 1970 to 2005 in Sample 1 to 116 states from 1981 to 2005 in Sample 2 
and finally, in 82 states from 1990 to 2005 in Sample 3. These changes in samples also 
included the addition of an increasing number of control variables as I moved from the 
larger to the smaller samples. The first set of control variables included the country 
demographics, governance and contiguity characteristics. In Model 2, the control 
variables included the population age structure and the social and economic development 
variables. In Model 3, I added characteristics of ethnic minority groups at risk in a sample 




risks of omitted variables bias, by including as many control variables as possible, and 
sample selection bias, by starting with the largest sample of countries and years and 
reducing the sample size from that starting point.  
 The most important element of this test was the multi-sample analytical strategy. 
By testing the instability effect in three different samples of countries and years, I was 
able to demonstrate both sample selection bias and omitted variables bias in action. 
Further, I demonstrated that the instability effect was most likely not a result of sample 
selection bias, because the effect was not beholden to the sample I chose. It is a shame 
that more studies in the literature do not employ such an analytical strategy since many of 
the control variables used in this study changed signs and statistical significance 
depending on the sample. Clear examples of this included the effects of GDP per capita 
and the effects of governance type, specifically full democracy relativ  to a transitional 
government. Differing sample composition is likely a clear factor in the div rgent effects 
found for some of these concepts in the literature. More tests are needed that utilize the 
multi-sample technique before conclusions can be drawn regarding the importance of 
these contested domains. 
One such contested domain that I tested in this dissertation was governance type. 
As I found in this study, it is generally agreed upon that the relationship between 
terrorism and full autocracies is negative, though surely some of this relationship is 
accounted for by underreporting in autocratic states. However, it was unclear in this study 
whether transitional democracies or full democracies were expected to experience 
different levels of terrorism. Depending on the sample and the model chosen in this 




democracies were expected to experience more terrorism. Because of the diverg nt 
effects, I was unable to make a final statement on the role of democracy and terrorism. 
All I was able to state with confidence is that full autocracies likely report less and are 
victimized less by terrorism. Further, I am unable to comment on whether the promotion 
of democracies would result in decreasing levels of terrorism. Democracy brings with it 
many social goods, but it is clear to me that the evidence is mixed on whether one of 
those goods is decreased terrorism. Until further research utilizes the multi-sample 
strategy that I exploited in this dissertation, the literature on democracy and terrorism is 
likely to be threatened by an unknown quantity of sample selection bias. 
The instability effect was robust over changes in samples and despite the 
inclusion of demographic, governance, social development, economic development and 
ethnic minority group control variables. In addition, the models I presented above
demonstrated that there was ample support for the instability effect in a statistically 
rigorous model, such as the fixed effects negative binomial regression model. This model 
only used within-country variation to estimate the coefficients such that the results I have 
demonstrated “control out” time-stable differences between countries. The time fixed 
effects also controlled for changes over time. As such, it provided a particul rly 
conservative test of the effects of changes in instability on changes in terrorism. This 
conservativeness allowed me to be more confident in the results. Specifically, the results 
indicate that when instability in a nation increased, terrorism in that nation lso increased. 
This is a classic sociological finding that would please Durkheim. The society is more 
than just the sum of its individual parts, and it has explanatory power above and beyond 





Hypothesis 1 suggested that the increases in instability ought to increase the 
number of terrorist attacks within a country. In fact, this hypothesis was strongly 
supported in all samples and in all analyses. Specifically, a state experiencing instability 
also experiences increased terrorism attacks.  
In Hypothesis 2, I argued that the effects of instability on terrorism ought to vary 
by type, that revolutionary war and ethnic war should be associated with the largest
increases in terrorism and that adverse regime change ought to be associated with the 
smallest increases in terrorism. In one of the three models, these hypotheses were clearly 
supported. In Models 2 and 3, possibly due to the rarity of certain types of instability in 
the sample, adverse regime change was not statistically distinguishable from stability 
with regards to terrorism. In addition, the equality of regression coefficients t sts 
demonstrated that revolutionary war predicted statistically significatly more terrorism 
incidents than any other type for Models 1 and 2. Overall, I conclude that the weightof 
the evidence across the models generally supports Hypotheses 2 and 2b while Hypothesis 
2a is likely unsupported. Revolutionary war at least is associated with a large inc ease in 
terrorism and adverse regime change is likely not statistically distinguishable from 
stability with respect to its effects on terrorism.  
For Hypothesis 3, I examined a theoretical extension to breakdown that suggested 
that there should be observable differences in terrorism between increases in instab lity 
that occurs once within a five-year period and instability that occurred more than once i  
both a five-year and a one-year period. The most important finding that emerged from the 
models that addressed the third set of hypotheses was that the occurrence of instability 




category as non-complex singular instability. There were varying results with regards to 
whether multiple instabilities were important relative to one instability. The varying 
results made the uniform results regarding the difference between stability nd non-
complex singular instability stand out in stark contrast. When instability occurs in a state, 
the state seems to be at heightened risk of terrorism, but this heightened risk does not 
seem to be further heightened by more instabilities.  
In Hypotheses 4 and 4a, I examined another theoretical extension which queried 
whether the temporal density of the multiple instabilities mattered. That is, this 
hypothesis questioned whether there is a difference in terrorism levels for multiple 
instabilities in the same year relative to multiple instabilities within five years. This 
hypothesis was a logical extension of the breakdown model. The results for Hyp thesis 4 
varied across models. However, for all models, Hypothesis 4a was supported. The 
difference between stability in a nation and complex singular instability was important 
and statistically significant across all models. When instability occurs in a state, again, 
the state seems to be more vulnerable to terrorism. 
Interestingly, the number and temporal density of instabilities looked relatively 
unimportant when compared to the uniformity of the positive and statistically significant 
effect of instability in the models. Further, when instability was the referenc  category as 
it was in the third and fourth sets of hypotheses, stability was uniformly negative and 
statistically significant. Over all the changes in models, samples and hypotheses, the 
instability effect remained a robust predictor of terrorism.  
My hypotheses were supported for the most part. State instability was associated 




type, with revolutionary war producing statistically significantly larger expected counts 
of terrorism. However, the results were more complex with regard to the effects of 
multiple instabilities in a five-year period and in a one-year period. What did not vary 
over the latter hypotheses was that instability itself still demonstrated a positive effect on 
terrorism levels. These results, taken as a whole, demonstrated that it is likely that it is the 
occurrence of instability itself that is most important.  
Omitted Variable Bias and Sample Selection Bias 
I attempted to put parameters on the degree of omitted variable bias and sample 
selection bias present in my analyses through the multi-stage analytical strategy. In this 
study, there was a very clear balancing act in attempting to minimize each type of bias. In 
order to minimize omitted variable bias, I needed to include as many control variables 
that are related to both instability and terrorism as possible. On the other hand, in order to 
minimize sample selection bias, I needed to include as many states and years as possible 
in my analysis. Unfortunately, because the desired control variables were not always 
available with coverage back to 1970, this balancing act was very nuanced for my study. 
It was made even more difficult given that I attempted to measure the effects of political 
instability, which is a phenomenon that is most common in the nations that are perhaps 
least likely to have reliable and valid data on those control variables needed to minimize 
omitted variables bias. In response to these data challenges, I developed a multi-stage 
analytical strategy. This strategy involved using three separate samples with increasing 
numbers of control variables and decreasing sample sizes and replicating the Model 1 
analysis on the two smaller samples. Upon reviewing the results for the control variab es 




selection and omitted variable bias in this study. I turn now to a discussion of sample 
selection bias.  
Sample selection bias 
In order to try to understand the degree of sample selection bias at work, I 
replicated Model 1, the analysis with the country demographics, governance and 
contiguity control variables on Samples 2 and 3. Most importantly, instability remain d  
positive and statistically significant predictor of terrorism incidents across the replications 
in Samples 2 and 3. This demonstrated that the instability effect is unlikely to be an 
artifact of sample selection. In the Sample 2 replication, there were a few important 
differences between the models. However, in the Sample 3 replication of Model 1, th re 
were even more important differences in the control variables. Further, when Model 2 
was replicated on Sample 3, the original Model 1 or even Model 2 results could not be 
replicated. In addition, the descriptive statistics indicated that Sample 3 was composed of 
the most democratic, most populous, most densely populated, and most urban country-
year observations. Sample 3 was also the most concentrated with regards to terrorism 
incidents, with the highest mean level of terrorism. In conjunction with the lack of Model 
1 and 2 replicability, the summary statistics demonstrated that Sample 3 is so different 
from Samples 1 and 2 that the sample selection issues at work ruled out statistical 
inferences across models. However, given that instability remained a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of terrorism even in Sample 3, I am pleased by the 
robustness of the instability effect. I turn now to addressing omitted variable bis.  
Omitted variable bias 
I assessed the effects of omitted variable bias by comparing Model 1 to Models 2 




the Model 1 and 2 variables in Model 3. However, these were made more complicated 
via the changes in samples across the models. The many statistically significant effects in 
Models 2 and 3 clearly demonstrated that Model 1 in particular suffers from omitted 
variable bias by excluding these variables. Overall, the most important missing variables 
were the economic measures from Model 2 and the political and economic discrimination 
MAR variables from Model 3. These all showed highly significant effects on terrorism. 
Overall, the evidence clearly suggested that that there were likely some important omitted 
variables issues at work, particularly in Model 1. However, what remained most 
important for this analysis was that instability remained a positive and statistically 
significant predictor of terrorism even with all of the other important domains of control 
variables.  
 I have reviewed the model findings regarding the likely effects of sample 
selection and omitted variables bias in my analyses. I concluded that both have an impact 
on the results presented here. It is worth noting that without the multi-sample strategy, the 
differences across models and samples and the perils of making cross-sample inferences 
would not have been known. I highly recommend that this strategy be adopted as often as 
possible in future research on terrorism. I turn now to an assessment of breakdown theory 
in the light of these findings. 
Breakdown Theory 
 Breakdown theory received empirical support from this study in the robustness of 
the instability effect. The results are consistent with the central premise of breakdown 
theory. As a country experiences rapid social change, non-routine collective action in the 
form of terrorism becomes more likely. Breakdown theory suggests that this occurs due 




severs the ties of individuals to conventional society. The loosening of bonds is 
reinforced when less restrained individuals decline to form new conventional 
commitments to society.  
Further, the support for breakdown theory largely extended to the findings that the 
type of instability influenced the level of terrorism experienced by the stat . Lower 
control instability types, like revolutionary war, were predicted to experience statistically 
significantly larger increases in terrorism. However, the shorter duration nd higher 
control instability, adverse regime change was not able to attain statistically significant 
effects in two of the three models, possible due to the rarity of occurrence. Overall, when 
the rapid social change took the form of a very low-control situation, like war, in which 
the society itself may have been torn apart, the concomitant increase in terrorism was 
quite large. These findings are all in line with the tenets of breakdown theory.  
However, there was almost no support for the theoretical extensions that I derived 
from breakdown theory. According to the third and fourth hypotheses, multiple 
instabilities within a five-year period should coincide with more terrorism than only one 
instability; further, multiple instabilities in a one-year period should also be associated 
with even more terrorism than one instability in a one year period (but more than one 
instability in a five-year period). These were sensible derivations from breakdown theory 
if the experience of breakdown had additive effects on terrorism. Largely, these 
hypotheses were not supported in the expected way.  
These findings may lend some support to the resource mobilization models 
suggested by Snyder and Tilly (1972) and the Tillys (1975). Resource mobilization 




discontent in society. This is primarily because breakdown and discontent, both forms of 
disorganization, exist in all societies and thus, this type of constant cannot explain a 
change in collective action. Further, because breakdown and discontent (disorganization) 
categorically cannot explain collective action in this theory, some type of preexisting 
organization must be required for collective action to occur. This organization may be in 
the form of primary, or family, group attachments or secondary attachments, such as to 
civic groups. Without some type of organization, there cannot be collective action, 
because discontented and untethered individuals do not suddenly engage in collective 
(group) actions.  
Though this study was not a theory competition between the breakdown and 
resource mobilization models, since I have no proxy measures for resource mobilization, 
it appears that some minimum level of organization may be required for terrorism t  
occur in an unstable state. It is unclear at this point whether primary or secondary group 
attachments are needed or if there is another type of organization required at th  
government level. My results can only suggest that perhaps there is such a thing as too 
much instability (disorganization). In a state experiencing multiple instabilities, 
particularly in the same year, the resulting chaos and uncertainty may be too much to 
allow terrorist groups to organize and to act. Von Hippel (2002) actually presented this 
possibility with respect to transnational terrorism. In the end, though, these are tentative 
suggestions that require further research.  
 Since the breakdown model is a non-deterministic model, it is clear that when 
rapid social change occurs, it will not always be associated with large amounts of 




That little to no terrorism occurs during rapid social change in some cases and plenty of 
terrorism occurs in the absence of rapid social change other times requires som  
attention. I attempt to offer an explanation of both variants of this problem for the 
breakdown model below.  
 I address the occurrence of rapid social change without accompanying terrorism 
first. In Figure 1, the breakdown model was demonstrated graphically. In that model, 
there were two stepping points between instability and terrorism. Breakdown needed to 
stimulate both a macro-level freeing effect via the disintegration of the bond between 
society and individuals. Then, the loss of controls over individuals needed to manifest 
itself via non-routine collective action. Perhaps instability does not always result in a 
macro-level freeing effect or perhaps non-routine collective action is not the result of this 
societal loss of informal and formal controls. Further, it is possible that individuals in 
some unstable societies engage in other non-routine collective actions rather than 
terrorism.  
This problem is of particular concern given the lack of support for the third and 
fourth hypotheses. These hypotheses suggested that increases in multiple instabiities and 
temporally dense multiple instabilities ought to be accompanied by increases in terrorism. 
This finding was heavily influenced by sub-Saharan Africa; roughly 40% of the multiple 
instabilities and same-year complex instabilities occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the 
mean of terrorism incidents for sub-Saharan Africa was only 3.5 incidents while the 
global average is 13.93 incidents from 1970 to 2005. Surely, some of this difference can 
be attributed to under-reporting, but it is reasonable to conclude that to some degree, sub-




amount of instability in that region. As mentioned earlier in this discussion, perhaps there 
does need to be some minimum level of organization present in a society before terrorist
groups will form and act. In this context, at least, the effects of instability on terrorism are 
not as simple as more breakdown leads to more terrorism. Further study is required to 
better explain this phenomenon. 
The reverse problem was also troubling for this test of the breakdown model. The 
occurrence of political instability simply cannot explain terrorism that occurs in its 
absence. However, that does not mean that the breakdown model cannot begin to explain 
terrorism that occurs without a preceding rapid social change. At its heart, t  breakdown 
model is a macro-level control theory; when the constraints on individuals’ behaviors re 
loosened, on average, non-routine collective action should be the result. Thus, if there 
were other reasons why the constraints in society have been loosened, then breakdown 
theory can offer predictions as to what will result, in this case, more terrorism. An 
example of this was the left-wing terrorism in the United States in the 1970s; it is not 
clear what type of rapid social change preceded the formation and actions of the Weather 
Underground, for example, but it is clear that society was disorganized and controls ove 
individuals’ behaviors were likely loosened during this time period.  
Further, some terrorism will never fit the breakdown model perhaps because they 
are better explained by the political grievance model (Gurr, 2000). A good example of 
this in the United States is anti-abortion terrorism. Clearly, this form of terrorism persists 
because the individuals and groups who engage in abortion clinic bombing and abortion 
provider assassinations are attempting to force their preferred resolution to heir 




does not explain this type of terrorism particularly well, nor is it intended to do so. Thus,
breakdown does not offer a complete theory of terrorism.  
Overall, breakdown theory received support from this study. It is an adequate 
explanation for the basic relationship between instability and terrorism though it does not 
offer a complete theory of terrorism. The extensions to the breakdown model that I 
derived in Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported. Either another theoretical model is 
needed to explain the idea that one instability is enough instability to observe a 
relationship with terrorism or my extrapolations were not in line with the tenets of 
breakdown theory. More than one instability, within a five-year or a one-year period, did 
not appear to predict more terrorism, and it is not clear which theoretical model can 
explain this. I turn now to a review of the limitations of the current research.  
Limitations of the Current Research  
 The most pressing limitation of the current research involves the validity of this 
study’s measures. This study was undertaken with only one of many possible 
operationalizations of state instability, a very broad one, and one operationalization and 
one measure of terrorism incidents, the GTD’s total terrorism incidents. Thus, it is 
unknown whether the instability effect I have suggested here will survive with narrower 
definitions of both instability and terrorism. Because of this uncertainty, it is premature to 
conclude that instability in all of its forms may be related to terrorism in all of its forms. 
It remains to be seen whether the instability effect can survive a test that uses different 
instability measures. Further, I examined the effects of instability on only the total 
number of terrorism incidents reported from the GTD. In future research, I intend to limit 
the dependent variable to include only fatal terrorism incidents from the GTD, that is, 




any differences for the instability effect between incidents that claim a fatality and those 
that do not. I also intend to examine various other operationalizations of state instability 
and their effects on terrorism. This will be discussed in further detail in the futur  
research section. 
 The next limitation of this study is that it only addresses a sample of the possible 
countries and years and thus, generalizability is hindered. Instability and terrorism both 
existed before 1970, but due to a lack of data, I am not able to examine the relationship 
prior to this year.30 Further, although instability and terrorism certainly exist in countries 
with less than 500,000 in population, I could not examine the relationship between 
instability and terrorism in these nations due to the PITF’s exclusion of these states. 
Further, due to control variable coverage, my sample of countries was further whittled 
down to a starting point of 151 nations from 1970 to 2005. Lack of variation on the 
dependent variable decreased Sample 1 to 147 nations. Although this sample included 
more states and years of domestic and transnational terrorism than the prior literature 
contained, it is still a sample. Thus, I can say nothing about the excluded countries, which 
included Iraq and Afghanistan. The generalizability of this study is quite clearly imited 
as a result. 
 Further, although extensive efforts have been made to minimize sample selection 
bias and omitted variables bias, they still remain a threat to validity. The instability effect 
was robust across changes in samples and the addition of many new control variables, but 
that does not mean it would remain robust if the full universe of countries were studied 
                                                        
30. However, Hoffman (1998) has stated that modern ter orism began in 1968 with the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacking of the El Al airliner that captured global media attenio . In 
addition, LaFree (2010, personal communication) has argued that the advent of satellite communications 
during this period opened the door to large-scale terrorism databases that rely on open-source media rports 




further back in time. In addition, there may be an unmeasured variable that drives both 
instability and terrorism, making the potential connection between them completely 
spurious. Future research may uncover such a third variable. I have done my best in this 
study to statistically control for time-stable unobserved heterogeneity as well as to 
balance the need for country-year coverage with the need for control variables. Certainly, 
others may be able to do this more convincingly in the future to either better establish a 
connection between instability and terrorism or to question its foundations. 
Finally, it should be made clear that I am not able to establish causality. I have 
simply demonstrated a correlation that is robust to changes in samples, to changes in the 
formulation of the independent variable of interest, and that makes good theoretical 
sense. In addition, I am not able to establish that any relationship between instability and 
terrorism is unidirectional. I cannot rule out the notion that in some states or years, 
terrorism may drive instability or that the relationship could be a constant feedback loop. 
This remains to future research to attempt. I turn now to the policy recommendations of 
this study.  
Policy Recommendations 
 It is interesting to note that the focus on state failure as a threat to international 
security largely began in the Helman and Ratner (1992) policy article on the need to 
intervene in these situations to prevent spectacular state failures like that in Somalia. 
Helman and Ratner systematically addressed the failings of all of the traditional 
approaches to dealing with state failure, including United Nations trusteeship, 
conservatorship, and various aid programs directed at social and economic development. 
In the end, their policy prescription suggested that although state failings and failure 




to apply a sliding scale of intervention to failed and failing states. This sage advice seems 
as useful now as it was then. I lay out a brief sketch of my modifications to their policy 
recommendations. 
 Briefly, the suggested program for sliding scale intervention should look 
something like the following. All unstable states ought to be targeted by programs to 
foster the promotion of the legitimacy of government and civil liberties, and the 
promotion of basic human security and public service provisions, regardless of regime 
type. These states will also need to enter the peace process with any rebel groups they 
may currently be fighting. Governments in these states should also be assisted in shoring 
up their borders to prevent the contagion of instability and terrorism across those borders. 
Further, the United Nations will likely need to step in both militarily with peacekeeping 
forces and with training, supplies and equipment to help states to deal with ethnic 
minority group tensions and social and governmental discrimination against ethnic 
minority groups living in their borders. Although this recommendation was based off the 
findings here, that only compared countries with MARs to other countries with MARs 
(rather than to countries that lack defined MARs), it seems reasonable to conclude that 
dealing with ethnic minority group tension is a good idea.  
It should be noted that caution should be applied regarding economic 
development given the findings of this research. This caution is suggested by the results 
in this study regarding the Food Production Index and carbon dioxide emissions. 
Certainly, economic development can bring opportunity and wealth, but it may also bring 
with it other ills, such as terrorism, as the state modernizes. Further, democracy 




of social goods, but the evidence is still incomplete with regards to its effect on terr rism. 
At the least, democracy should not be promoted as a way to lessen terrorism levels.  
 Ideally, this type of policy intervention would be applied along a sliding scale, 
with the most unstable countries receiving the most treatment. Basic functionig of the 
state will need to be addressed first and this may require the most time and resources. As 
it was for Helman and Ratner (1992), this list of policy prescriptions is a massive 
undertaking and will not uniformly lead to success. I turn now to a future research 
agenda. 
Future Research 
 There are four main projects that are sorely needed. The first two have been 
previously discussed. Specifically, the operationalizations of instability and terrorism 
need to be changed to test whether the relationship suggested here is dependent on the 
formulation that I used. Ideally, several domains of political instability could be tested 
against one another; legitimacy of government, social service provision, and basic human 
security, and collapse of central government, for example, could be tested together to 
attempt to narrow down the involved mechanisms. In addition, a measure of timing or 
duration could be explored to see if instabilities that occur at certain points in time or if 
longer instabilities are more harmful. Further, the measure of terrorism should be varied 
to substitute the number of fatal attacks for total number of attacks. In the future,
transnational and domestic terrorism should be tested separately to determine if the 
effects differ across type of terrorism.  
 Future research will need to address the directionality of the potential instability 
and terrorism relationship. This could be addressed via statistical methods such aspath 




the relationship is important, because it is unrealistic to assume that instabilty can only 
lead to terrorism. Further, it is similarly unrealistic to assume that the directionality of the 
effect cannot change over time in the same state. In some years, instability could 
conceivably stimulate terrorism while in others the reverse could occur. Without 
specifying the facilitating conditions that may lead to instability influencing terrorism and 
those that lead to the reverse, work on instability and terrorism is incomplete. I plan to 
conduct such research in the future again utilizing the multi-sample strategy us d here.  
 The final future research project that is needed the most is more difficult and 
ambitious than the changes in operationalizations and statistical modeling outlined above. 
Put simply, even if there is an actual relationship between instability and terrorism, it is 
still unknown what the mechanisms involved are and how they work. This is simply not a 
question that can be answered with quantitative, country-level research. The question of 
how and why instability and terrorism may be related requires an ambitious qualitative 
research agenda that includes in-depth case studies of states in stability and states with 
one instability, with complex singular instability and with same-year complex 
instabilities. Ideally, these in-depth case studies could follow these states as they 
transitioned into and out of instability. Further, these case studies require surveys and 
interviews of the general citizenry to measure the degree of breakdown felt in each state 
(Useem, 1998) as well as interviews with perpetrators of terrorism and instability. The 
perpetrator interviews ought to delve into the decision-making process that preceded th  
violent actions and should be conducted at the individual and group-level, if applicable. 
This qualitative research can help to answer questions regarding the mechanisms of any 




 In conclusion, future research is most certainly needed to replicate this study. 
First, alternative operationalizations and measures of both instability and terrorism need 
to be tested. The ways in which I operationalized both instability and terrorism in this 
study was quite broad, and it is necessary to test the relationship with different and 
narrower formulations so as to ensure the findings reported here are not artifac s of the 
data. Second, research that tests the directionality of any relationship, as well  allowing 
the directionality to go both ways, between terrorism and instability is needed. Finally, it 
is necessary to supplement this quantitative, country-level study with qualitative research, 
such as case studies of states as they transition into and out of instability as well as in-
depth individual interviews. It is only by considering both the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence that true conclusions can be drawn regarding any relationship between 
instability and terrorism. 
Conclusions 
 This study examined the relationship between political instability and terrorism. 
Prior research had suggested that political instability and terrorism could be related in a 
positive way (Marshall, 2002; Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2008; Tikusis, 2009; LaFree, Dugan 
and Fahey, 2008). Theoretically, such a relationship made sense in the breakdown 
framework. Rapid social change had been shown repeatedly to be associated with he
occurrence of non-routine collective action at the individual, city and country-level 
(Useem, 1980; 1985; 1997; 1998; LaFree and Drass, 1997; Lieske, 1978). Political 
instability constitutes one form of rapid social change and was the principal focus of this 
study. Political instability was conceptualized primarily as the legitimacy of the state in 




conformity in its citizens through the rule of law. Political instability was operationalized 
using the Political Instability Task Force data; the four types of political instability were 
revolutionary war, ethnic war, adverse regime change, genocide and any combination of 
these events. Non-routine collective action, collective action that violates soci tal norms 
was conceptualized here as terrorism. Terrorism was operationalized using the Global 
Terrorism Database and was measured as the total number of terrorism incidents in the 
sampled countries from 1970 to 2005. This study sought to establish whether the 
occurrence of political instability in a state coincided with the occurrence of terr rism in 
that state. 
My analysis demonstrated a strong positive relationship between instability nd 
terrorism. When instability occurred, terrorism increased. When certain types of 
instability occurred, such as revolutionary war and ethnic war, the increases in terrorism 
were larger. These findings are highly supportive of breakdown theory. However, my 
logical extensions to breakdown theory were not supported. These extensions included 
that idea that multiple instabilities within five years should be accompanied by more 
terrorism incidents than one instability within five years. This was not observed. Further, 
the theoretical extensions suggested that multiple instabilities within a year should 
coincide with even more terrorism than one instability within a year. This also was not 
observed. Thus, breakdown theory explained the basic relationship between terrorism and 
instability; it is unclear what theoretical framework explains the findings re arding 
multiple instabilities and temporal density. The most important factor to emerg  from this 
study was that despite the changes in formulations and samples, the occurrence of 




positive relationship between political instability and terrorism, but future res arch is 







The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) data has issued a set of narratives 
which describe the basic foundations of their determinations of political instability for 
each instability event. The instability event types include adverse regime change, 
genocide, ethnic war and revolutionary war as well as a combination of any of these 
events called complex. (The complex category is disaggregated into its component parts 
in the data narratives, which allowed me to deal directly with the four instability types in 
the following procedure.) After reading the codebook, I discovered that it was possible 
for terrorism campaigns to be used by PITF as evidence in support of the occurrence of 
an instability event. Because of this, it is necessary to exclude these events so that no 
instability events in my independent variable could conceivably appear as a terrorism 
incident, my dependent variable, which is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD). I have gone about this in a three-step process. (All event descriptions in this Data 
Appendix come directly from Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2009 and can be located via the 
country name and the instability type for that period).  
Step 1 
First, I searched for all occurrences of the words “terror”, “terrorize”, “terrorism”, 
“terrorist”, “terrorists”, etc. in the PITF event narratives and excluded any instability 
events that included the use of terrorism. This means that I kept the countries in th  
analysis, but I coded them as if they were not experiencing the instability event. What 
follows are those events that were excluded based on this rule.  




Militants of the Muslim Brotherhood initiate a terror and assassination campaign 
against the Alawite-dominated, Baathist regime.  
 
In Israel from 1987 to the present, an ethnic war was excluded based on: 
Palestinians rebel against Israel’s repressive authority in the occupied territories 
of Gaza and West Bank and in Israel proper (the “intifada”). Violent mass 
demonstrations and systematic terrorist campaign is largely suspended in October 
1998 awaiting the final implementation of the Wye River Accords. Violence 
begins again in September 2000 as implementation falls short of expectations. 
 
In Peru from 1982-1987, a revolutionary war was excluded based on: 
Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) attack government troops, 
terrorize rural and urban supporters of government. 
 
In the United Kingdom (which includes Northern Ireland in this study) from 1971-1982, 
an ethnic war was excluded based on: 
Catholic IRA (Irish Republican Army) uses terror against British forces and 
militant Protestants in quest for union with Republic of Ireland. Violence begins 
to subside in late 1970s and early 1980s as all sides search for alternatives to 
violence, eventually culminating in October 1994 peace agreement. 
 
In Algeria from 1991 to 2004, a revolutionary war was excluded based on: 
 Islamic militants and military-government initiate intense terror campaigns 
 designed to undermine each other’s support bases. 
 
In China from 1988-1998, an ethnic war was excluded based on: 
Episodic violent protests by Uighurs in Xinjiang Province against Han Chinese 
control escalate by 1996 into terror campaign; government repression ends open 
opposition. 
 
In the Philippines, from 1972-1976, a genocide was excluded based on: 
Moro resistance to Christian settlement and support for separatist guerrillas results 
in military and paramilitary terror tactics in which many Moros die in massacres 
and napalm bombings. 
 
In Egypt from 1992 – 1999, a revolutionary war was excluded based on: 
Terror campaign by militant Islamic groups against secular government; largely 




renunciation of violence by the Gamaat-I-Islamiya (Egypt’s largest resistance 
group). 
 
In Iran from 1981 to 1983, a revolutionary war was excluded based on: 
Moderates (National Front) and conservatives (IRP Islamic Revival Party) use 
terror and repression in competition for political control. 
Excluding these instability events is a necessary data strategy to avoid 
confounding my independent and dependent variables.  
Step 2 
 
Second, I also excluded any government actions that were a response to the 
terrorism on the grounds that it is likely that they would not have occurred if the terrorism 
had not itself occurred in the first place. This excluded government reaction instabil ty 
events that likely would not have occurred without the terrorism. To be clear, I kept these 
countries in the analysis, but I coded them as if they were not experiencing the i stability 
events. The events excluded by this rule are provided below.  
In Syria, the government responded to a revolutionary war that involved the use of terror 
(discussed earlier) by conducting a genocide in 1981 and 1982. The following genocide 
was excluded because it occurred in direct response to the terror campaign discussed 
above. 
Following a coup attempt in January 1982, government forces move to crush the 
militants’ stronghold in Hama in February 1982. 
 
In Peru in 1992, the government response to the revolutionary war excluded above 
consisted of a regime change which was then excluded. 
Facing internal warfare and recession, President Fujimori, backed by military, 
dissolves Congress and suspends Constitution. 
 
In the Sudan from 2003 to the present, an ethnic war and a genocide were each excluded. 




genocide, because it was a direct governmental response. [I classify these both as 
responses because the local Arab militias took on a government role of using terror as 
they took over the anti-insurgency role from the government.] 
Rebellion breaks out in Darfur region in western Sudan in February 2003 
followed by army offensive in March; violence quickly escalates as local Arab
militias take over anti-insurgency role [ethnic war]. Government backs local, 
Arab janjaweed militias and encourages them to terrorize suspected supporters of 
separatist rebels; victims groups include Fur, Zaghawa, Masaleit, and other n n-
Arab peoples of the Darfur region [genocide]. 
 
In Iran from 1981 to 1992, a revolutionary war was excluded based on the use of terror so 
the corresponding government response of a genocide by the government was excluded 
based on:  
To consolidate Islamic revolution, Khomeini government violently suppresses 
dissident Muslims (Mujahedin) and rebel Kurds, selectively executes prominent 
Baha'is. 
 
Excluding the government response-instability events to the preceding instability 
events that included terror is premised on the notion that the government response-
instability event would likely not have occurred without the instability event that included 
terror tactics. It is a conservative data strategy to avoid confounding the dependent and 
independent variable. It is not without weaknesses, which are discussed later in the 
appendix.  
Step 3 
For the third prong of my data strategy, I dropped all terrorism incidents from the 
Global Terrorism Database in which any of the targets of the incident was military. The 
reasoning for doing so is as follows. Two of the instability types in the PITF data involve 
war: ethnic war and revolutionary war. Unfortunately, there are few clear ut boundaries 




that are part of a larger campaign in an ethnic war or a revolutionary war. Because of this 
lack of conceptual clarity, it is conceivable that terrorist incidents included in the GTD 
may have been used as evidence in support of the determination of an ethnic war or a 
revolutionary war instability event. For this reason, I exclude all incidents in which any 
of the targets of the incident are a nation’s military to avoid confounding my depen nt 
and independent variables.  
I have also removed high casualty incidents (25 or more fatalities) perpetrated in 
Rwanda from April 1, 1994 until July 31, 1994 from the GTD as these incidents may 
have been part of the Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan genocide is part of a complex 
instability in the PITF data; the specific classification of this event is a genocide from 
4/1994 to 7/1994. These criteria resulted in the deletion of 4 incidents from the GTD, 
including the massacre of more than 1000 individuals in a Catholic Church. There were a 
total of 21 incidents in Rwanda between April 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994. Thus, the 
contamination of the GTD with individual genocide events is quite low, given that at 
least 500,000 individuals perished within the 100 days of the Rwandan genocide.  
Step 4 
A second possible area of concern are when genocides were perpetrated against 
civilian populations by armed rebel groups as evidenced by the inclusion of events that 
made up the Rwandan genocide in the GTD as terrorism events. It is possible that these 
instability events could have been picked up in the GTD and counted as terrorism 
incidents. For this reason, I exclude all of the genocides that were perpetrated by groups 
other than the government from the PITF data. This includes genocides perpetrated by 




them out. The following genocides were excluded so as to not run the risk of confounding 
the independent and dependent variables.  
In Angola, two separate genocides were excluded because the rebel group the e 
participated in it. 
Both Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels and 
government forces perpetrate destructive campaigns and atrocities against 
civilians throughout conflict (Genocide: 11/75-11/94). 
Targeting of civilian populations resumes with the break down to civil war 
(Genocide: 12/98-3/02). 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a genocide was excluded based on the following. 
Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to “ethnic cleansing” measures including 
destruction of property, forced resettlement, and execution mainly by Serb and 
some Croat forces (Genocide: 5/92-11/95). 
 
In Burundi, a genocide was excluded based on the following narrative.  
 
Subsequent armed clashes and massacres occur in three waves: Tutsi soldiers 
against Hutu civilians, Hutus against Tutsis, and Tutsi against Hutus (Genocide: 
10/93-12/93). 
 
In Sudan, genocide was perpetrated by rebel militia groups, among others, and so was 
excluded.  
Non-Muslim supporters of secession are targeted for destruction by indiscriminate 
military attacks, massacres by government-supported tribal militias, and 
government-induced privation and population displacement; targeting of civilian 
population ends in October 2002 as part of peace talks and opening of conflict 
areas to relief agencies (Genocide: 9/83-10/02). 
 
Excluding these instability events is an important, but conservative step to guard 
against confounding the independent and dependent variable. Since I do not actually 
know that there was any overlap between, this strategy is not technically necessary, but it 
is important to ensure that there is little to no chance of confounding instability and 




Possibility of False Negatives 
Searching for terrorism campaigns in the PITF narratives by searching for “terror” 
may undercount the amount of terrorism uncovered in the PITF narrative, thus leading to 
the possibility of false negatives. The false negatives would be instability events that did 
involve terrorism and should have been excluded. After very careful review of all of the
narratives, I determined that the danger of these false negatives was low. However, for 
the sake of transparency, I have included examples of the instability events that I 
reviewed and included. 
In Laos, a series of instabilities occurred from 1960 to 1979. I start including the 
instabilities once my observation period begins, 1970. These instabilities were included 
in my data. 
Kong Le seizes power in an attempt to form a neutralist government; government 
remains locked in bitter struggle between neutralist, rightists, and communists 
until the ending of the war in neighboring Vietnam provides opportunity for the 
Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP; Pathet Lao) to establish one-party rule 
(Regime Change: 1/60-12/75). Military coup sparks sustained conflict as rebels 
fight unsuccessfully to overthrow rightist Somsanith regime (Revolutionary w: 
9/60-5/62). Hmong (Meo) rebels encouraged to fight Pathet Lao; rebellion is 
suppressed after Pathet Lao takeover in 1975, no significant guerrilla activity after 
1979 (Ethnic war: 7/61-6/79). Neutralists and Conservatives join forces to oppose 
Communist Pathet Lao forces; resistance by rightist forces continues u til 1979 
(Revolutionary war: 3/63-3/79).  
 
In Comoros, two separate outbreaks of instability occurred. The first outbreak was in a 
regime change in 1976 and the second involved two regime changes from 1995 to 1999.  
Twenty-eight days after the declaration of independence a coalition of six 
political parties known as the United National Front ousts the Abdallah 
government. Democratic governance ends with the designation of Ali Soilih as 
head of state. 
 
Foreign-led mercenaries and disaffected Comorian troops overthrow elected 
government of President Djohar. French troops sent to the island one week later 




of Staff, Col. Assoumani Azzali, leads April 30, 1999 coup that dissolves 
constitution and government; promised transition to new elections based on 
Antananarivo agreement do not materialize. 
 
In the Central African Republic, from 2003 to the present, there were a series of 
instabilities. 
Following his dismissal as commander, troops loyal to Gen. Bozize mount 
challenge to elected government of President Patasse. Gen. Bozize succeeds in 
seizing power in March 2003 while Patasse is out of the country (Regime change: 
3/03). Supporters of ousted President Patasse in the north face retribution from the 
Bozize regime which draws its support from southerners. Open rebellion breaks 
out in the northwest in June 2005 and, then, in October 2006 in the northeast 
(Ethnic war: from 6/05).  
 
I turn now to the weaknesses of excluding data as I have done here.  
Weaknesses of the Data Exclusions 
Carving out all instability events that were coded based on the use of terror or on 
government reactions to terrorism is a necessary decision so that I do not include the 
same types of events in my dependent and independent variable such that any 
relationship between instability and terrorism could be due to predicting terrorism with 
terrorism (by another name).  
Carving out military targets from the GTD and genocides perpetrated by or in 
collusion with non-state actors from the PITF data are conservative decisions to guard 
against counting the same types of events in the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. To count the same types of events in the independent and dependent variable 
could mean that any relationship I find between instability and terrorism is purious due 
to predicting terrorism with terrorism. To be clear, I do not actually know with certainty 
that I would be predicting terrorism with terrorism in the military target and armed rebel 




cleaning step and excluded them from their respective data sets. However, to be clear, it 
is not without downsides. In a very real way, it does decrease the generalizability of this 
dissertation. Simply put, my dissertation cannot answer questions about the effects of 
political instability on terrorism that includes actions against the military nor of the 
effects of instability with genocides perpetrated by armed rebel groups on terrorism. This 
is a weakness of this strategy. However, the downside of hampering the generalizability 
of the study is outweighed by the risks of including events in the independent variable 
that could conceivably be included in the dependent variable. Finally, it should be noted 
that I have done more to ensure that my results are not hampered by possible overlap 
between the independent and dependent variables than others who have studied the 




Table 12. List of countries and years in sample 1 
Sample 1 Years in Sample Sample 2 Years in Sample Sample 3 Years in Sample 
      
Albania 1970-2005 Algeria 1981-2005 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997-2005 
Algeria 1970-2005 Argentina 1981-2005 Eritrea 1996-2005 
Angola 1975-2005 Armenia 1993-2005 Georgia 1996-2005 
Argentina 1970-2005 Australia 1981-2005 Belarus 1995-2005 
Armenia 1992-2005 Austria 1981-2005 Moldova 1995-2005 
Australia 1970-2005 Azerbaijan 1992-2005 Czech Republic 1994-2005 
Austria 1970-2005 Bahrain 1981-2005 Kazakhstan 1994-2005 
Azerbaijan 1992-2005 Bangladesh 1981-2005 Kyrgyzstan 1994-2005 
Bahrain 1971-2005 Belarus 1995-2005 Macedonia 1994-2005 
Bangladesh 1972-2005 Benin 1981-2005 Slovakia 1994-2005 
Belarus 1992-2005 Bolivia 1981-2005 Estonia 1993-2005 
Benin 1970-2005 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997-2005 Russia 1993-2005 
Bolivia 1970-2005 Botswana 1981-2005 Ukraine 1993-2005 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-2005 Brazil 1981-2005 Azerbaijan 1992-2005 
Botswana 1970-2005 Burkina Faso 1981-2005 Croatia 1992-2005 
Brazil 1970-2005 Burundi 1981-2005 Latvia 1992-2005 
Bulgaria 1970-2005 Cameroon 1981-2005 Lithuania 1992-2005 
Burkina Faso 1970-2005 Central African Republic 1981-2005 UK 1992-2005 
Burma 1970-2005 Chad 1981-2005 Zambia 1992-2005 
Burundi 1970-2005 Chile 1981-2005 Algeria 1990-2005 
Cambodia 1970-2005 China 1981-2005 Argentina 1990-2005 
Cameroon 1970-2005 Colombia 1981-2005 Australia 1990-2005 




Sample 1 Years in Sample Sample 2 Years in Sample Sample 3 Years in Sample 
      
Central African Republic 1970-2005 Congo-Kinshasa 1981-2005 Bangladesh 1990-2005 
Chad 1970-2005 Costa Rica 1981-2005 Bolivia 1990-2005 
Chile 1970-2005 Croatia 1992-2005 Botswana 1990-2005 
China 1970-2005 Cyprus 1981-2005 Brazil 1990-2005 
Colombia 1970-2005 Czech Republic 1993-2005 Burundi 1990-2005 
Congo-Brazzaville 1970-2005 Denmark 1981-2005 Cameroon 1990-2005 
Congo-Kinshasa 1970-2005 Dominican Republic 1981-2005 Chad 1990-2005 
Costa Rica 1970-2005 Egypt 1981-2005 Chile 1990-2005 
Croatia 1992-2005 El Salvador 1981-2005 China 1990-2005 
Cuba 1970-2005 Eritrea 1993-2005 Colombia 1990-2005 
Cyprus 1970-2005 Estonia 1993-2005 Congo-Kinshasa 1990-2005 
Czech Republic 1993-2005 Fiji 1981-2005 Costa Rica 1990-2005 
Denmark 1970-2005 Finland 1981-2005 Cyprus 1990-2005 
Djibouti 1977-2005 France 1981-2005 Dominican Republic 1990-2005 
Dominican Republic 1970-2005 Gabon 1981-2005 Egypt 1990-2005 
East Timor 2002-2005 Georgia 1996-2005 El Salvador 1990-2005 
Ecuador 1970-2005 Germany 1990-2005 Fiji 1990-2005 
Egypt 1970-2005 Ghana 1981-2005 France 1990-2005 
El Salvador 1970-2005 Greece 1981-2005 Germany 1990-2005 
Equatorial Guinea 1970-2005 Guatemala 1981-2005 Ghana 1990-2005 
Eritrea 1993-2005 Guinea 1981-2005 Greece 1990-2005 
Estonia 1992-2005 Guinea-Bissau 1981-2005 Guatemala 1990-2005 
Fiji 1970-2005 Guyana 1981-2005 Guinea 1990-2005 
Finland 1970-2005 Haiti 1981-2005 Guyana 1990-2005 




Sample 1 Years in Sample Sample 2 Years in Sample Sample 3 Years in Sample 
      
Gabon 1970-2005 Hungary 1981-2005 Hungary 1990-2005 
Georgia 1992-2005 India 1981-2005 India 1990-2005 
Germany 1990-2005 Indonesia 1981-2005 Indonesia 1990-2005 
Ghana 1970-2005 Ireland 1981-2005 Israel 1990-2005 
Greece 1970-2005 Israel 1981-2005 Italy 1990-2005 
Guatemala 1970-2005 Italy 1981-2005 Japan 1990-2005 
Guinea 1970-2005 Ivory Coast 1981-2005 Jordan 1990-2005 
Guinea-Bissau 1974-2005 Jamaica 1981-2005 Kenya 1990-2005 
Guyana 1970-2005 Japan 1981-2005 Korea, South 1990-2005 
Haiti 1970-2005 Jordan 1981-2005 Madagascar 1990-2005 
Honduras 1970-2005 Kazakhstan 1994-2005 Malaysia 1990-2005 
Hungary 1970-2005 Kenya 1981-2005 Mali 1990-2005 
India 1970-2005 Korea, South 1981-2005 Mauritania 1990-2005 
Indonesia 1970-2005 Kyrgyzstan 1994-2005 Morocco 1990-2005 
Iran 1970-2005 Latvia 1992-2005 Namibia 1990-2005 
Ireland 1970-2005 Lithuania 1992-2005 Nicaragua 1990-2005 
Israel 1970-2005 Macedonia 1994-2005 Niger 1990-2005 
Italy 1970-2005 Madagascar 1981-2005 Pakistan 1990-2005 
Ivory Coast 1970-2005 Malawi 1981-2005 Panama 1990-2005 
Jamaica 1970-2005 Malaysia 1981-2005 Peru 1990-2005 
Japan 1970-2005 Mali 1981-2005 Philippines 1990-2005 
Jordan 1970-2005 Mauritania 1981-2005 Rwanda 1990-2005 
Kazakhstan 1992-2005 Mauritius 1981-2005 Saudia Arabia 1990-2005 
Kenya 1970-2005 Mexico 1981-2005 Senegal 1990-2005 




Sample 1 Years in Sample Sample 2 Years in Sample Sample 3 Years in Sample 
      
Kyrgyzstan 1992-2005 Morocco 1981-2005 Spain 1990-2005 
Laos 1970-2005 Mozambique 1981-2005 Sri Lanka 1990-2005 
Latvia 1992-2005 Namibia 1990-2005 Sudan 1990-2005 
Lebanon 1970-2005 Nepal 1981-2005 Switzerland 1990-2005 
Lesotho 1970-2005 Netherlands 1981-2005 Syria 1990-2005 
Liberia 1970-2005 Nicaragua 1981-2005 Thailand 1990-2005 
Libya 1970-2005 Niger 1981-2005 United States 1990-2005 
Lithuania 1992-2005 Nigeria 1981-2005 Venezuela 1990-2005 
Macedonia 1993-2005 Pakistan 1981-2005 Zimbabwe 1990-2005 
Madagascar 1970-2005 Panama 1981-2005   
Malawi 1970-2005 Papua New Guinea 1981-2005   
Malaysia 1970-2005 Peru 1981-2005   
Mali 1970-2005 Philippines 1981-2005   
Mauritania 1970-2005 Portugal 1981-2005   
Mauritius 1970-2005 Russia 1993-2005   
Mexico 1970-2005 Rwanda 1981-2005   
Moldova 1992-2005 Saudia Arabia 1981-2005   
Morocco 1970-2005 Senegal 1981-2005   
Mozambique 1975-2005 Slovakia 1993-2005   
Namibia 1990-2005 Slovenia 1992-2005   
Nepal 1970-2005 South Africa 1981-2005   
Netherlands 1970-2005 Spain 1981-2005   
Nicaragua 1970-2005 Sri Lanka 1981-2005   
Niger 1970-2005 Sudan 1981-2005   




Sample 1 Years in Sample Sample 2 Years in Sample Sample 3 Years in Sample 
      
North Korea 1970-2005 Sweden 1981-2005   
Norway 1970-2005 Switzerland 1981-2005   
Pakistan 1972-2005 Syria 1981-2005   
Panama 1970-2005 Tajikistan 1992-2005   
Papua New Guinea 1975-2005 Thailand 1981-2005   
Paraguay 1970-2005 The Gambia 1981-2005   
Peru 1970-2005 Togo 1981-2005   
Philippines 1970-2005 Trinidad and Tobago 1981-2005   
Poland 1970-2005 Tunisia 1981-2005   
Portugal 1970-2005 Turkey 1981-2005   
Qatar 1971-2005 UK 1981-2005   
Romania 1970-2005 Ukraine 1993-2005   
Russia 1992-2005 United Arab Emirates 1981-2005   
Rwanda 1970-2005 United States 1981-2005   
Saudia Arabia 1970-2005 Venezuela 1981-2005   
Senegal 1970-2005 Yemen 1991-2005   
Sierra Leone 1970-2005 Zambia 1981-2005   
Slovakia 1993-2005 Zimbabwe 1981-2005   
Slovenia 1992-2005     
Solomon Islands 1978-2005     
Somalia 1970-2005     
South Africa 1970-2005     
Spain 1970-2005     
Sri Lanka 1970-2005     




Sample 1 Years in Sample Sample 2 Years in Sample Sample 3 Years in Sample 
      
Swaziland 1970-2005     
Sweden 1970-2005     
Switzerland 1970-2005     
Syria 1970-2005     
Tajikistan 1992-2005     
Tanzania 1970-2005     
Thailand 1970-2005     
The Gambia 1970-2005     
Togo 1970-2005     
Trinidad and Tobago 1970-2005     
Tunisia 1970-2005     
Turkey 1970-2005     
Uganda 1970-2005     
UK 1970-2005     
Ukraine 1992-2005     
United Arab Emirates 1971-2005     
United States 1970-2005     
Uruguay 1970-2005     
Uzbekistan 1992-2005     
Venezuela 1970-2005     
Vietnam 1976-2005     
Yemen 1990-2005     
Zambia 1970-2005     
Zimbabwe 1970-2005     




Table 13. Full distribution of terrorism incidents for all samples 
Incidents  Sample 1 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents Sample 2 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents  Sample 3 Cumulative 
Percentage 
         
0 2,358 50.31 0 1,105 42.11 0 434 34.94 
1 514 61.28 1 299 53.51 1 136 45.89 
2 286 67.38 2 168 59.91 2 98 53.78 
3 190 71.43 3 105 63.91 3 51 57.89 
4 136 74.33 4 86 67.19 4 38 60.95 
5 102 76.51 5 69 69.82 5 39 64.09 
6 83 78.28 6 51 71.76 6 29 66.43 
7 56 79.48 7 37 73.17 7 18 67.87 
8 42 80.37 8 25 74.12 8 11 68.76 
9 41 81.25 9 26 75.11 9 10 69.57 
10 44 82.18 10 32 76.33 10 17 70.93 
11 39 83.02 11 25 77.29 11 17 72.3 
12 28 83.61 12 18 77.97 12 10 73.11 
13 25 84.15 13 18 78.66 13 7 73.67 
14 24 84.66 14 17 79.31 14 8 74.32 
15 24 85.17 15 17 79.95 15 10 75.12 
16 28 85.77 16 18 80.64 16 7 75.68 
17 22 86.24 17 19 81.36 17 13 76.73 
18 23 86.73 18 16 81.97 18 9 77.46 
19 17 87.09 19 11 82.39 19 7 78.02 
20 15 87.41 20 8 82.7 20 4 78.34 
21 14 87.71 21 13 83.19 21 8 78.99 
22 19 88.12 22 13 83.69 22 10 79.79 
23 24 88.63 23 16 84.3 23 8 80.43 
24 9 88.82 24 6 84.53 24 1 80.52 
25 11 89.05 25 8 84.83 25 7 81.08 
26 9 89.25 26 8 85.14 26 5 81.48 
27 11 89.48 27 10 85.52 27 6 81.96 
28 11 89.72 28 9 85.86 28 4 82.29 
29 12 89.97 29 9 86.2 29 7 82.85 
30 12 90.23 30 9 86.55 30 8 83.49 
31 8 90.4 31 3 86.66 31 1 83.57 
32 6 90.53 32 3 86.78 32 1 83.66 
33 9 90.72 33 7 87.04 33 5 84.06 
34 5 90.83 34 3 87.16 34 2 84.22 
35 7 90.98 35 6 87.39 35 4 84.54 
36 6 91.1 36 6 87.61 36 4 84.86 




Incidents  Sample 1 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents Sample 2 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents  Sample 3 Cumulative 
Percentage 
         
38 18 91.66 38 14 88.34 38 12 86.07 
39 4 91.74 39 3 88.45 39 2 86.23 
40 6 91.87 40 6 88.68 40 1 86.31 
41 8 92.04 41 6 88.91 41 4 86.63 
42 3 92.11 42 2 88.99 42 1 86.71 
43 6 92.23 43 5 89.18 43 3 86.96 
44 5 92.34 44 5 89.37 44 4 87.28 
45 6 92.47 45 5 89.56 45 2 87.44 
46 6 92.6 46 5 89.75 46 4 87.76 
47 7 92.75 47 4 89.9 47 1 87.84 
48 3 92.81 48 1 89.94 49 2 88 
49 4 92.9 49 2 90.02 50 1 88.08 
50 2 92.94 50 1 90.05 51 2 88.24 
51 3 93 51 3 90.17 52 1 88.33 
52 3 93.07 52 1 90.21 53 1 88.41 
53 3 93.13 53 1 90.24 54 1 88.49 
54 3 93.19 54 3 90.36 56 2 88.65 
55 2 93.24 55 1 90.4 57 2 88.81 
56 5 93.34 56 3 90.51 58 2 88.97 
57 3 93.41 57 2 90.59 59 1 89.05 
58 4 93.49 58 3 90.7 60 1 89.13 
59 2 93.54 59 2 90.78 61 2 89.29 
60 2 93.58 60 2 90.85 62 5 89.69 
61 4 93.66 61 4 91.01 63 3 89.94 
62 8 93.83 62 8 91.31 64 2 90.1 
63 4 93.92 63 3 91.43 65 2 90.26 
64 3 93.98 64 2 91.5 66 2 90.42 
65 5 94.09 65 4 91.65 68 1 90.5 
66 3 94.15 66 3 91.77 70 2 90.66 
68 5 94.26 68 3 91.88 72 2 90.82 
69 1 94.28 70 2 91.96 73 2 90.98 
70 4 94.37 71 1 92 74 3 91.22 
71 3 94.43 72 2 92.07 75 1 91.3 
72 3 94.5 73 2 92.15 76 2 91.47 
73 2 94.54 74 4 92.3 78 4 91.79 
74 5 94.64 75 1 92.34 79 4 92.11 
75 1 94.67 76 2 92.42 80 2 92.27 
76 2 94.71 77 1 92.45 81 3 92.51 
77 2 94.75 78 4 92.61 82 3 92.75 




Incidents  Sample 1 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents Sample 2 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents  Sample 3 Cumulative 
Percentage 
         
79 4 94.92 80 3 92.87 85 2 93 
80 5 95.03 81 4 93.03 86 1 93.08 
81 7 95.18 82 3 93.14 89 1 93.16 
82 3 95.24 84 2 93.22 94 2 93.32 
84 3 95.31 85 2 93.29 96 1 93.4 
85 4 95.39 86 2 93.37 99 2 93.56 
86 2 95.43 87 1 93.41 100 2 93.72 
87 2 95.48 89 1 93.45 101 1 93.8 
89 1 95.5 92 1 93.48 102 2 93.96 
92 1 95.52 93 1 93.52 104 1 94.04 
93 1 95.54 94 3 93.64 105 2 94.2 
94 4 95.63 95 1 93.67 107 1 94.28 
95 1 95.65 96 4 93.83 109 1 94.36 
96 4 95.73 98 3 93.94 111 2 94.52 
97 1 95.75 99 3 94.05 116 1 94.61 
98 3 95.82 100 3 94.17 117 1 94.69 
99 3 95.88 101 1 94.21 123 2 94.85 
100 3 95.95 102 3 94.32 124 2 95.01 
101 2 95.99 104 2 94.4 126 1 95.09 
102 3 96.05 105 3 94.51 127 1 95.17 
104 2 96.1 106 2 94.59 129 1 95.25 
105 3 96.16 107 1 94.63 130 2 95.41 
106 2 96.2 108 1 94.66 132 1 95.49 
107 5 96.31 109 1 94.7 133 1 95.57 
108 2 96.35 111 2 94.78 134 3 95.81 
109 1 96.37 113 2 94.86 135 1 95.89 
111 2 96.42 114 1 94.89 136 1 95.97 
113 2 96.46 116 2 94.97 143 1 96.05 
114 1 96.48 117 1 95.01 145 1 96.14 
115 1 96.5 119 1 95.05 148 2 96.3 
116 2 96.54 120 2 95.12 149 1 96.38 
117 1 96.56 123 3 95.24 152 1 96.46 
118 1 96.59 124 2 95.31 153 1 96.54 
119 2 96.63 125 2 95.39 154 2 96.7 
120 2 96.67 126 2 95.46 155 1 96.78 
122 2 96.71 127 1 95.5 160 2 96.94 
123 3 96.78 129 2 95.58 163 1 97.02 
124 2 96.82 130 2 95.66 164 1 97.1 
125 2 96.86 132 1 95.69 169 2 97.26 




Incidents  Sample 1 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents Sample 2 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents  Sample 3 Cumulative 
Percentage 
         
127 1 96.93 134 5 95.92 177 2 97.5 
129 2 96.97 135 1 95.96 180 1 97.58 
130 2 97.01 136 2 96.04 187 1 97.67 
131 1 97.03 138 2 96.11 191 1 97.75 
132 1 97.06 139 1 96.15 192 1 97.83 
133 1 97.08 141 1 96.19 205 1 97.91 
134 5 97.18 143 2 96.27 209 1 97.99 
135 2 97.23 144 1 96.3 211 1 98.07 
136 2 97.27 145 1 96.34 214 1 98.15 
137 1 97.29 146 1 96.38 227 1 98.23 
138 2 97.33 147 1 96.42 231 1 98.31 
139 2 97.38 148 3 96.53 234 1 98.39 
141 2 97.42 149 1 96.57 249 1 98.47 
143 2 97.46 151 1 96.61 261 1 98.55 
144 1 97.48 152 1 96.65 262 1 98.63 
145 1 97.5 153 1 96.68 263 1 98.71 
146 1 97.53 154 2 96.76 269 1 98.79 
147 1 97.55 155 1 96.8 278 1 98.87 
148 3 97.61 156 1 96.84 284 1 98.95 
149 2 97.65 157 1 96.87 328 1 99.03 
151 1 97.67 160 3 96.99 330 1 99.11 
152 1 97.7 163 1 97.03 334 1 99.19 
153 2 97.74 164 1 97.07 337 1 99.28 
154 3 97.8 165 1 97.1 341 1 99.36 
155 1 97.82 167 1 97.14 348 1 99.44 
156 1 97.85 169 2 97.22 363 1 99.52 
157 2 97.89 174 1 97.26 390 1 99.6 
159 1 97.91 177 3 97.37 463 1 99.68 
160 3 97.97 180 1 97.41 477 1 99.76 
163 2 98.02 182 1 97.45 571 1 99.84 
164 1 98.04 186 2 97.52 609 1 99.92 
165 1 98.06 187 1 97.56 645 1 100 
 167 1 98.08 191 1 97.6    
169 3 98.14 192 1 97.64 Total 1,242  
174 2 98.19 195 1 97.68    
177 3 98.25 197 1 97.71    
180 1 98.27 204 1 97.75    
182 2 98.31 205 1 97.79    
184 1 98.34 207 1 97.83    




Incidents  Sample 1 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents Sample 2 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents  Sample 3 Cumulative 
Percentage 
         
187 1 98.4 211 1 97.9    
191 1 98.42 214 1 97.94    
192 1 98.44 225 1 97.98    
195 1 98.46 227 1 98.02    
197 2 98.51 231 1 98.06    
200 1 98.53 233 1 98.09    
202 1 98.55 234 1 98.13    
204 1 98.57 237 1 98.17    
205 1 98.59 242 1 98.21    
207 1 98.61 243 1 98.25    
209 2 98.66 249 1 98.29    
210 1 98.68 259 1 98.32    
211 1 98.7 261 2 98.4    
214 1 98.72 262 1 98.44    
225 1 98.74 263 1 98.48    
227 1 98.76 269 1 98.51    
231 1 98.78 272 1 98.55    
233 1 98.81 278 1 98.59    
234 1 98.83 283 1 98.63    
237 1 98.85 284 1 98.67    
242 1 98.87 292 3 98.78    
243 1 98.89 302 1 98.82    
244 1 98.91 313 1 98.86    
249 1 98.93 315 1 98.89    
259 1 98.95 317 1 98.93    
261 2 99 319 1 98.97    
262 1 99.02 328 1 99.01    
263 1 99.04 330 1 99.05    
269 1 99.06 334 1 99.09    
272 2 99.1 337 1 99.12    
278 1 99.13 340 1 99.16    
283 1 99.15 341 1 99.2    
284 1 99.17 348 1 99.24    
292 3 99.23 349 1 99.28    
295 1 99.25 351 1 99.31    
296 1 99.27 363 1 99.35    
302 1 99.3 376 1 99.39    
304 1 99.32 390 1 99.43    
313 1 99.34 417 1 99.47    




Incidents  Sample 1 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents Sample 2 Cumulative 
Percentage 
Incidents  Sample 3 Cumulative 
Percentage 
         
317 1 99.38 442 1 99.54    
319 1 99.4 459 1 99.58    
328 1 99.42 463 1 99.62    
330 1 99.45 477 1 99.66    
334 1 99.47 481 1 99.7    
337 1 99.49 523 1 99.73    
340 1 99.51 540 1 99.77    
341 1 99.53 556 1 99.81    
348 1 99.55 571 2 99.89    
349 1 99.57 593 1 99.92    
351 1 99.59 609 1 99.96    
363 1 99.62 645 1 100    
376 1 99.64       
390 1 99.66 Total 2,624     
417 1 99.68       
432 1 99.7       
442 1 99.72       
459 1 99.74       
463 1 99.77       
477 1 99.79       
481 1 99.81       
523 1 99.83       
540 1 99.85       
556 1 99.87       
571 2 99.91       
593 1 99.94       
602 1 99.96       
609 1 99.98       
645 1 100       
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